Bava Metzia Daf 68 - Iska
Summary
- This segment presents a chain of sugyot in Bava Metzia 67b–68a on field-collateral custom and conditions, early repayment and cessation of produce consumption, the status of *nechiyata* and the conduct of Amoraim with Tosafot’s resolutions, an analogy to *sedeh ahuzah* and its rebuttal, two teachings from the elders of Mata Mehasya about *mashkanta*, Rava’s rejection of three commercial instruments, and the opening of the *iska* sugya establishing the need to pay the working partner wages. It rules that changing the local *minhag* on eviction requires a *kinyan*, that impending repayment halts further eating of produce, and that an ordinary *mashkanta* has a one-year floor and grants the lender first rights by *dina de-var metzra*. It rejects the arrangements of *tarshi Papunai*, *shetre Mechoznai*, and *chakirei Nershai*, even where later instruments tried to regularize them. It then defines the viable structure of *iska*, requiring wages like a *po’el batel*, and records tannaitic disputes over the minimum wage-equivalent and which animals or outputs suffice to offset labor without violating *ribbit*.
- Rav Pappa states that in a place where the *minhag* is to evict the lender from the field upon repayment, a lender can stipulate “*lo mistalekna*,” and that is binding; the question is the reverse case in *be-atra d'mesalki lo*, where the lender says “I am willing to be evicted.” Rav Pappa says no *kinyan* is needed, Rav Sheshet bar Rav Idi says a *kinyan* is needed, and the halakha rules that a *kinyan* is required. Rashi explains that without a *kinyan* it is mere “*dibura be'alma*,” and the lender can revert to the *minhag ha-medinah*.
- If the borrower says “*ezil v'ayti zuzei*,” the lender must stop eating the field’s produce because the funds are effectively ready in a place where the borrower may evict upon payment. If the borrower says “I will go exert effort and bring money,” Ravina permits continued eating, Mar Zutra bar Rav Mari forbids it, and the halakha rules the lender may no longer eat.
- Rav Kahana, Rav Pappa, and Rav Ashi do not eat via *nechiyata*, while Ravina does. Tosafot challenges Ravina in light of the earlier statement that a “צורבא מרבנן אפילו בנכייתא לא ניכול,” and notes that even views permitting *kitsutsa* concede that *nechiyata* is at least forbidden to a צורבא מרבנן; Rashi had stated that a תלמיד חכם must act stringently so that others not learn to be lax in prohibitions. Tosafot answers: Rabbeinu Tam suggests Ravina did not take the status of a צורבא מרבנן for himself; alternatively a variant reading places that stringency on Rafram, not Ravina; and a third approach reads Ravina’s “*nechiyata*” here as actually *kitsutsa*.
- Mar Zutra explains the rationale for permitting one who eats with *nechiyata* by analogy to *sedeh ahuzah*, where even if the redeemer consumes many fruits the Torah sets a fixed redemption of a sela per year, showing the monetary offset need not match fruit value. The opposing view rejects the analogy, asserting that *sedeh ahuzah* is *hekdesh* with its own redemption regime, while here it is a *halva'ah* where appearances of interest, “*mechzi ke-ribbit*,” forbid the structure.
- Rav Ashi reports from the elders of Mata Mehasya that “*stam mashkanta shata*,” and the practical outcome is that even in *be-atra d'mesalki*, the borrower may not evict the lender before one year of possession. Rav Ashi further reports that “*mashkanta*” means “dwelling by him,” making the lender the closest neighbor for *dina de-var metzra*, so if the owner sells the field the lender has the first right as the most proximate “neighbor.”
- Rava rules not like three practices: not like *tarshi Papunai*, not like *shetre Mechoznai*, and not like *chakirei Nershai*. The *tarshi Papunai* (Rav Pappa’s seasonal beer pricing) lets the buyer pay in Nisan at the higher Nisan price for beer delivered when cheap, which reads as charging more for time and thus *ribbit* from the buyer’s perspective. The *shetre Mechoznai* capitalize expected profit into principal in the *shtar*, which is improper since profit is uncertain; Mar bar Amimar says Amimar would believe merchants who claimed no profit, but Rav Ashi objects that heirs holding the *shtar* will demand the fixed sum, and indeed “כשגגה שיוצא מלפני השליט,” Amimar then died. The *chakirei Nershai* structure has the borrower give land as *mashkanta* and the lender then “leases it back” to the borrower, but it appears the lender never truly acquired to re-convey; later documents wrote “קנינו מיניה ושהה קמן עידן והדר חכרה,” to regularize it “שלא תנעול דלת בפני לווין,” yet this is nonetheless rejected: “ולאו מילתא היא.”
- The sugya frames *iska* as a hybrid: half *halva'ah* and half *pikadon*, with profits and losses split, to encourage investment without full *ribbit* concerns. Because the worker’s labor on the loan-half would otherwise constitute benefit to the investor, the arrangement requires paying wages like a *po'el batel* to avoid *ribbit*.
- The Mishnah prohibits seating a *chanvani* or giving funds to buy produce *le-machatzit sachar* unless he is also paid wages like a *po'el batel*. It likewise prohibits giving *tarnegolin* or *egalin ve'sayichin* on an assessed half-profit basis unless the worker receives pay for labor and sustenance, but permits accepting calves and foals for half until they reach “*meshulashin*,” and a donkey until it is “*to'enet*.”
- Abaye defines *po'el batel* as the differential between the harder trade the worker would perform and the easier current work. Both the shopkeeper case and the funds-to-buy-produce case are needed: one might have required more than *po'el batel* in the higher-*tircha* case, or allowed less than *po'el batel* in the lower-*tircha* case; the Mishnah fixes *po'el batel* as both necessary and sufficient.
- One Baraita records: Rabbi Meir allows any wage, great or small; Rabbi Yehuda says even sharing a bit of dip, “אפילו לא טבל עמו אלא בציר,” or a single fig, “ולא אכל עמו אלא גרוגרת אחת,” suffices; Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai requires full wages. A second Baraita forbids assessing goats, sheep, or anything that does not “do work and eat” for half, while Rabbi Yose b. Rabbi Yehuda permits goats for milk, sheep for wool, and chickens for eggs; the Tanna Kamma argues that *gizah* and *chalav* are insufficient to cover labor and sustenance. The analysis clarifies that for actual shearings and milk all agree they can suffice; the dispute is about *nesiovei* and *tostrei*, where the Tanna Kamma aligns with Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai’s full-wage view and Rabbi Yose b. Rabbi Yehuda aligns with Rabbi Yehuda’s minimal-wage view. A further Baraita allows a woman to rent a hen to her friend for two chicks, and in a case where one supplies the hen and the other the eggs while they split chicks, Rabbi Yehuda permits and Rabbi Shimon forbids; the justification for Rabbi Yehuda is that the egg-owner receives *beitzim muzrot*, which provide some compensatory benefit.
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