Megillah 7
Summary
- A teaching on Megillah 7a–b frames the dispute about Adar I versus Adar II around competing values, *ein ma’avirin al ha-mitzvot* versus *misamchin geulah legeulah*, and then expands into whether Esther is fully part of *Kitvei HaKodesh*, how Chazal justified writing and canonizing the Megillah, and what “*beruach hakodesh ne’emrah*” means. The narrative moves into core Purim mitzvot such as *matanot la-evyonim* and *mishloach manot*, includes stories that define minimum standards and social expectations for giving, and culminates in the famous statement about becoming intoxicated on Purim alongside the dangerous episode of Rabbah and Rabbi Zeira and its halachic ramifications. The daf ends by returning to the “*ein bein*” format with the difference between Shabbat and Yom Tov regarding *ochel nefesh* and *machshirei ochel nefesh*.
- A Gemara explains that Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Yosi reads the Megillah in Adar I because *ein ma’avirin al ha-mitzvot*, so the earliest opportunity is taken without passing it by. A Gemara explains that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel reads in Adar II because *misamchin geulah legeulah*, so Purim is placed near Pesach since both are redemptions and that consideration overrides *ein ma’avirin al ha-mitzvot*. A Terumat HaDeshen (רצד) rules that a *yahrzeit* for a parent who died in Adar of a non-leap year is observed in Adar I of a leap year, and he grounds this in the rule that unstated “Adar” in *nedarim* and *shetarot* means Adar I, and in the Purim sugya’s conclusion that *misamchin geulah legeulah* is a special reason limited to Purim-related mitzvot, while otherwise the default is *ein ma’avirin al ha-mitzvot*.
- A Tosafot questions applying *ein ma’avirin al ha-mitzvot* to choosing between two times for one mitzvah, and cites an approach that limits *ein ma’avirin* to a case where two mitzvot are before a person and the issue is which is first. A Minchat Asher (Rav Asher Weiss) distinguishes four similar principles—*zerizim makdimin la-mitzvot*, *shihuy mitzvah lo meshahin*, *chavivah mitzvah bi-sha’atah*, and *ein ma’avirin al ha-mitzvot*—and assigns each to its own halachic context rather than merging them as interchangeable.
- A Gemara derives Adar II from the phrase *le-kayem et iggeret ha-Purim ha-zot ha-shenit*, and it requires both *ha-shenit* and *bechol shanah ve-shanah* to exclude reading twice and to locate the proper month. A Gemara explains that Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Yosi uses *ha-shenit* to teach Rav Shmuel bar Yehudah’s idea that Purim was first established in Shushan and only later extended to the entire world. A Pnei Yehoshua answers how that can fit the Megillah’s earlier language by proposing that the first acceptance was driven by Mordechai’s directive or immediate gratitude and was not yet a binding obligation for future generations, especially given the concern of provoking hatred among the nations.
- A Gemara reports that Esther asks the sages *kav’uni le-dorot*, and they object that it will arouse *kin’ah* among the nations, to which Esther responds that the story is already recorded in the chronicles of Media and Persia. A Gemara reports that Esther then asks *ketav’uni le-dorot*, and the sages initially reply *halo katavti lakh shalishim*—three and not four—before they ultimately find a Torah allusion that authorizes writing the Megillah.
- Rashi explains *shalishim* as a tradition limiting mention of Amalek to three places in Tanakh, so a fourth is not added. A Ritva בשם בעלי התוספות explains *shalishim* as Shlomo HaMelech having only three books included, so Esther cannot add another. A Pnei Yehoshua and Maharatz Chayos explain *shalishim* as Torah, Nevi’im, and Ketuvim, rejecting any “fourth category” for Esther, and they say the sages initially lacked the *remez* that would permit adding it within the canon. A Gemara then says the sages accept it once they interpret *ketov zot zikaron ba-sefer* as a multi-part allusion, with a Tannaitic dispute whether *ba-sefer* refers to Nevi’im/ Ketuvim or specifically to the Megillah, and Rabbi Elazar HaModa’i reads *ba-sefer* as what is written in the Megillah.
- A teaching in *Ikvei HaTzon* (page קלה) explains that “זאת” aligns with Torah as clarity of *zeh*, “זכרון” aligns with Nevi’im as *hazkarah* and spoken proclamation, and “בספר” aligns with Ketuvim as texts given to be written and learned rather than originally proclaimed. A citation contrasts the Rambam’s view that Nevi’im are a higher level of *ruach hakodesh* than Ketuvim with Rav Chaim’s view that Nevi’im are given to be said to others (*nib sefatayim*) while Ketuvim are given primarily to be written.
- Shmuel rules that Esther does not render hands impure, using the rabbinic decree that *Kitvei HaKodesh* are *metamei yadayim* to prevent kohanim from storing *terumah* with scrolls and attracting rodents. A Gemara challenges this because Shmuel also holds that Esther was said *beruach hakodesh*, and it answers that it was said to be read but not to be written, with Rashi explaining that it was given for oral study and recitation rather than full written status. A Baraita in the style of Masechet Yadayim lists disputes about Kohelet and Shir HaShirim and states that Ruth, Shir HaShirim, and Esther are *metamei yadayim*, and the Gemara resolves Shmuel as following Rabbi Yehoshua who does not include Esther.
- A Baraita reports Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s view that Kohelet is not *metamei yadayim* because it is Shlomo’s wisdom rather than *ruach hakodesh*. A Baraita rejects this by citing Shlomo’s vast output of *meshalim* and the verse *al tosif al devarav*, treating the canonized works as fixed and not optional selections.
- A Baraita gives multiple proofs that Esther was said *beruach hakodesh*: Rabbi Eliezer from *vayomer Haman be-libo*, Rabbi Akiva from *noseit chen be-einei kol ro’eha*, Rabbi Meir from *vayivada ha-davar le-Mordechai*, Rabbi Yosi ben Dormaskit from *u-va-bizah lo shalchu et yadam*, Shmuel from *kiyemu ve-kiblu* as *kiyemu le-ma’alah*, Rabbi Yosi from *lo ya’avru*, and Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak from *ve-zikhram lo yasuf mi-zar’am*. A Turei Even questions Rabbi Meir’s proof because knowledge revealed to Mordechai could still be reported by a narrator without implying the book itself was written *beruach hakodesh*. A Ye’arot Devash answers that Mordechai’s extraordinary humility makes it unlikely he would write “it became known to Mordechai” as self-credit unless compelled by *ruach hakodesh* to preserve the exact phrasing. Rava says all proofs except Shmuel’s have refutations, treating Haman’s thoughts as obvious inference, Esther’s universal favor as explainable by each imagining her as their own nation, Mordechai’s knowledge as possibly via human channels, and the spoils report as something people could have communicated.
- A Rambam at the end of Hilchot Megillah rules that all Nevi’im and Ketuvim will be *batel* in the days of Mashiach except Megillat Esther, which remains like the Five Books of Torah and like the halachot of Torah SheBe’al Peh that never cease, citing *lo ya’avru* and *lo yasuf*. A Raavad rejects this as *divrei hedyotot* and argues that no book becomes void because each contains learning, and he interprets Chazal as meaning that the public obligation of *mikra megillah* remains even if other readings are not obligatory.
- Rav Yosef teaches that *mishloach manot ish le-re’eihu* means two gifts to one person, while *matanot la-evyonim* means two gifts to two poor people. A Terumat HaDeshen (סימן קי"א) rules that sending clothing does not fulfill *mishloach manot* because the purpose is ensuring everyone has sufficient provisions for the Purim meal. A Manot HaLevi (R. Shlomo Alkabetz) grounds *mishloach manot* in fostering *ahavah ve-achvah ve-shalom ve-re’ut*, and he frames even a sefer as a fitting “portion,” matching the practice of giving Torah gifts as Purim offerings.
- A Binyan Tziyon (Aruch LaNer) asserts as a chumra that *mishloach manot* requires delivery via a *shaliach* because it is phrased as “sending,” and many poskim do not accept this as essential, while some fulfill it once through a messenger to satisfy the view. A report about Rabbi Yehudah Nesi’ah sending Rabbi Oshaya meat and wine raises a textual issue where some versions omit “*matanot la-evyonim*,” and a Yerushalmi-based reading in R. Chananel and the Ritva describes a two-stage sending in which the first gift is dismissed as not sufficiently *chashuv* for that recipient until a more substantial gift is sent.
- A story has Rava sending a basket of dates and roasted flour via Abaye, Abaye criticizing the choice as too ordinary, and the recipient responding with ginger and long peppers, prompting Abaye to remark that sweetness was met with sharpness. Abaye describes leaving Mar’s house satiated yet still eating sixty dishes and desiring the final “*tzli kdera*,” and he cites sayings that a poor person may not realize hunger and that there is always room for dessert. Abaye bar Ravin and R. Chanina bar Avin “exchange meals,” with Rashi reading this as alternating years and other readings understanding that each year they reciprocally send to fulfill *mishloach manot* despite limited means.
- Rava states that one is obligated to become intoxicated on Purim until one cannot distinguish between “*arur Haman*” and “*baruch Mordechai*,” and Rashi defines this as becoming drunk with wine. A narrative follows in which Rabbah and Rabbi Zeira feast together, become intoxicated, Rabbah slaughters Rabbi Zeira, and the next day prays and revives him, after which Rabbi Zeira declines repeating the joint feast the next year because *lo bechol sha’ah ve-sha’ah mitrachish nisa*. A view attributed to Rabbeinu Ephraim reads the sequence as indicating the statement is not *halachah le-ma’aseh*, while others read the story as confirming the obligation and warning only about relying on miracles. A citation of the Meiri, echoed in Biur Halachah, defines Purim joy as *simchah shel ta’anug* leading to love of Hashem and gratitude for miracles and not *hollelut* and *shtut*, and it directs a person who anticipates *kalut rosh* or missed mitzvot to avoid drunkenness and act *leshem shamayim*.
- Rava rules that a Purim meal eaten at night does not fulfill the obligation because the verse says *yemei mishteh ve-simchah*, indicating days. A story reports Rav Ashi learning this from Amimar, who had not heard the rule until it was repeated forty times and then held firmly “like something placed in his pocket.”
- A Mishnah states that the only difference between Yom Tov and Shabbat is *ochel nefesh* alone, while *machshirei ochel nefesh* are the same and thus forbidden. A Gemara identifies the Mishnah as not following Rabbi Yehudah, who permits even *machshirei ochel nefesh*, and it bases the dispute on the verses “*hu*” excluding preparatory acts versus “*lachem*” including all needs. A Gemara explains that “*lachem*” also excludes cooking for non-Jews and for dogs, and it limits Rabbi Yehudah’s inclusion to preparatory acts that could not have been done before Yom Tov.
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