Sanhedrin Daf 09 - How Many Judges for Motzi Shem Ra, Hazama on Motzi Shem Ra
Summary
- The shiur advances five further explanations of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Chachamim over whether a case of *motzi shem ra* requires three or twenty‑three dayanim, tying each explanation to classic disputes about a knowledgeable offender’s need for *hatra'ah*, warnings limited to lashes, a *karov o pasul* among multiple *edim*, whether the *edim* themselves must warn, and contradictions in *bedikot* rather than *chakirot*. It then analyzes how to apply כאשר זמם לעשות לאחיו and קם ליה בדרבה מיניה to *edim zomemin* in *motzi shem ra*, identifying when only one punishment applies and when ממון לזה ונפשות לזה allows both. It closes by setting up the sugya of אין אדם משים עצמו רשע and *palginan dibura*.
- Rav Pappa says the case is an אשה חברה and aligns the dispute with רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה versus the Rabbanan about whether a *chaver* needs *hatra'ah*. רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה holds חבר אין צריך התראה לפי שלא ניתנה התראה אלא להבחין בין שוגג למזיד, so the case remains *dinei nefashot* and needs twenty‑three; the Rabbanan require *hatra'ah* even for a *chaver*, leaving only *dinei mamonot* and three dayanim.
- Maharam of Rothenburg asks why a warned non‑*chaver* still must say אף על פי כן to be חייב מיתה if *hatra'ah*’s knowledge is already explicit, whereas a *chaver*—who “already knows”—does not need to be מתיר עצמו למיתה. He answers that a non‑*chaver* may suspect the warning is exaggeration, so אף על פי כן verifies real comprehension, while a *chaver* certainly knows the consequences are real and not a גוזמא.
- Rambam (Issurei Bi’ah 1:3) rules like the Rabbanan that a *chaver* requires *hatra'ah*, yet he uses רבי יוסי’s formulation לא ניתנה התראה אלא להבחין בין שוגג למזיד. Maggid Mishneh explains that Rambam’s לשון concerns intent about the מעשה (e.g., misidentifying an ערוה), whereas רבי יוסי in the Gemara speaks about knowledge of the עונש; thus Rambam can adopt the phrase while ruling that even a *chaver* needs *hatra'ah*.
- Rav Ashi posits that they warned for מלקות but not for מיתה and anchors the dispute in רבי ישמעאל versus the Rabbanan on how many dayanim are needed for מלקות. The novelty is that their machloket applies even to a לאו שניתן להזהרת מיתת בית דין within *motzi shem ra*, not only to a standard לאו, as indicated by רמי בר חמא and the Rabbanan.
- Ravina sets the case as שנמצא אחד מן העדים קרוב או פסול and connects it to רבי יוסי and Rabbi according to רבי עקיבא on whether one *karov o pasul* nullifies the entire *edut* when there are more than two. Rabbi Akiva says לא בא שלישי אלא להחמיר עליו לעשות דינו כיוצא באלו, derives ענש הכתוב את הנטפל לעוברי עבירה כעוברי עבירה and teaches ומה שנים נמצא אחד מהם קרוב או פסול עדותן בטלה, אף שלשה ... ומנין שאפילו מאה ... תלמוד לומר עדים. Rabbi Yosi limits that nullification to *dinei nefashot* and maintains by *dinei mamonot* the kosher *edim* stand; Rabbi says אחד דיני ממונות ואחד דיני נפשות, and he requires that nullification only when the *pasul* also gave the *hatra'ah*. In applying this to the Mishnah, Rabbi Meir treats the third, though *pasul* and not a warner, as joining to disqualify, reducing the case to *dinei mamonot* with three dayanim, while the Rabbanan count only those who gave *hatra'ah* as *edim*, preserving *dinei nefashot* and requiring twenty‑three.
- Rabbi Akiva’s מוסר השכל—ענש הכתוב את הנטפל לעוברי עבירה ... על אחת כמה וכמה שישלם שכר הנטפל לעושי מצוה כעושי מצוה—supports Rav Menashe Klein’s leniency about a participant at a siyum sharing in the recitation and celebration as a form of נטפל לעושי מצוה. The shiur analogizes this to ברוב עם הדרת מלך, including cases where many share a single mitzvah act (e.g., handing the blood for קרבן פסח from כהן to כהן) to magnify the mitzvah through broader participation.
- Sefer Kos Yeshuot notes that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbanan in our sugya are not precisely duplicating רבי יוסי and Rabbi, because evidence from another Mishnah shows רבי יוסי concedes to Rabbi in *dinei nefashot* about requiring *hatra'ah* and argues only regarding *dinei mamonot*. He thus refines Ravina’s mapping by distinguishing the scope of their disagreement.
- Rashi (Makkot 5b) reads Rabbi Akiva as agreeing with רבי שמעון that you punish the set of *edim* only if all of them become *zomemin*, learning that from והנה עד שקר העד and the unitary nature of a testimony group, and viewing לא בא שלישי אלא להחמיר עליו as adding liability where all three are *zomemin*. Tosafot in our sugya rejects that, holding Rabbi Akiva disagrees with רבי שמעון and would kill two of three *edim* if only those two became *zomemin*.
- Another answer sets the case as שהתרו בה אחרים ולא התרו בה עדים and bases the dispute on רבי יוסי versus the Rabbanan regarding whether only פי שני עדיו may warn. Rabbi Yosi requires על פי שנים עדים both for testimony and for *hatra'ah*, limiting the case to *dinei mamonot*, while the Rabbanan accept *hatra'ah* from others, preserving *dinei nefashot*.
- A final answer makes the case דאיתכחש בבדיקות ולא איתכחש בחקירות and ties it to בן זכאי and the Rabbanan, invoking the episode where בן זכאי examined עוקצי תאנים to trip up witnesses. Tosafot argues that even per Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam one still needs twenty‑three dayanim out of concern for other *edim* who may later arrive, while Maharam Shif cites Rashi (8b) that once *edim* have already come, we are not חושש לסהדי אחריני.
- Rav Yosef rules that when the husband’s *edim* are rendered *zomemin*, they are executed and do not pay, applying קם ליה בדרבה מיניה to their attempted combination of death and financial loss. Ramban asks why this is not a failure of כאשר זמם and answers that יש בכלל מאתיים מנה treats the higher punishment as encompassing the lesser, so כאשר זמם is considered fulfilled. When the husband later brings *edim* who render the father’s *edim* *zomemin*, those *edim* are נהרגין ומשלמין because it is ממון לזה ונפשות לזה, allowing both punishments to be applied. Tosafot ha‑Rosh and the Ran challenge this from Bava Kamma’s מדליק את הגדיש and from Rava’s ruling in רודף, noting apparent applications of קם ליה בדרבה מיניה even where liabilities target different people, and the Rishonim labor to resolve these tensions.
- The sugya concludes by preparing the analysis of אין אדם משים עצמו רשע and its interface with *palginan dibura*, where a statement may be split to accept incrimination of others while rejecting self‑incrimination.
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