Sanhedrin Daf 16 - Variety of Items that Require Sanhedrin Hagadol
Summary
- The sugya analyzes the Mishnah’s rule that only a Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges adjudicates a case of a shevet, establishes that a shevet either as a whole engaged in avodah zarah is judged by the great Sanhedrin for din (though executions are individual) or that a nasi shevet who sinned is tried there, and rejects applying seventy-one for shevet inheritance disputes. It sets numbers for an ir hanidachat through a machloket between Rabbi Yoshiya and Rabbi Yonatan and probes Rambam’s formulation, compares derashot from “ish ve’ishah” to Pesach Sheni, and examines “kol ha-shevet kulo” with rov ke-kulo and the mesorah that a full shevet is never destroyed. It derives that a navi sheker and a *Kohen Gadol* require seventy-one through scriptural links, explores whether a *shor* of a *Kohen Gadol* and his mamon require the great Sanhedrin, and cites Noda BiYehuda regarding an eved. It requires Sanhedrin approval to wage a *milchemet reshut*, illustrated by David HaMelech’s nightly regimen and the process of consulting Achitophel, the Sanhedrin, and the *Urim ve-Tumim*, and presents Meiri, Minchat Chinuch, and Sifrei on pikuach nefesh and war. It mandates seventy-one for expanding the city and azarot and distinguishes consecration of *klei sharet* in Moshe’s day by *meshicha* versus later by *avodah*, details instituting Sanhedriyyot and appointing judges and officers at national, tribal, and city levels, and concludes limitations on declaring an *ir hanidachat*, including number, geography, and border-town exclusions with the reason per Rabbi Shimon who is doresh ta‘ama dekra.
- The Gemara asks what case of a *shevet* requires the Sanhedrin of seventy-one and rejects a suggestion of generic sin like chillul Shabbat because distinctions between yachid and rabbim are reserved for avodah zarah. It examines *shevet* that became like an *ir hanidachat* and navigates the limits from the baraita: Rabbi Yoshiya sets “from ten to one hundred,” and Rabbi Yonatan “from one hundred to rov shevet,” implying beyond that it is not an *ir hanidachat*. Rav Matna establishes the case as a nasi shevet who sinned, supported by “כל הדבר הגדול יביאו אליך,” interpreted as דבריו של גדול going to the great Sanhedrin. Ulla in the name of Rabbi Elazar suggests inheritance disputes between shevatim, learning from the initial division of Eretz Yisrael, but the Gemara rejects this comparison since תחילתה had kalpi, *Urim ve-Tumim*, and kol Yisrael present, which are not required for later disputes.
- Ravina maintains the case can be a *shevet* that was הודח for avodah zarah, and resolves that even though executions occur as individuals, the judgment is by seventy-one because “והוצאת את האיש ההוא או את האשה ההיא” teaches “איש ואשה אתה מוציא לשערך ואי אתה מוציא כל השבט כולו לשערך.” The Gemara states that an entire *shevet* cannot be brought to the local Sanhedrin ketanah and must go to the Sanhedrin gedolah for din, while ketala remains individual.
- The baraita cites Rabbi Yoshiya: “מעשרה ועד מאה,” and Rabbi Yonatan: “ממאֵה ועד רובו של שבט,” delimiting the scope for *ir hanidachat*. Rashi reads the numbers as defining the size of the city, with majority of the city’s residents seduced, while Rambam (Avodat Kochavim 4:2) rules like Rabbi Yonatan yet writes “ויהיו המודחים ממאה ועד רובו של שבט,” seemingly counting the seduced rather than total residents, and then cites “יושבי העיר, לא כבר קטן ולא כרך גדול,” which sounds like city size, creating a difficulty in his formulation.
- Tosafot asks why “איש” at Pesach Sheni (Pesachim 66b) implies an ir could be נדחה, yet here “איש ואשה אתה מוציא לשעריך” excludes an ir or a *shevet* from local adjudication. Tosafot answers by context, since “שערך” suits individuals, not a whole city, and by textual nuance that multiple mi’utim like “איש ואשה” exclude the collective here, whereas Pesach Sheni has a single “איש.”
- The sugya states “כל השבט כולו לשערך,” and Rashi on 2a reads the operative case as רובו של שבט עובד ע״ז במזיד, with Maharsha explaining rov ke-kulo applies. Chidushei Remez notes the mesorah from Bava Batra that no *shevet* will be entirely destroyed, which underscores why the case is rov rather than kol.
- Rabbi Yosi bar Rabbi Chanina derives that a *navi sheker* is tried by seventy-one through a linkage to *zaken mamre*, initially suggested via *hazadah hazadah* and then established via a גזירה שוה of *davar davar* from “המראתו.” The Gemara rejects importing *hazadah hazadah* to require seventy-one for the execution of a *zaken mamre*, explaining that only *davar davar* is kabbalah; Rashi frames this as limits of mesorah for גזירה שוה, and Yad Ramah adds that the “hazadah” forms differ (“והאיש אשר יעשה בזדון” vs. “אך הנביא אשר יזיד”), so the precise match of *davar davar* governs.
- Rav Adda bar Ahava derives from “כל הדבר הגדול יביאו אליך” that דבריו של גדול require the great Sanhedrin, and a baraita clarifies that “דבר גדול” cannot mean only difficult matters because “הדבר הקשה” already appears, so “דבר גדול” teaches matters involving a great person. Rabbi Elazar asks whether a *shor* of a *Kohen Gadol* that killed is judged like the owner’s usual forum (seventy-one) or like ordinary owners’ forum (twenty-three), while Abaye implies that the *Kohen Gadol’s* mamon cases remain standard with three, and the hava amina of “כל הדבר הגדול” might have extended even mamon to seventy-one is rejected. Noda BiYehuda (Mahadura Tinyana, CM 7) extends the doubt to an eved of a *Kohen Gadol*, while his son rules an eved is certainly judged by twenty-three because the equation “כמיתת הבעלים כך מיתת השור” stems from “וגם בעליו יומת,” a special linkage for the *shor*, not for an eved.
- Rav Abbahu cites “ולפני אלעזר הכהן יעמד... וכל העדה” to include the Sanhedrin in war decisions, and Rav Acha bar Bizna in the name of Rabbi Shimon Chasida details David HaMelech’s nightly routine: a harp above his bed played at midnight, he learned Torah until dawn, the sages reported the people’s parnassah needs, he directed “לכו פשטו ידיכם בגדוד,” and they immediately took counsel with Achitophel, consulted the Sanhedrin, and asked the *Urim ve-Tumim*, then implemented by the general, as in “עורה כבודי עורה הנבל וכנור אעירה שחר.” The Yerushalmi records two views whether the harp played by itself or David played, with a practical difference for Shabbat. Anaf Yosef notes that the dialogue is a model of David’s daily governance rather than a literal daily war plan. Meiri limits Sanhedrin approval to *milchemet reshut* and not *milchemet mitzvah*, and Minchat Chinuch explains that war entails loss of life and overrides typical pikuach nefesh calculus for *milchemet mitzvah*, with Sifrei extending the war-nature rationale to *milchemet reshut*; Rav Schachter applies this to contemporary debates about land for peace and the status of *milchemet mitzvah*.
- Rav Shimi bar Chiya derives from “ככל אשר אני מראה אותך... וכן תעשו” that adding to the city and azarot requires the great Sanhedrin. Rava cites the baraita “כל הכלים שעשה משה משיחתן מקדשן, מכאן ואילך עבודתן מחנכתן,” and the Gemara resolves via “וימשחם ויקדש אתם” that Moshe’s generation used *meshicha*, while later generations consecrate by *avodah* per “אשר ישרתו בהם בקודש,” and “אותם” excludes later *meshicha* lest “וכן תעשו” lead to requiring both *meshicha* and *avodah* in later generations.
- The Gemara models Sanhedriyyot from Moshe standing in place of seventy-one. A baraita derives: “שופטים תתן” mandates judges for Israel; “שוטרים תתן” mandates officers; “שופטיך” and “לשבטיך” mandate judges and officers for each *shevet*; and “לשעריך” mandates judges and officers for each city. Rabbi Yehuda states “תתן לך” implies one supervisor over all, the great Sanhedrin, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel states “לשבטיך ושפטו” creates a mitzvah for each *shevet* to judge its own members.
- Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef in the name of Rabbi Oshaya derives that only seventy-one can declare an *ir hanidachat* because “איש ואשה אתה מוציא לשעריך ואי אתה מוציא כל העיר כולה לשעריך.” The Mishnah’s exclusion of a border town follows “מקרבך” and not “מן הספר,” and the limit of not three towns follows “אחת,” while “עריך” allows up to two. Rav sometimes limits the “no three” rule to one beit din, permitting multiple courts to declare multiple towns, and sometimes forbids even via multiple courts, due to “קרחה.” Reish Lakish permits three in separate places, while Rabbi Yochanan forbids three anywhere because of “קרחה,” and a baraita supports Rabbi Yochanan: one in Yehudah and one in the Galil are permitted, but two in one region are not, and near the border even one is not because “שמא ישמעו נכרים ויחריבו את ארץ ישראל,” presented per Rabbi Shimon who is doresh ta‘ama dekra.
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