Megillah 20
Summary
- An introduction to Megillah 20 continues the Mishnah about who may read the Megillah, contrasts the *cheresh shoteh v’katan* disqualification with רבי יהודה’s validation of a *katan*, and frames the debate around whether *chinuch* creates a personal obligation on the child or only an obligation on the father. A chain of sugyot then links *hashma’ah la’ozno* across *Keriat Shema*, *terumah*, and *Birkat HaMazon*, arriving at three Tannaitic positions and multiple conceptual “levels of speech.” The text then moves to the Mishnayot of daytime and nighttime mitzvot, explains why many acts require *netz hachamah* *lechatchilah* but are valid from *amud hashachar* *bedi’eved*, derives sources for the timing of Megillah, milah, tevillah, hazayah, and Temple avodah, and adds major Rishonim and Acharonim on timing, *zeman gerama*, women’s exemptions, and the special emphasis on early milah.
- A Mishnah states that all may read the Megillah except a *cheresh shoteh v’katan*, while רבי יהודה validates a *katan*. Tosafot asks how a *katan* can be *motzi* others if he is *higi’a l’chinuch* and therefore obligated *mid’rabbanan*, since everyone’s Megillah obligation is *mid’rabbanan*, and asks how he can be *motzi* anyone if he is not *higi’a l’chinuch*. Tosafot suggests that a “double *derabbanan*” cannot be *motzi* a “single *derabbanan*,” because a *katan* is a *gavra d’rabbanan* and Megillah is *d’rabbanan*, while a *gadol* is a *gavra d’oraita* even when his specific obligation here is *d’rabbanan*.
- The Ran quotes the Ramban that the Chachamim hold it is not proper for a *katan* even after *chinuch* to be *motzi* a *gadol*, because the mitzvah is not the child’s but the father’s, since the child is not obligated in mitzvot at all. The Ramban’s formulation explains רבי יהודה’s allowance only for Megillah because “כולם היו באותו הנס.” The Ran rejects this as unsatisfying because “אף הן היו באותו הנס” applies to people who are generally *bnei chiyuva* in mitzvot, such as women, but does not create obligation for one who has no category of obligation, and the Ran concludes that Tosafot’s approach is primary.
- The Rambam’s language is presented as inconsistent across halachot about whether *chinuch* reads as the father’s obligation or the child’s. In Hilchot Chametz u’Matzah (6), the Rambam writes that all are obligated in matzah “אפילו נשים וקטנים,” yet describes the *katan* with “מחנכין אותו,” and the Kesef Mishneh deduces that the *katan* is not personally obligated and the obligation lies on the father. In Hilchot Sukkah, Lulav, and Berachot, the Rambam uses language of personal obligation, such as “חייב בסוכה מדברי סופרים,” “חייב בלולב מדברי סופרים,” and “הקטנים חייבין בברכת המזון מדברי סופרים,” which suggests a different framing than matzah and Megillah.
- A Tosafot Yeshanim in Nazir is cited in connection with a father being *madir b’no* and what that implies about obligation. A reference is given to אשר וייס, Parashat Vayera, אות ה. A broader point is stated that even if the details of *chinuch* are *d’rabbanan*, the concept of training children to be בני ובנות תורה is treated as rooted in the Torah’s רצון, tied to *v’shinantam l’vanecha* and the verse “כי ידעתיו... למען יצוה את בניו ואת ביתו אחריו.”
- The sugya seeks to align the Mishnah with a known dispute about one who recites *Shema* without *hashma’ah la’ozno*. An initial approach reads the Mishnah as *chasuri mechasra* and attributes it wholly to רבי יהודה, distinguishing between two kinds of *ketanim*, where a *katan shelo higi’a l’chinuch* is invalid but a *katan shehigi’a l’chinuch* is valid even *lechatchilah* according to רבי יהודה. The Gemara then challenges the setup from a beraita that a *cheresh* who speaks but does not hear can separate terumah *lechatchilah*, which does not fit a view that permits only *bedi’eved* or forbids even *bedi’eved*.
- The text states that it cannot mean the produce remains *tevel* because lack of a berachah never prevents the act from taking effect. A Tosafot HaRosh in Berachot is cited that if a berachah were *d’oraita* it would be *me’akev*, and *Birkat HaTorah* is raised as possibly *d’oraita* according to the Ramban, linked to Nedarim’s “לא ברכו בתורה תחילה” and Rabbeinu Yonah’s explanation. The Sfat Emet expresses strong difficulty with the Gemara’s phrasing that for רבי יוסי “אפילו בדיעבד נמי לא,” since one obligated in a mitzvah who cannot recite the berachah must still do the mitzvah without it, and he offers an interpretive resolution that avoids treating the act as invalid while explaining the Gemara’s language.
- The Gemara resolves the contradictions by distinguishing between רבי יהודה’s own view and רבי יהודה quoting רבי אלעזר בן עזריה, and then concludes that once רבי מאיר’s position is introduced, the beraita about terumah can be רבי מאיר. רבי יהודה is presented as permitting without *hashma’ah la’ozno* even *lechatchilah*, רבי אלעזר בן עזריה as requiring it for *Shema*, and רבי מאיר as grounding the matter in “אחר כוונת הלב הן הן הדברים.” The text frames the conceptual issue as what counts as *dibbur* across a scale from *hirhur*, to mouthing without sound, to quiet speech, to *hashma’ah la’ozno*, to speaking *b’kol ram*, and asks whether the requirement is a *gezeirat hakatuv*, a *kavanah* enhancer, or definitional to *dibbur*.
- A baraita records רבי יהודה saying that as a *katan* he read Megillah before רבי טרפון and elders in Lod, and the reply is “אין מביאין ראיה מן הקטן.” Another baraita records רבי saying he read before רבי יהודה, and the reply is “אין מביאין ראיה מן המתיר,” with the Gemara explaining “חדא ועוד” that the speaker was a *katan* and even if he were an adult one cannot prove a ruling from the very authority who permits it. Tosafot Ri”d explains that even though a *katan* can testify as an adult about matters he saw in childhood for *mili d’rabbanan*, Megillah is treated as *דבר תורה* because *divrei kabbalah k’divrei Torah d’mi* and because a *remez* is found in the Torah for Megillah, so the child’s testimony is not accepted as proof.
- A Mishnah states that one does not read the Megillah, perform milah, immerse, do hazayah, or allow a *shomeret yom k’neged yom* to immerse until *netz hachamah*, while if they were done from *amud hashachar* they are valid. Rashi explains the *lechatchilah* delay as avoiding “ספק לילה,” and a question is raised whether this is merely epistemic or a halachic twilight-like status. The Sfat Emet contrasts this with *Keriat Shema* and *vatikin*, explaining that *Shema* is tied to “בשכבך ובקומך” and therefore does not share the same fixed daytime requirement.
- A derivation reads “והימים האלה נזכרים ונעשים” as “בימים ולא בלילה” for the daytime Megillah. The text asks whether that contradicts רבי יהושע בן לוי’s rule “חייב אדם לקרות את המגילה בלילה ולשנותה ביום,” and the Gemara answers that the Mishnah is teaching only the daytime requirement. A view of the בנין שלמה is brought that reads the nighttime reading as רבי יהושע בן לוי’s later enactment, while noting the difficulty of fitting this into the Gemara’s assumption.
- Milah is derived from “וביום השמיני ימול,” and Tosafot notes that the same verse is used elsewhere to derive “אפילו בשבת,” answering that the daytime derivation is simpler. Ravenu Efraim’s question is presented that if milah is only by day it should be *mitzvat aseh shehazman gerama* and women should be exempt without a special verse, yet Kiddushin derives exemption from a verse. Tosafot answers that one might have thought the *zman gerama* exemption does not apply where *karet* is involved, citing milah and korban Pesach, and adds an alternative that the verse addresses *milah shelo bizmanah* per an opinion allowing nighttime.
- The Ritva argues that the *zman gerama* exemption applies to *mitzvot sheb’gufan* but not necessarily to obligations relating to someone else, so one might have thought a mother is obligated to circumcise her son like *beit din*, requiring a verse to exempt her. The Minchat Chinuch uses this Ritva to suggest possible implications for *shevitat behemah* and *shevitat ha’aretz* in Shemitah, where the focus is outside the person. The Tosafot Ri”d suggests that milah’s “time” is not a fixed calendrical date but counted from birth, and further proposes that the father’s obligation includes ongoing involvement and preparations day and night, so the father’s mitzvah is not fully time-bound in the sense that triggers the *zman gerama* exemption. The Sfat Emet adds that milah may be result-oriented toward producing a *mahul*, which could also shift how time-boundness is evaluated.
- The Gemara asks why *shomeret yom k’neged yom* is singled out after “ולא טובלין,” and answers that one might have analogized her first sighting to the first sighting of a *zav* which is compared to *ba’al keri*, who immerses by day. The Gemara rejects allowing immersion that night because she requires *sefira*, and *sefira biyom hu*, so the counting unit is daytime.
- Rava initially derives the validity from *amud hashachar* from “ויקרא אלוהים לאור יום,” but the Gemara questions symmetry with night. Rav Zeira derives from the builders’ schedule “מעלות השחר עד צאת הכוכבים” together with “והיו לנו הלילה משמר והיום מלאכה,” establishing that *amud hashachar* is halachic day and that the verse is not merely reporting their personal practice.
- A Mishnah states that the entire day is valid for Megillah, Hallel, shofar, lulav, Mussaf prayer and korban Mussaf, *viduy* of bulls, *viduy ma’aser*, *viduy* Yom Kippur, *semichah*, *shechitah*, *tenufah*, *hagashah*, *kemitzah*, *haktarah*, *melikah*, *kabbalah*, *hazayah*, giving the sotah water, breaking the heifer’s neck, and purifying the metzora. The Rashba notes that korban Mussaf cannot literally be offered at any time because of other avodah constraints, and explains that “all day” means the inherent day-validity absent external scheduling limits. The Chizkei Chemed asks why milah is not listed, and the Aruch HaShulchan explains that it is omitted because milah has a special requirement of *zerizut* and should not be delayed, calling delayed milah for social reasons “עוון פלילי.”
- The Sfat Emet notes that despite the *lechatchilah* restriction until *netz*, the Mishnah does not similarly forbid performing daytime mitzvot after *sheki’ah* as a protective fence, and suggests a reason based on *chazakah*. The Sfat Emet states that at the end of the day, uncertainty is supported by a חזקה that it was day, while at the beginning of the day uncertainty is supported by a חזקה that it was night, which justifies greater stringency before *netz*.
- A Mishnah states that the entire night is valid for harvesting the omer and for burning fats and limbs, and gives the rule that anything whose mitzvah is by day is valid all day and anything whose mitzvah is by night is valid all night. The Meiri notes that the practice of saying Hallel on the night of Pesach is not listed and argues this omission is not proof against its existence.
- The Gemara derives daytime obligations from verses such as “ביום צותם,” “ממזרח שמש עד מבואו,” “זה היום עשה ה’,” “ולקחתם לכם ביום הראשון,” “יום תרועה יהיה לכם,” and “דבר יום ביומו,” and equates Mussaf prayer to Mussaf offerings. It derives *viduy* of bulls by *gezeirah shavah* of *kaparah* to Yom Kippur and anchors *viduy ma’aser* in the juxtaposition to “היום הזה.” It derives *semichah* and *shechitah* together from “וסמך ושחט” with “ביום זבחכם,” and derives *tenufah* from “ביום הניפכם,” *hagashah* by linking it to *tenufah*, and the remaining avodot from “ביום צותם.” Tosafot asks why *shechitah* needs a separate source if avodah is learned from “ביום צותם,” and answers that because *shechitah* is valid by a *zar* one might have thought it is valid at night, so a separate verse teaches it is only by day.
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