Sanhedrin Daf 59 - Bnei Noach and Shabbos, Torah, Milah, Pru U'rvu, Gid Hanashe
Summary
  • This shiur on Sanhedrin 58b presents R. Elazar’s severe stance on raising a hand to strike, Resh Lakish’s teachings on strength in landownership and labor, the prohibition for a non-Jew to observe Shabbat and to study Torah with its halachic ramifications, the Acharonim’s practical solutions for a safek Jew/*ben Noach* regarding Shabbat, the Rambam’s ruling that we punish but do not execute for these acts, the scope of *dam min hachai* and its derivations, and the rule “כל מצוה שנאמרה לבני נח ונשנית בסיני, לזה ולזה נאמרה” with its tests, exceptions (מילה and פרו ורבו), and resolutions. It then records Rav’s view that Adam was forbidden meat until Noach, derives exclusions (e.g., sheratzim), and fields challenges from verses about dominion over fish and birds by interpreting those as permissions for labor rather than for eating.
  • R. Elazar rules that one who raises his hand to strike “אין לו תקנה אלא קבורה,” deriving from “ואיש זרוע לו הארץ,” and he adds “לא ניתנה קרקע אלא לבעלי זרועות.” Resh Lakish expounds “עובד אדמתו ישבע לחם” to mean that only one who makes himself like a servant to the land will be satisfied by its yield, and otherwise he will not.
  • Resh Lakish rules “עובד כוכבים ששבת חייב מיתה,” deriving from “ויום ולילה לא ישבתו,” and the principle “אזהרה שלהן זו היא מיתתן” defines their warning as their death-penalty liability. Ravina extends the prohibition to designating any day as a Shabbat “אפילו שני בשבת,” and the חתם סופר explains the choice of Monday to avoid overlap with Shabbat occurring somewhere on earth on Sunday. The Gemara asks why this is not counted among שבע מצוות בני נח and answers that the list counts only שב ואל תעשה, while this prohibition functions as a קום ועשה; it resolves the challenge from דינים by noting that דינים includes both positive and negative elements.
  • The משנה למלך in Parashas Derachim argues that the Avot’s status oscillates between *bnei Noach* and Jews to the point that they themselves faced ספק, and he applies this to a foundling case in Horayot that yields a practical ספק for Shabbat. The מחנה in Kiddushin suggests that “ויום ולילה לא ישבתו” binds *bnei Noach* to day-before-night cycles, allowing avoidance of the prohibition by not resting for a “יום ולילה.” The חשק שלמה (in the name of R. Avraham Broda) suggests wearing ציצית on Shabbat to ensure ממה נפשך either fulfillment or חילול שבת via carrying; he notes the limitation in a community with an עירוב. The חתם סופר suggests appointing a שליח גוי or employing שנים שעשאוה to ensure ממה נפשך avoidance of violation as a Jew or violation as a non-Jew.
  • The Rambam (Hilchot Melachim 10:9) rules that an עכו"ם who keeps Shabbat, studies Torah, or innovates a religion is punished and informed that he is חייב מיתה “אבל אינו נהרג.” The Ran asks from the Gemara’s challenge “ולחשביה גבי ז' מצוות,” and the כסף משנה answers that the Gemara sought only to list the איסור among prohibitions, not to impose full חיוב מיתה. The ערוך לנר suggests the question follows the שיטה that a *ben Noach* is not executed for all שבע מצוות and asks to include *goy sheshavat* among the non-capital categories.
  • Rabbi Yochanan rules “עובד כוכבים שעוסק בתורה חייב מיתה,” deriving from “תורה צוה לנו משה מורשה לנו,” and the Gemara includes it under גזל if read מורשה or under עריות if read מאורסה. Tosafot haRosh asks from Chagigah 13 that “אין מוסרין דברי תורה לגוי” should already follow from לפני עיוור, and he answers that there is also a direct prohibition beyond לפני עיוור; Tosafot in Chagigah distinguishes חד עברא דנהרא, in which case לפני עיוור would not apply even as the direct prohibition still would. The תורי אבן explains that the גזל aspect applies only when the non-Jew learns independently, so teaching him is not גזל and thus needs the separate prohibition of “משפטים בל ידעום.” The מאירי limits the איסור to learning aimed at קיום עיקרי המצוות, permitting mere informational study; the נצי"ב (Meromei Sadeh) permits teaching if he will not be מחדש הלכות and even allows חידוש within שבע מצוות בני נח. The שלטי גבורים quotes the ריא"ז that לפני עיוור applies to תורת משה ומצוותיה, but teaching נביאים וכתובים for נחמה and to rebut אפיקורסות is permitted; the יהודה יעלה further rules that only *Torah shebe’al peh* is prohibited to teach, while *Torah shebikhtav* is open to all. Rav Schachter aligns with permitting *Torah shebikhtav* while warning that using Rashi or oral interpretations crosses into *Torah shebe’al peh*.
  • Rabbi Meir expounds “אשר יעשה אותם האדם וחי בהם” to teach that even an עובד כוכבים who studies Torah is like a כהן גדול, and the Gemara resolves this by limiting it to their שבע מצוות. Rashi associates “אדם” limitations with non-Jews, and Tosafot differentiates between “אדם” and “האדם” to harmonize usages.
  • Rabbi Chanina ben Gamliel includes “אף הדם מן החי” for *bnei Noach* from “אך בשר בנפשו דמו לא תאכלו,” reading “בשר בנפשו לא תאכל; דמו בנפשו לא תאכל.” The Rabbanan assign the phrase to permit שרצים from *eiver min hachai* via “רק חזק לבלתי אכול הדם כי הדם הוא הנפש,” or to prohibit blood drawn in a manner “שהנשמה יוצאה בו.”
  • Rabbi Yossi b’Rabbi Chanina states “כל מצוה שנאמרה לבני נח ונשנית בסיני, לזה ולזה נאמרה; לבני נח ולא נשנית בסיני, לישראל נאמרה ולא לבני נח,” and cites גיד הנשה (per Rabbi Yehuda) as the sole case not repeated and thus now exclusive to Israel. The Gemara defends the first clause by proof from עבודה זרה, which was repeated and remains binding with liability for non-Jews. The Gemara defends the second clause by ruling “ליכא מידי דלישראל שרי ולעובד כוכבים אסיר,” answering challenges from יפת תואר (non-Jews are “לאו בני כיבוש”) and פחות משוה פרוטה (non-Jews are “לאו בני מחילה”), with Rashi and the יד רמה explaining the differing social assumptions that affect the practical law while preserving an identical underlying principle.
  • Milah was said pre-Sinai and “נשנית בסיני,” yet it binds only Israel; the Gemara answers that the repetition teaches “ביום ואפילו בשבת,” not a renewed אזהרה, and Rashi infers non-obligation for non-Jews from its absence in שבע מצוות. Tosafot haRosh cites Rabbeinu Meir that positive commands are often omitted from the list and then proves non-Jewish non-obligation from Avodah Zarah 26 (using “ואתה את בריתי תשמור ולא עכו״ם” to disqualify a non-Jewish מוהל) and from Nedarim 31 (“מולים” referencing Jews alone). Pru u’rvu was said to *bnei Noach* and repeated at Sinai via “שובו לכם לאהליכם,” yet it obligates only Israel; the Gemara explains that the repetition teaches “כל דבר שבמנין צריך מנין אחר להתירו,” and Tosafot identifies a corollary שב ואל תעשה in השחתת זרע that would have appeared among שבע מצוות if *bnei Noach* were obligated in פרו ורבו.
  • An alternative resolution states that milah was never a *bnei Noach* command but a charge to Avraham and his seed: “ואתה את בריתי תשמור אתה וזרעך אחריך לדורותם.” The Gemara excludes בני ישמעאל via “כי ביצחק יקרא לך זרע” and excludes בני עשו via “ביצחק ולא כל יצחק,” while including בני קטורה through “את בריתי הפר לרבות בני קטורה” per R. Yossi bar Avin (or R. Yossi b’Rabbi Chanina).
  • Rav Yehuda said in Rav’s name that Adam was forbidden meat, deriving “לכם יהיה לאכלה ולכל חית הארץ” as excluding “ולא חית הארץ לכם,” and that Noach received permission: “כירק עשב נתתי לכם את כל.” The verse “אך בשר בנפשו דמו לא תאכלו” preserves *eiver min hachai*, and “אך” excludes שרצים, with “דמו” interpreted as limiting the law to species whose blood is distinct from their flesh. The Gemara rejects challenges from “ורדו בדגת הים” and “ובעוף השמים” for eating by explaining dominion as permission for מלאכה, illustrating fish and birds as בני מלאכה through scenarios of a fish pulling and of geese/chickens threshing with muzzling concerns.
Previous Page
Next Page