Sanhedrin Daf 61 - Avoda Zara With Words
Summary
- The text sets the context for מסכת סנהדרין דף ס"א, with the shiur sponsored by Abishai and Elisha Ben-Numen לזכות רפואה שלימה for חיים נפתלי בן פרומט פרידא and שרה פרידא בת חיה, and proceeds from דף ס' עמוד ב' to define when one is *chayav sekilah* for *avodah zarah*: one is liable for any of the *avodot panim* done to an idol even she-lo ke-darka, and for *hishtachavah* even though it is not one of the *avodot panim*; otherwise liability requires worship ke-darka. The derivations from verses establish that “זובח” is a melamed on all *avodot panim* and that *hishtachavah* is a singled-out exception, and they refine exclusions from “איכה יעבדו.” The text then analyzes whether intent alone or speech of commitment (“I will serve”) creates liability, resolves an apparent contradiction between mishnayot through several distinctions (conditions of acceptance, Tannaitic dispute, *yachid* vs. *rabbim*, *mesit* quality, prior record, or literary structuring), and concludes with a dispute whether one who serves *me-ahavah u-mirah* without accepting the idol as a deity is liable.
- The shiur covers מסכת סנהדרין דף ס"א, resuming from דף ס' עמוד ב', and focuses on categories of *chayav sekilah* within *avodah zarah*. The shiur is sponsored by Abishai and Elisha Ben-Numen לזכות רפואה שלימה for חיים נפתלי בן פרומט פרידא and for שרה פרידא בת חיה, that they should have רפואה שלימה בתוך שאר חולי ישראל.
- The text states that performing any of the *avodot panim* for an idol renders one *chayav sekilah* even she-lo ke-darka, and that *hishtachavah* alone is also *chayav sekilah* though it is not among the *avodot panim*. The text states that outside those, liability requires worship ke-darka of that specific idol. The text states that the Mishnah’s framework is derived by identifying “זובח” as melamed on the general category and “השתחויה” as a singled-out exception for capital liability.
- The text states that “זובח לאלהים יחרם” is established as referring to *avodah zarah* rather than *shechutei chutz*, because *zove’ach kodashim bachutz* carries only *karet* even with warning, whereas the verse here teaches death for *zove’ach* to idols. The text states that a challenge to making *hishtachavah* a melamed for all honorable services is rejected by showing that if so, “זובח” would be redundant unless teaching a separate law, leading to analysis of whether מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה is learned from there. The text states that Rabbi Yochanan prohibits benefit from an animal slaughtered while thinking to later perform another service (*zerikah* or *haktarah*) for *avodah zarah*, analogizing to piggul, while Reish Lakish permits the animal and denies carryover from piggul; the sugya then evaluates whether “זובח לאלהים יחרם” is needed to obligate the person or to teach the category of *avodot panim*. The text states that Rav Acha argues that even according to Reish Lakish the man is certainly liable while the object remains permitted, as evidenced by one who bows to a mountain—the mountain is permitted but the worshipper is executed by sword—freeing “זובח לאלהים יחרם” to serve as the melamed on all *avodot panim*.
- The text states that if *hishtachavah* were a general model for any honorable service she-lo ke-darka, “איכה יעבדו” must exclude something; it excludes cases like הפוער עצמו למרקוליס, where the idol’s worship is via ביזיון (throwing stones) and one performs a different ביזיון, teaching that even ביזיון only obligates ke-darka. The text states that Rabbi Elazar derives liability for slaughtering to Markulis from “ולא יזבחו עוד את זבחיהם לשעירים,” which, since “איכה יעבדו” already covers ke-darka, extends to she-lo ke-darka, and capital liability then follows from “זובח לאלוהים יחרם.” The text states that this does not conflict with the earlier model because that verse addresses a case of זובח להכעיס, where *hishtachavah* cannot serve as the model, and thus the separate verse is required.
- The text states that the analysis of מחשבין מעבודה לעבודה probes whether thought during *shechitah* to perform a different service for *avodah zarah* creates liability, and whether the verse “זובח לאלהים יחרם” is available to teach the generalization to all *avodot panim*. The text states that even according to Rabbi Yochanan, who prohibited the animal, a verse is still needed to obligate the person with death for such thought; and even according to Reish Lakish, who permitted the animal, the person is still liable as an עובד when his thought is idolatrous, as shown by the mountain case, thereby preserving “זובח לאלהים יחרם” for its generalizing function.
- The text states that the Mishnah’s implication that only an *oved* is liable appears to contradict a later mishnah that deems “אעבוד,” “אלך ואעבוד,” or “נלך ונעבוד” liable; Rav Hamnuna resolves that the latter is where one is now accepting the idol, whereas the former implies “איני מקבלה עלי אלא בעבודה.” The text states that Rav Yosef first aligns the contradiction with a Tannaitic dispute—Rabbi Meir obligates and Rabbi Yehuda exempts one who says “בואו ועבדוני”—but then revises that even Rabbi Yehuda obligates *dibbur* of commitment to *avodah zarah*, while exempting the “come worship me” case as מסית לעצמו where the audience’s “hen” is mockery, not acceptance. The text states that Rav Yosef’s attempt to distinguish *yachid hanisat* from *rabbim hanisatim*—deriving from “לא תאבה לו ולא תשמע אליו”—is rejected by Abaye from a ברייתא that singles them out only to differentiate punishments and property law, not speech-liability thresholds. The text states that Abaye resolves the mishnayot as כאן בניסת מפי עצמו, כאן בניסת מפי אחרים, supported by “לא תאבה לו ולא תשמע אליו,” which implies liability where enticement by another exists; Rava instead distinguishes cases where the *mesit* praised the idol—“כך אוכלת כך שותה כך מטיבה כך מריעה”—supported by “מאלהי העמים אשר סביבותיכם הקרובים אליך,” indicating persuasive praise. The text states that Rav Ashi attributes the speech-only liability case to a *Yisrael mumer*, whose declaration is credible due to a proven record, and Ravina resolves with “לא זו אף זו קתני,” making no contradiction at all since the earlier Mishnah’s “העובד” does not exclude speech-liability.
- The text states that Abaye holds one who serves *me-ahavah u-mirah* is *chayav*, because he performed worship, while Rava holds he is exempt unless he accepted the idol as a deity. The text states that Abaye adduces from the Mishnah’s phrase “העובד... אחד העובד” that it includes *me-ahavah u-mirah*, whereas Rava reads it as teaching ke-darka; Abaye then brings a ברייתא from “לא תשתחוה להם ולא תעבדם” permitting bowing to a regular person but forbidding worship of one who makes himself a deity “כהמן,” implying that Haman was worshipped mi’irah, supporting liability without acceptance. The text states that Rava answers that the case is “like Haman” only in that the person made himself a deity, but unlike Haman regarding fear, and he maintains exemption absent acceptance.
Previous Page
Next Page
Daf Images are property of Vagshal and may not be reproduced.
Suggestions