Sanhedrin Daf 71 - Parents of Ben Sorer Umoreh
Summary
- This daf continues the laws of the *ben sorer u'moreh*, ruling that liability applies only when he eats meat and drinks wine, derives this from verses, and interweaves an aggadic warning about sleeping in a *beit midrash* with halachic codification and debate. It defines the precise theft-and-eating scenario that creates liability, addresses how the mother can have independent property, and requires both parental consent, while Rabbi Yehuda demands that the parents be identical in voice, appearance, and height; claims that a *ben sorer u'moreh*, an *ir hanidachat*, and a *beit ha-menuga* “never was and never will be” are recorded together with testimonies to the contrary and halachic analyses they trigger. It disqualifies cases where parents are physically disabled via derashot on each verb in the verses and outlines the process of warning, initial *malkot*, and subsequent capital judgment, including evidentiary requirements. It concludes with aging-out rules and a broader analysis of status-change cases, adopting Rabbi Chanina’s principle that exemption applies only where both the legal regime and the death penalty change, and recording Rabbi Yochanan’s emendation that preserves prior liability.
- The Gemara rules that if he eats other foods and not meat or drinks other beverages and not wine, he is not a *ben sorer u'moreh*, explicitly including a d’vila from Ke‘ilah and *dvash ve’chalav* as intoxicating for entry to the *Mikdash* but insufficient here. It derives the requirement from זולל וסובא and supports it with “אל תהי בסובאי יין בזוללי בשר למו,” identifying סובאי with wine and זוללי with meat, and adds “ואומר כי סובא וזולל יורש וקרעים תלביש נומה.” Rabbi Zeira states that one who sleeps in a *beit midrash* will see his Torah torn to pieces, “ו קרעים תלביש נומה.”
- Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De’ah 246:16 rules not to sleep in a *beit midrash* and cites this sugya (and Megillah 28a about Rabbi Zeira’s conduct) as support. The Shach (s.k. 15) classifies refraining even from a brief nap as a middat chasidut, reconciling with Orach Chaim 151 that permits a temporary sleep in a *beit midrash*, while Beit Hillel rejects this, arguing from our sugya and Berachot 25 that the prohibition sounds fundamental, leaving the acharonim to work out precise parameters.
- The Mishnah rules that he is not a *ben sorer u'moreh* if he steals from his father and eats in his father’s domain, or steals from others and eats in their domain, or steals from others and eats in his father’s domain; he becomes a *ben sorer u'moreh* only if he steals from his father and eats elsewhere. The Gemara explains that this combination is both readily available and fearless, whereas the other combinations lack either accessibility or fearlessness. Rabbi Yosi b’Rabbi Yehuda requires theft from both father and mother; the Gemara answers the ownership problem of “kol mah she-kan’tah ishah kanah ba’alah” by either “מדמי סעודה מוכנת דאביו ואמו” or through a third party who gave her property “על מנת שאין לבעליך רשות בה.”
- The Mishnah requires both parents to want to prosecute; Rabbi Yehuda adds that if the mother is not “ra’uyah” to the father, he cannot become a *ben sorer u'moreh*. The Gemara defines “ra’uyah” as equal to the father in voice, appearance, and height, deriving from “איננו שומע בקולנו,” and extends equivalence from voice to other features. The view that a *ben sorer u'moreh* “never was and never will be” fits Rabbi Yehuda’s stringent match or Rabbi Shimon’s assertion that parents, moved by mercy, will not deliver a son to stoning for meat and wine; Rabbi Yonatan counters, “אני ראיתיו וישבתי על קברו,” prompting halachic analysis of benefiting from graves via Tosafot Bava Kamma 16 (reading “הושיבו ישיבה על קברו” as near the grave) and Minchat HaGershoni (publicization with a davar she-eino mitkavein), alongside Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De’ah 364:1, the Shach, Hagahot Asheri, and the Bach’s report of the minhag.
- A baraita claims an *ir hanidachat* “never was and never will be,” which follows Rabbi Eliezer that a city with even one mezuzah cannot become an *ir hanidachat* because “ואת כל שללה תקבוץ אל תוך רחובה ושרפת באש” cannot be fulfilled in light of “לא תעשון כן להשם אלקיכם.” The Acharonim ask why לא תעשה is not overridden by the aseh; Aruch LaNer answers that where a mezuzah exists, the aseh never applies (a condition for the law is unmet), while Maharam Shik argues that erasing the Name entails both aseh and lo ta’aseh, and אין עשה דוחה לא תעשה ועשה. Rabbi Yonatan says, “אני ראיתיה וישבתי על תלה,” asserting historical occurrence.
- Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon requires a lesion “כשני גריסין על שתי אבנים בשתי קירות בקרן זוית, ארכו כשני גריסין ורחבו כגריס,” derived from the juxtaposition of קיר and קירות that identifies a corner. Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Tzadok testifies to a place near Gaza called חורבתא סגירתא, and Rabbi Shimon Ish Kfar Akko reports marked stones said to be from a *beit ha-menuga*, countering the “never was” claim.
- The Mishnah excludes cases where one parent is maimed, lame, mute, blind, or deaf, deriving respectively from “ותפסו בו,” “והוציאו אותו,” “ואמרו,” “benenu zeh,” and “איננו שומע בקולנו,” and it initially appears to support a general rule of בעינן קרא כדכתיב, which the Gemara limits here because the verse is entirely extra. It requires warning before two and then *malkot* before three, with subsequent capital judgment by twenty-three only if the original three are present, learned from “benenu zeh” to identify the previously lashed offender. Rabbi Abbahu derives *malkot* for the *ben sorer u'moreh* by linking “וייסרו” to “ויכת,” ultimately reaching “והיה אם בן הכות הרשע.”
- The Mishnah rules that if he fled before *gmar din* and then developed facial hair he is exempt, but if he fled only after *gmar din* and then matured he remains liable as a gavra ketila. Rabbi Chanina rules that a ben Noach who is mevarech et Hashem and then converts is exempt “הואיל ונשתנה דינו ונשתנה מיתתו,” and the sugya distinguishes our Mishnah (where the act now carries no death at all) and cases after *gmar din*. It further rules that if only the legal process changes but the death remains the same (e.g., murder) he remains liable, whereas shifts between punishments are evaluated with positions that for bnei Noach all deaths are chenek (Tanna d’bei Menashe; Rabbi Shimon), allowing kal vachamurah downgrades in severity. Rabbi Yochanan corrects a proposed proof from a na’arah me’orasah who becomes a bogeret by instructing, “tani tidon b’sekilah,” preserving liability despite status change.
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