Sanhedrin Daf 74 - Yehareig V'al Yaavor
Summary
- This shiur on Sanhedrin דף ע"ד, sponsored by Mimi and Charles Gershbaum לזכר נשמת Moshe Weiss, Moshe Shraga בן רב נתן, presents the tension between paying a fine for *chayavei keritot* and the rule of *nitan lehatzilo benafsho* against the backdrop of קם ליה בדרבה מיניה and offers five reconciliations. It develops core laws of a *rodef*, liability and exemptions for property damage during pursuit and rescue, and the parameters of מציל עצמו בממון חברו and repayment. It records Tannaitic views expanding *nitan lehatzilo benafsho* to עובד עבודה זרה and מחלל שבת, and it codifies the triad of *yehareg ve’al ya’avor* with sources for עבודה זרה, *giluy arayot*, and murder, alongside exceptions for *sha’at gezeirat ha’malchut* and *parhesya* including the measure of ten Jews. It resolves the Esther case through either *karka olam* or *hana’at atzman*, applies that distinction to practical coercion cases, and concludes with the unresolved inquiry whether a בן נח is commanded in *kiddush Hashem*.
- Today’s דף is סנהדרין דף ע"ד, with the learning begun from the two dots at the bottom of דף ע"ג עמוד ב'. The shiur is sponsored by Mimi and Charles Gershbaum לזכר נשמת Mimi’s father Moshe Weiss, Moshe Shraga בן רב נתן, with a tefillah that the נשמה have an עליה through the לימוד.
- The sugya presents a contradiction between the Mishnah in כתובות that awards a *kenas* to specified נערות—including הבועל אחותו—and the rule that חייבי כריתות are *nitan lehatzilo benafsho*, which seems precluded by קם ליה בדרבה מיניה. The first answer states that from the moment of *ha’ara’ah* the פגם occurs and the death-authorization falls away, while the *kenas* obligation only accrues at גמר ביאה, so the liabilities are not בעידנא. This answer fits if *ha’ara’ah* is defined as *neshikah* but not if defined as *hachnasat atarah*, prompting further answers.
- Rav Chisda answers that the כתובות case is where he had previously been בועל her *shelo kedarka*, rendering her already פגומה, and then he was בועל *kedarka*, obligating *kenas* without any concurrent חיוב מיתה. Rava answers that the כתובות case follows Rabbi Yehuda that an *anusah* who does not resist due to mortal fear is not in the category that triggers killing the *rodef*, removing the death liability and leaving *kenas*. Rav Pappa answers that the case is *mefateh*, where consent removes *nitan lehatzilo benafsho* and leaves monetary liability according to all. Abaye answers that the case is where it was possible to stop him *be’echad me’eivarav*, so by Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul’s rule one may not kill, and only monetary liability remains.
- Rabbi Yonatan ben Shaul derives from וכי ינצו אנשים and ואם אסון יהיה that even when someone is a *rodef* for murder, if he can be stopped *be’echad me’eivarav* one may not kill him, which explains why monetary liability may still attach. The suggestion to avoid קם ליה בדרבה מיניה here based on מיתה לזה ותשלומין לזה is rejected, as Rava rules that a *rodef* who breaks anyone’s *kelim*—whether belonging to the *nirdaf* or others—is פטור since he is מתחייב בנפשו at that time, demonstrating that קם ליה בדרבה מיניה applies even when death and payments point to different parties.
- The *nirdaf* who breaks the *rodef*’s property while escaping is פטור, but if he breaks other people’s property he is חייב as he is מציל עצמו בממון חברו. One who pursues a *rodef* to save a victim and breaks property belonging to the *rodef*, the *nirdaf*, or others is פטור by rabbinic enactment, lest fear of liability deter rescuers from stopping a *rodef*. The sugya notes the broader question in בבא קמא about מציל עצמו בממון חברו and reports that many ראשונים read דוד המלך’s inquiry as about repayment rather than permissibility, concluding that ordinarily one may save himself at another’s expense but must pay back, with a royal exception of “מלך אתה.”
- The Mishnah rules that a *rodef* toward בהמה, a מחלל שבת, or an עובד עבודה זרה is not *nitan lehatzilo benafsho*. Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai rules עובד עבודה זרה ניתן להצילו בנפשו by a קל וחומר and holds *onshin min hadin*. Rabbi Elazar berabbi Shimon extends this to מחלל שבת, aligning with his father about *onshin min hadin* and linking שבת to עבודה זרה via a גזירה שוה of חילול–חילול.
- Rabbi Yochanan in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak records that they voted בעליית בית נתזה בלוד that for all עבירות one should transgress rather than be killed, except for *avodah zarah*, *giluy arayot*, and murder. Rabbi Yishmael derives from *vechai bahem* that even for עבודה זרה one may transgress בצינעא, but the Lod ruling follows Rabbi Eliezer from ואהבת את ה’ אלקיך בכל לבבך ובכל נפשך ובכל מאדך that one must give up life and even wealth for devotion to Hashem. Rebbe expounds כי כאשר יקום איש על רעהו ורצחו נפש כן הדבר הזה to compare *na’ara me’orasa* and murder: just as *na’ara me’orasa* is *nitan lehatzilo benafsho*, so is a murderer; and just as murder is *yehareg ve’al ya’avor*, so is *na’ara me’orasa*. Murder is identified as *yehareg ve’al ya’avor* by sevara, as Rava rules that one must not kill another to save himself since “who says your blood is redder; perhaps his blood is redder.”
- Rabbi Yochanan (via Rav Dimi) states that the allowance of transgressing to avoid death applies only שלא בשעת גזירת המלכות, but בשעת גזירת המלכות even a מצוה קלה is *yehareg ve’al ya’avor*. Rabbi Yochanan (via Rabin) adds that even שלא בשעת גזירת המלכות, בצינעא one may transgress, but בפרהסיא even a מצוה קלה is *yehareg ve’al ya’avor*. Rava defines מצוה קלה as even changing the strap-style of a shoe, and Rabbi Yaakov in the name of Rabbi Yochanan defines *parhesya* as a public of not fewer than ten Jews, learned by אתיא תוך תוך from ונקדשתי בתוך בני ישראל and הבדלו מתוך העדה הזאת, requiring ten and all ישראל.
- Abaye answers the challenge from Esther by stating אסתר *karka olam* הייתה, rendering her passive and not obligated in self-sacrifice. Rava answers that *hana’at atzman* is different, so when coercion serves the aggressor’s personal pleasure rather than a religious aim it is not a case of *chilul Hashem* requiring *yehareg ve’al ya’avor*, as illustrated by yielding coal-pans for their own utility without apostasy. Rava accordingly rules that if a non-Jew says “cut fodder on Shabbat and feed my animal or I will kill you,” one should do the act and live, but if he says “cut and throw it into the river,” one must die rather than transgress, because there his aim is to make the Jew violate Shabbat.
- Rabbi Ami inquires whether a בן נח is commanded in *kiddush Hashem*. Abaye argues from “שבע מצוות נצטוו בני נח” that adding *kiddush Hashem* would make eight, implying no separate command. Rava answers “אינהו וכל אביזרייהו,” maintaining that the seven constitute headings and include *avizrayhu*, so *kiddush Hashem* could be encompassed without counting as an eighth.
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