Sanhedrin Daf 28 - Pesul Kerovim
Summary
- This source establishes when children suffer for their fathers’ sins, limits communal liability to cases where protest was possible, and derives the scope of invalid relatives for testimony from verses, extending to paternal and maternal lines, to both conviction and acquittal, and to monetary law. It delineates degrees of kinship that invalidate testimony, with Rav disqualifying a “third in the first line” while Rabbi Elazar also disqualifies a “third in the second line,” and it applies spousal-equivalence principles—*ishto kegupo*, *baal ke-ishto*, and *isha ke-baala*—to invalidate in-law relations. It rules that stepbrothers’ status is debated, that mechutanim may testify for one another, and that one may not testify for one’s *arusa* because of *kerovat da’ata*, notwithstanding distinct rules of tumah and inheritance for *erusin*. It concludes with a halachic ruling like Rabbi Yosi that only those “fit to inherit” create a *psul* of kinship, yet a case shows a deed signed by two brothers-in-law still fails when it is “mezuyyaf mitokho,” even if one seeks to rely on *edei mesirah*.
- The passage states that children are not punished for their parents’ sins unless they perpetuate them, reconciling “ובנים בעוון אבות לא” with “פוקד עוון אבות על בנים” by limiting liability to כשאוחזין מעשה אבותיהם בידיהן. The Ralbag (Sefer Yehoshua 7) explains that punishment aims at correction; when a sin becomes ingrained across generations, greater punishment is needed to repair the person, whereas no one is punished for sins not his own. A supporting *baraita* reads “איש בחטאו יומתו” alongside “ואף בעוונות אבותם אתם ימקו” to the same effect, and the phrase “וכשלו איש באחיו” teaches mutual responsibility only when it was בידם למחות ולא מיחו. Some Acharonim note that a child is not expected to issue forceful protest against a parent, making that route inapplicable to punishing children for parents’ sins.
- The disqualification of relatives is derived from “לא יומתו אבות על בנים ובנים לא יומתו על אבות,” which yields that an uncle and nephew, brothers, and even first cousins are invalid for each other. The text asserts that even a first cousin’s husband is invalid by Torah law because *ishto kegupo* is de’oraita, and it labels a first cousin’s husband as a de’oraita invalid for *edei kiddushin*. The suggestion of Rami bar Hama to invalidate first cousins serving together as a set of witnesses from the mechanics of *edim zomemim* is rejected by Rava, and the true source is the wording “ובנים,” which signals even two “sons” teaming up are invalid. Maternal relatives are included from the double “אבות” (אם אינו עניין לקרובי אב תנהו עניין לקרובי אם), disqualification applies both לחובה and לזכות from the repetition “יומתו יומתו,” and it extends to monetary cases from “משפט אחד יהיה לכם.” The Rambam (Hilchot Edut 13:1), as explained by Kesef Mishneh, treats only explicitly stated paternal relatives as de’oraita while maternal and marital extensions are derabbanan; the Rashba (Teshuvot II:270) holds all listed relationships are de’oraita, and all Rishonim accept extension to monetary law and לזכות as de’oraita.
- Rav rules that one’s father’s brother is invalid, as are that uncle’s son and son-in-law vis-à-vis oneself, and reciprocally one, one’s son, and one’s son-in-law are invalid vis-à-vis the uncle. The term “חתנו” there refers to the uncle’s own son-in-law (counted like another generation since he “comes from outside”), and the *psul* reaches a שלישי בראשון, while Rav is mekasher a שלישי בשני. Rav’s source for disqualifying a שלישי בראשון is the extra vav in “ובנים,” which adds a דור אחד; Rabbi Elazar extends the disqualification to a שלישי בשני via “על בנים אמר רחמנא פסולי דאבות שדי אבנים,” projecting the fathers’ *psulim* onto their sons.
- Rav Nachman invalidates one’s mother-in-law’s brother, his son, and the son of one’s mother-in-law’s sister, and the Mishnah’s list “בעל אחותו ובעל אחות אביו ובעל אחות אמו הן ובניהן וחתניהן” supports this. Ulla identifies that these relationships are symmetric: just as one is invalid to the in-law relatives listed, so too those relatives are invalid to him. The result includes disqualification to testify for one’s wife’s uncle and for her first cousins on that side.
- Rav was asked whether one may testify concerning the property of one’s stepson’s wife, *eshet chorego*. In Sura they ruled by *baal ke-ishto* and in Pumbedita by *isha ke-baala*, as Rav Huna said in the name of Rav that “ערות אחי אביך לא תגלה אל אשתו לא תקרב דודתך היא” shows that the Torah calls an uncle’s wife “דודתך,” teaching *isha ke-baala*. These principles render certain marital in-law relationships invalid for testimony.
- Regarding “ובעל אמו הוא ובנו וחתנו,” Rabbi Yirmiyah reads “בנו” as a stepbrother, while Rav Chisda permits a stepbrother and reads the Mishnah as listing both a paternal and a maternal brother as separate invalid relations. Rav Chisda rules that mechutanim, “אבי חתן ואבי כלה,” may testify for each other, stating that they are not relatives and likening them to a barrel and its ill-fitting cover. The passage thereby allows honoring mechutanim as valid witnesses when other *kurva* concerns are absent.
- Rabba bar bar Hana permits testimony for one’s *arusa*, and Ravina first limits this to harm but then concludes one is not believed at all, whether to harm or benefit, due to *kerovat da’ata*. Ulla states that an *arusa* and *arus* do not create onen status, do not entail becoming *mitamei*, and do not establish inheritance, and the passage rejects analogy to *edut* because tumah and inheritance hinge on “שארה” while testimonial invalidity turns on relational closeness of mind. The Rambam rules a married woman is not obligated to become *mitamei* for her husband, while the Raavad infers from Ulla that only an *arusa* lacks such an obligation and a *nesua* is obligated; the note further records that the ban of Rabbenu Gershom on coerced divorce applies to a *nesua* but the ban on polygamy likely applies even at *erusin*. The upshot for *edut* is that one may not testify for one’s *arusa*.
- Two *baraitot* report whether “חורגו לבדו” or “גיסו לבדו,” or whether each includes his son and son-in-law, and the reconciliation frames our Mishnah like Rabbi Yehuda (חורגו לבדו; גיסו הוא ובנו וחתנו) and a *baraita* like Rabbi Yosi (both לבדו). Shmuel rules like Rabbi Yosi that only one who is “ראוי לירשו” creates a kinship invalidation, so standard brothers-in-law are valid, as Shmuel said, “כגון אנא ופנחס דהוינן אחי וגיסי... אבל גיסי דעלמא שפיר דמי.” In a deed signed by two brothers-in-law, Rav Yosef sought to validate based on this ruling, Abaye questioned which Rabbi Yosi it followed, and the court attempted validation with *edei mesirah* per Rabbi Elazar. Rabbi Abba’s rule that a document “מזוייף מתוכו” is invalid prevented reliance on *edei mesirah*, and the recipient was dismissed because the deed could not be upheld.
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