Sanhedrin Daf 33 - Reversing Judicial Mistakes
Summary
- The shiur states that Sanhedrin 33 centers on whether erroneous monetary rulings are reversible, distinguishing between a judge who is a *to’eh bedavar mishnah* and one who is *to’eh beshikul hada’at*, and presents multiple resolutions to an apparent contradiction with Masechet Bechorot. It analyzes Tosafot and Chiddushei haRan on cases like “טיהרת את הטמא,” addresses the liability and status of a judge who errs (including Teshuvot haTashbetz and a hashkafic point rejecting any doctrine of infallibility), and offers three major resolutions: *mumcheh* vs. non-*mumcheh* with a higher court, *to’eh bedavar mishnah* vs. *to’eh beshikul hada’at*, and *natal venatan beyad* vs. not. It then derives the rule that in capital law one reverses only for *zekhut* and not for *chovah*, applies this to *galut* and *malkot*, treats the exception of a *mesit*, and defines when even capital cases are reversed for *chovah* in matters “שהצדוקים מודין בו,” including adultery, while something like *bi’ah shelo k’darka* remains non-reversible for *chovah*.
- The shiur is sponsored by Dr. David Landman and his wife and children לעילוי נשמת his mother גילדא בת שמחה עליה השלום, and by Daniel Sadian for the success of כלל ישראל and הצלחה for soldiers and captives to return home safely. The sponsors are thanked for their support.
- The daf raises a primary *stirah*: the Mishnah states that in *dinei mamonot* one is *machzirin* בין לזכות בין לחובה, while a Mishnah in Masechet Bechorot rules “מה שעשה עשוי וישלם מביתו,” implying no reversal even when the judge erred. The shiur defines two error categories: *to’eh bedavar mishnah* and *to’eh beshikul hada’at*, which guide whether a ruling stands or is undone. The sugya introduces a narrative about Rabbi Tarfon’s error to assess culpability and reversibility.
- Tosafot asks how “מה שעשה עשוי” could apply to “טיהרת את הטמא”: a declaration cannot convert a שרץ into טהור, and if the produce is deemed טהור, why must the judge pay. Tosafot answers that “מה שעשה עשוי” refers to the owner’s subsequent mixing of those fruits with other fruits, rendering them בטל ברוב (thus they remain טהור), whereas payment applies when the mixing was insufficient to create ביטול, causing loss. Chiddushei haRan (quoting Rabbeinu David) states that regarding איסור the fruits revert to טמא, but regarding ממון the judge’s declaration conferred monetary value and “מה שעשה עשוי” preserves that monetary acquisition; the later error cannot uproot the baal ha-bayit’s *zekhiyah*.
- Teshuvot haTashbetz (חלק ב’ סימן ט’) rules that a judge who errs and pays does not become פסול going forward, since even great תנאים ואמוראים erred; only negligence or inadequate diligence could disqualify due to risk of repeated mistakes. The shiur states that there is no doctrine of infallibility in תורה hashkafah; even גדולי תורה can err, as affirmed by Rav Reisman in response to an overly defensive appeal to דעת תורה regarding historical judgments.
- Rav Yosef answers: כאן במומחה, כאן בשאינו מומחה. The Gemara challenges from a source that “אם היה מומחה לבית דין פטור מלשלם,” implying the ruling stands even for a מומחה. Rav Nachman resolves that our Mishnah speaks where שיש גדול ממנו בחכמה ומנין, so a higher court reverses the lower court’s ruling; Bechorot speaks where אין גדול ממנו בחכמה ומנין, leaving the ruling intact and the judge’s non-liability hinging on his *mumchiyut*.
- Rav Sheshet answers: *to’eh bedavar mishnah* is חוזר, while *to’eh beshikul hada’at* is אינו חוזר. Ravina asks if “דבר משנה” includes teachings of Rabbi Chiyya and Rabbi Oshaya (Tosefta), rulings of Rav and Shmuel, and even statements of Ravina and Rav Ashi; the Gemara affirms all as within *to’eh bedavar mishnah*, “אטו אנן קטלי קני באגמא אנן.” The Rambam rules that error in what is explicit in the Gemara is *to’eh bedavar mishnah*; the Meiri includes compelling conclusions and necessary inferences; the Nimukei Yosef includes mishnayot left as תיקו, requiring standard monetary rules (לחומרא for the תובע and לקולא for the נתבע); Ketubot indicates that violating established pesak rules (e.g., הלכה כרבי עקיבא against Rabbi Tarfon) is also *to’eh bedavar mishnah*. Rav Pappa defines *shikul hada’at* as choosing among two Tannaitic/Amoraic views with no decided halakha while the sugya’s practice follows the other side.
- The Bechorot case recounts a cow whose רחם was removed; Rabbi Tarfon ruled it a טרפה and it was fed to dogs, but the sages in Yavneh permitted it based on תודוס הרופא’s testimony about Alexandria animals, proving viability after removal. Rabbi Tarfon said “הלכה חמורך טרפון,” accepting liability to compensate, but Rabbi Akiva ruled “פטור אתה, שכל המומחה לרבים פטור מלשלם.” The Gemara explains he gave two grounds: חדא, *to’eh bedavar mishnah* is חוזר; ועוד, even if it were *shikul hada’at*, a מומחה לרבים is פטור. The challenge about reversal fails practically because the cow was gone; Tosafot clarifies that “האכילה רבי טרפון לכלבים” reflects ruling-induced action rather than his personal handling.
- Rav Chisda answers: כאן שנטל ונתן ביד, כאן שלא נטל ונתן ביד; Bechorot’s non-reversal and liability are where the judge physically transferred assets, while our Mishnah allows reversal absent *natal venatan beyad*. The sugya equates saying “פטור אתה” to *natal venatan beyad*, thereby making a non-reversible case of מזכה את החייב parallel to physical transfer. The phrase “בין לזכות בין לחובה” is read as חדא קתני: *machzirin* לזכות שהיא חובה for the other litigant when no physical transfer occurred. The attempt to map an analogous “חובה” in *dinei nefashot* to חובתיה דגואל הדם yields “קשיא,” with Chiddushei haRan softening it since Rav Chisda can revert to Rav Sheshet’s distinction. Ravina concretizes *natal venatan beyad* cases: for מזכה את החייב via returning a משכון, for מטמא by handling a שרץ onto produce, and for מטהר by mixing the suspect produce into the owner’s other produce.
- A ברייתא derives that if one exits Beit Din חייב and someone says “יש לי ללמד עליו זכות,” one returns him, from ונקי וצדיק אל תהרוג. It also derives that if one exits זכאי and someone says “יש לי ללמד עליו חובה,” one does not return him, from “וצדיק אל תהרוג,” where צדיק means vindicated in judgment rather than sinless.
- Rabbi Simun bar Ashi states a חילופא למסית: for a *mesit*, Beit Din does not return for *zekhut* after חיוב and does return for *chovah* after זכאי, as in לא תאבה לו ולא תשמע אליו. Rabbeinu Yonah cites a view that although one returns for *chovah*, one does not refuse to hear *zekhut*, but most Rishonim disagree; Rav Kahana derives severity from “כי הרוג תרגנו.”
- Rav Zeira asks about חייבי גליות, and the Gemara rules like *dinei nefashot* via *gezera shava* “רוצח רוצח.” It rules the same for חייבי מלקות via *gezera shava* “רשע רשע,” and a ברייתא supports both derivations.
- Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that non-reversal for *chovah* in capital law applies only when the error concerns something the צדוקים would not admit; if the error is בדבר שהצדוקים מודין בו, זיל קרי בי רב, the ruling lacks standing and is חוזר even לחובה. Rabbi Yochanan affirms that error in נואף ונואפת is חוזר since those laws are explicit, and he illustrates non-reversal in עריות only where the mistake concerns *shelo k’darka*, learned from “משכבי אשה,” which the צדוקים would not admit.
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