Summary
  • The text presents the Mishnah on Avodah Zarah 11b–12a that permits commerce outside a city holding a *yom eid* for *avodah zarah* and, conversely, permits inside if the *avodah zarah* is outside; it limits travel to such a city due to *chashad* only when the road uniquely leads there. The Gemara defines “outside” via Atluza shel Azza and analyzes whether proximity extends prohibitions, bringing a proof from two adjacent pots of a Jew and a non-Jew in Tyre and exploring what the Sages were not concerned about, with Abaye, Rava, and Rabbah bar Ulla offering different understandings. Tosafot requires constant supervision only when the non-Jew risks no embarrassment, rules out fear of gratuitous sabotage, and is followed by Shulchan Aruch YD 118, while Rashi’s assumptions lead to greater concern when unattended, and Meiri limits the leniency to *bediavad*, with Rema and Shach adding *lechatchilah* safeguards. The sugya establishes that we do not extend influence/spillover (money or food splatter) across boundaries when it is uncommon and/or *batel*, and a Baraita codifies multiple *mar’it ayin* laws (bending for a splinter, gathering coins, drinking by a spring, statues-fountain, and entering by a unique road), clarifying that “eino nira” means it does not look like *hishtachavayah* and affirming that *mar’it ayin* applies even privately, while later sources nuance whether the primary concern is suspicion or that observers may think it is permitted. The text concludes with safety laws about drinking from natural waters and at night (leeches and *shavriri*), therapeutic allowances on Shabbat, and practical remedies.
  • The Mishnah states that a city with *avodah zarah* having a *yom eid* renders commerce outside the city permitted, because influence does not extend past city limits and different cities have different festival days. It states that if the *avodah zarah* and its *yom eid* are outside the city, then commerce inside is permitted for the same reason. It permits travel when one can plausibly be going elsewhere, but forbids entering when the road uniquely leads to that city due to *chashad* that one appears to be going to serve *avodah zarah*.
  • The Gemara asks what counts as “outside,” and Reish Lakish in the name of Rabbi Chanina cites כגון אטלוזא של עזה, understood by Rashi as a meat market just beyond Azza, showing that even an adjacent suburb is “outside.” Rashbam interprets Atluza as the name of an idol outside Azza and frames the question as whether one may do business with Bnei Azza on the day of Atluza, while Tosafot rejects both readings and explains the case as a *shuk* established for *avodah zarah*, creating concern for “money of *avodah zarah*” in that *shuk* regardless of the individual’s rank.
  • Resh Lakish asked Rabbi Chanina about Atluza, and he answered from Tyre where a Jew and a non-Jew placed two pots on one stove and the Sages “were not concerned,” showing that proximity does not automatically create prohibition. Abaye explains “lo chashu” as not fearing that the non-Jew slipped *nevelah* into the Jew’s pot when the Jew turned away, and infers similarly that we do not fear “money of *avodah zarah*” making its way outside the city.
  • Tosafot states that ordinary reliance on *yotzei ve-nichnas* suffices only when the non-Jew would be caught “as a thief” and risk consequence; here he can claim he was just stirring, so constant supervision would otherwise be required. Tosafot adds that we fear substitution for profit (swapping fatty meat) but not gratuitous sabotage, which explains common practice of leaving our pots with non-Jewish help without fearing they will insert *issur* “just because.” Rashi assumes the case lacks *hana’ah* for the non-Jew and implies greater concern if the Jew actually turned away, whereas Shulchan Aruch YD 118 rules like Tosafot that we do not presume gratuitous sabotage. Chacham Tzvi (Teshuvot 39) explains that a non-Jew will not expend effort to cause unseen dietary transgression, unlike harming or killing where the victim perceives it. Meiri limits the Tyre leniency to *bediavad*, Rema YD 118 urges *lechatchilah* stringency, and Shach clarifies that the *lechatchilah* concern is uncovered pots due to possible splatter.
  • Rava explains “lo chashu” as not fearing *bishulei ovdei kochavim* in the Jew’s pot, analogizing that we do not link those just outside the city to the inner-city *yom eid*. Rabbah bar Ulla explains “lo chashu” as not fearing *tzinora* (splatter), and Rashi justifies this as an uncommon minor *issur* that would in any case be *batel*, yielding the parallel that we do not fear spillover to “*lifnei eideihen*” or to the outskirts of Azza.
  • Rashi formulates that even when the potential *issur* would be biblical, the Sages did not establish a presumption of *issur* without basis, *achzukei issura lo machzikinan*. Rema YD 95:3 applies this to a clean dairy dish found among meat utensils, ruling that one need not assume prohibited contact occurred because there are many permissible scenarios.
  • The Baraita forbids entering a city with *avodah zarah* when the road uniquely leads there and permits when it plausibly leads elsewhere. It forbids bending to remove a splinter before an idol, gathering scattered coins before an idol, and bending to drink from a spring before an idol because it appears like *hishtachavayah*, yet permits when it is clearly not *hishtachavayah*. It forbids placing one’s mouth on statues that spout water because it appears like kissing an idol, and it adds a general safety rule not to drink directly from a ground-fixed pipe due to danger.
  • The text clarifies that “eino nira” does not mean unseen, because wherever the Sages forbade due to *mar’it ayin* it remains forbidden even in private, but rather it means it does not appear like *hishtachavayah*. It explains the need for multiple cases: a splinter could be removed elsewhere, coins present pressing monetary loss, and water presents danger, so each teaches a limit. Rashi states explicitly that *mar’it ayin* includes cases where observers will suspect one of a transgression, while later authorities cited by Shaar HaTziyun via Shedei Chemed emphasize the concern that observers may conclude the act is permitted. The text notes Yoreh De’ah 87 on imitation-milk with poultry as a major discussion about *mar’it ayin* regarding a rabbinic *issur*, and Hagaot Asheri in the name of Or Zarua instructs one not to bow at *Modim* if a non-Jew with a cross stands before him.
  • The Baraita rules not to drink from rivers or marshes directly with one’s mouth or with one hand, permitting two hands since one can inspect the water, and labels violations dangerous due to leeches. Rabbi Chanina permits heating water on Shabbat to treat a swallowed water leech, and Rabbi Nechemiah did so in practice, while vinegar serves as a temporary measure; swallowing a hornet is fatal, though strong vinegar may prolong life briefly.
  • The text forbids drinking water at night due to the danger of *shavriri*, defined by Rashi as a demon that causes blindness. It prescribes remedies: rouse a companion by saying one is thirsty, simulate company by rattling a vessel, and recite to oneself, “Ploni bar Plonita amar lach imecha ‘hizaher mi-shavriri briri riri yri ri,’” progressively diminishing the name, and to use white cups.
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