Summary
  • This shiur on Avodah Zarah 13 presents the Mishnah on 13b that forbids selling specific items to idolaters year-round due to their likely use for avodah zarah, identifies those items in the Gemara, and delineates nuanced rules for selling a white rooster based on request language, packaging, and situational context. It establishes that selling “bundles” of certain items is permitted because of lifnei iveir limits, clarifies stam mutar and pirushan asur through a wheat case, and records Rav Ashi’s unresolved scenarios about a tarnegol lavan. It addresses the scope of assur le’olam with reasons from Rishonim, explores the permissibility of cutting the rooster’s toe vis-à-vis tza’ar ba’alei chayim, and analyzes selling a dekel in light of lo techonem, along with definitions of chatzav and niklas. It includes practical halachic notes about kapparos and white chickens (Rema and Magen Avraham), the Rambam’s ruling about mixed items and Kesef Mishneh/Lechem Mishneh’s analysis, and the tradition that Avraham’s tractate of Avodah Zarah had 400 chapters, highlighting the breadth and our limited mastery.
  • The shiur is sponsored by Kenny Sharp le’iluy nishmas his father Yaakov Kopel ben Moshe zicrono livracha on his eighth yahrzeit and by Avishai and Elisheva Noam l’zechus refuah sheleimah for Chaim Naftali ben Fruma Freida and for Sarah Freida bas Chaya be’soch she’ar cholei Yisrael. The learning begins from the Mishnah on 13b at the bottom, continuing the sugya of doing business with ovdei kochavim on or near their yom eidam and shifting to items that are always restricted because of avodah zarah use.
  • The Mishnah forbids selling to ovdei kochavim the following: *itztrobelin*, *bnot shuach*, and “*petotrot*,” which qualifies the first two; *levonah*; and a white rooster, a tarnegol lavan. Rabbi Yehuda permits selling a tarnegol lavan when it is among other roosters, and if it is by itself one may cut off its toe and then sell it, since they do not offer a deficient animal for avodah zarah. For all other items, stam is permitted and pirushan asur.
  • The Gemara identifies *itztrobelin* as the fruit of an erez (cedar), resolving its shevi’it status by defining it as fruit with a root-based criterion. It identifies *bnot shuach* as white figs and explains that “*petotrot*” means with their stems attached; it defines *levonah* here as *levonah zakhah*. It states that one may sell these items only as a bundle, defined by R. Yehuda ben Beteira as no fewer than three stalks, and rejects the concern of resale to other idolaters as merely lifnei d’lifnei, which is not proscribed in this context.
  • The sugya limits the prohibition to lifnei iveir and not lifnei d’lifnei, while Rishonim distinguish Pesachim 48b where selling compromised wheat to a goy could lead to a Jew’s violation, triggering concern either as lifnei d’lifnei for a Jew or because of areivut. Tosafot suggest that a goy is not prohibited in lifnei iveir, so the concern is when a Jew may ultimately violate, while Tosafot Rid conditions leniency on the buyer being meizid rather than a shogeg. Terumas HaDeshen prohibits selling clearly avodah zarah books to priests but permits selling to another goy as lifnei d’lifnei, whereas Ba’er HaGolah and the Gra restrict even that when the item is evidently designated for avodah zarah.
  • R. Yonah in the name of R. Zeira states that if the buyer asks “tarnegol lemi,” selling a tarnegol lavan is permitted, but if he asks “tarnegol lavan lemi,” it is prohibited. The Mishnah’s allowance according to Rabbi Yehuda—selling a tarnegol lavan “bein ha’tarnegolim”—is reconciled by a beraita clarifying that “zeh v’zeh” language permits and that stated needs like a mishteh le’bno or a choleh betoch beito permit the sale. The Gemara restricts mishteh to a celebration like tabzigi and not the wedding-day feast itself, because the Mishnah elsewhere limits commerce on the wedding day with that specific individual.
  • Bava Metzia 60 prohibits deceptive cosmetic enhancement in sales, and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 605) records the preference for white chickens for kapparos as symbolic of “אם יהיו חטאיכם כשנים כשלג ילבינו.” The Rema emphasizes the white choice, while Magen Avraham warns not to specifically seek white as that resembles darchei ha’emori per Avodah Zarah 14. A responsum in Shu”t Meshiv forbids painting chickens white to stimulate demand, both as deception and because people should not chase white specifically in light of darchei ha’emori.
  • Rashba and Ritva read “assur le’olam” to mean the prohibition applies even not near their festivals, unlike earlier limitations; Beit Yosef adds that this applies both bizman haTalmud and in our time. Bach extends the scope to all goyim, not only priests, and both in Eretz Yisrael and chutz la’aretz, unlike other restrictions bound to Eretz Yisrael. Ritva gives two reasons: these items are hard to obtain so idolaters stock up well in advance, and these items are used for avodah zarah year-round.
  • The permission to “kote’a et etzba’o” raises the issue of tza’ar ba’alei chayim, which may be de’oraita; Rishonim cite many loci for its source despite no explicit verse. Tosafot Chadashot, building on a principle in Tosafot, suggests that chachamim can uproot a Torah prohibition for a reason, such as preventing avodah zarah, or that the toe-cutting was done via a sam to minimize pain while achieving mechosar eiver status.
  • Rashi explains “yesh lo ikar yesh lo shevi’it” as “mitkayem ba’aretz,” yet Tosafot ask why grain has shevi’it if its roots do not last in the rainy season; Ra’avad and Meiri note the difficulty of finding a significant “fruit” of erez fit for offering. Rabbeinu Tam defines “ein lo ikar” as having no root at all in any season, while Tosafot Rid proposes a variant girsa because the Mishnayot in Shevi’it (7) teach criteria that appear opposite the Bavli’s formulation.
  • The Mishnah’s rule “stamman mutar, pirushan asur” is applied to a case of wheat by defining stam as requesting chittin and pirushan as requesting chittin chivarta, or even requesting for avodah zarah use. The Gemara rejects the assumption that explicit avodah zarah intent is always a given and teaches that even if the buyer claims an avodah zarah purpose one must take it at face value and may not sell, countering the hava amina that he is merely leveraging his “noble purpose” to obtain a better price in a mixed marketplace.
  • Rav Ashi asks whether a buyer who requests a tarnegol lavan ketu’a allows selling him a full tarnegol lavan, weighing whether the “ketu’a” is proof of non–avodah zarah intent or a ruse; the question remains unresolved. Rav Ashi further asks whether one may sell a tarnegol lavan after the buyer already purchased black and red roosters despite asking for white, considering whether his conduct dispels avodah zarah concerns or is still elaborate ha’arama; this too ends in teiku.
  • Rabbi Meir’s prohibition on selling a dekel tov, chatzav, and niklas to ovdei kochavim is limited to the fruits of a dekel tov and not the tree itself, since selling land or plants mechubar la’karka in Eretz Yisrael violates lo techonem. Chatzav is explained as kishba, and niklas is identified by Rav Dimi in the name of Rav Chama bar Yosef as koreiti; Abaye notes that even if the term is unknown locally, the identification aids inquiry in places where the vernacular is known. Rav Chisda cites a tradition that Avraham’s Avodah Zarah had 400 chapters while ours has five, underscoring both the proliferation of avodah zarah and our limited scope, and Sefer Kos Yeshuos leverages this to address Tosafot’s doubt whether lo techonem applies only to the sheva amamin or to all ovdei kochavim.
  • The Taz in Yoreh De’ah 242, citing Bach, infers from Abaye’s direct address to Rav Dimi that one need not always use third person when repeatedly speaking to a great person. The exchange illustrates halachic etiquette alongside the lexical clarifications embedded in the sugya.
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