Summary
  • The text presents the Mishnah’s rules on selling animals to a non-Jew, treating the sale of a beheimah dakah as dependent on local minhag and prohibiting the sale of a beheimah gasah everywhere, with specific Tannaic allowances for a shevurah and a horse. It develops two main rationales: fear of *revi’ah* and concern for Shabbat violations through *shevitat behemto* or through *mechamer* during last-minute testing, while analyzing whether *sechirut kaniyah* and concluding that it is not, which intensifies the Shabbat concern. It records heterim such as selling through an agent and cases where one can plausibly assume immediate shechitah, articulates a rule to “assume permissibility where plausible,” and extends the discussion to selling to a Jew suspected of resale to a non-Jew, to Kutim, and to the sale of weapons and dangerous implements. It also contrasts Rashi’s grounding of *amirah le-akum* in “*mimtzo cheftzecha ve-daber davar*” with the Steipler’s alternative basis and highlights ancillary principles about ongoing versus momentary issurim.
  • The Mishnah permits selling a beheimah dakah to an *oved kokhavim* where the minhag is to sell and forbids where the minhag is not to sell, and it prohibits selling a beheimah gasah to an *oved kokhavim* in all places. It extends this issur even to calves and foals and to both shalem and shevurim due to a *gezeirah* lest one come to sell large, work-ready animals. Rabbi Yehuda permits a shevurah, and Ben Beteira permits a horse because riding is a *shevut* and “chai nosei et atzmo.”
  • Rashi (Pesachim) explains that the reason not to sell a beheimah dakah is a *gezeirah* lest one come to sell a beheimah gasah, while Tosafot here states that the concern is *revi’ah* and thus *lifnei iver*. Tosafot asks why we do not distinguish cases where the non-Jew already has another animal (as by avodah zarah risk), and Rabbeinu Yehudah answers that desire for *revi’ah* extends to each animal individually. Ritva and Meiri state that even though the Gemara concludes on 15a that the non-Jew is “chas al behemto,” some locales still maintained the minhag due to occasional overpowering desire. Meiri cites Yerushalmi that selling an animal to a non-Jew removes the seller from mitzvot such as *reishit ha-gez*, sometimes from *bechor* and *matanot kehunah*, which justifies a minhag but not a binding halachah due to its breadth; R. Akiva Eiger explains Rashi’s avoidance of the *revi’ah* rationale because consistency would also forbid buying animals for a korban lest they be *nirba*.
  • The Gemara challenges whether the issur on selling a beheimah dakah is mere minhag and juxtaposes the ban on leaving animals in the inns of non-Jews due to *revi’ah*. Rav initially aligns sale-permission with places that permit *yichud* and sale-prohibition with places that forbid *yichud*. R. Elazar rules that even where *yichud* is asur it is permitted to sell, because a non-Jew is “chas al behemto she-lo te’akar,” and Rav retracts to that view. Abraham ben haRambam praises such retraction as intellectual strength and honesty.
  • The text states that the concern for a beheimah gasah is melachah on Shabbat, not *revi’ah*, and rejects *lifnei iver* since a *ben Noach* is not commanded in Shabbat; it attributes the issur to a *gezeirah* of *she’eilah* or *sechirut* leading to the owner’s *shevitat behemto* and to *nesyonei* near sundown on Friday leading to the Jewish seller’s *mechamer achar behemto*. Tosafot explains that the Gemara invokes *mechamer* rather than *shevitat behemto* because Chazal are not gozer for a momentary, lighter issur of *shevitat behemto*, but they are gozer even for a moment for the more severe *mechamer*, while for ongoing, all-Shabbat *shevitat behemto* they do decree. The text uses this to illustrate the broader principle that an “issur kal” may become weightier by ongoing repetition, citing Pnei Yehoshua on “sheluchei mitzvah peturin min ha-sukkah” and Minchat Chinuch on spending beyond a fifth for a continuous mitzvah like mezuzah. Rashi states that *amirah le-akum* is prohibited by “*mimtzo cheftzecha ve-daber davar*,” which the Steipler challenges from non-Shabbat cases and elsewhere explains via “yesh shelichut la-akum lechumra,” and the text notes the distinct derabbanan of benefiting from melachah done by a non-Jew and illustrates a practical case where a non-Jew adjusted lights for his own needs.
  • The Gemara asks whether *sechirut kaniyah* and brings a proof from rentals in Eretz Yisrael and avodah zarah, retaining the stringency of “velo tavi to’eivah el beitecha.” It then brings a conclusive proof from feeding *terumah* to a rented cow, establishing that *sechirut lo kaniyah*. The sugya therefore anchors the beheimah gasah ban in a threefold *gezeirah*: *she’eilah*, *sechirut*, and *nesyonei*. Tosafot reconciles the conclusion with Bava Metzia 56 that *sechirut* has *ona’ah* by limiting the “sale” characterization to the laws of *ona’ah*, while for other halachot *sechirut lo kaniyah*.
  • Rav Ada permits selling a donkey through a Jewish agent, and Tosafot deflects concerns of appearances either because agents are publicly known or because adding that stringency would be a *gezeirah le-gezeirah*. The sugya justifies this heter because the animal does not heed the agent’s voice, removing *mechamer*, and because an agent tasked to sell neither lends nor rents it out and avoids exposing defects that lending would reveal.
  • Rav Huna sold a cow to a non-Jew and justified it by assuming the buyer’s intent for immediate shechitah, invoking Beit Hillel’s heter to sell a plowing cow during Shevi’it since the buyer can slaughter it. Rava objects that Shabbat adds *shevitat behemto*, but Abaye and Rav Ashi establish the governing rule: whenever there is a reasonable assumption toward permissibility, one assumes it even where a mitzvah of rest applies, and where no such assumption exists, one does not assume permissibility even where no mitzvah of rest applies. The text supports this with cases of selling fields during Shevi’it versus selling field-working implements during Shevi’it.
  • Rava sold a donkey to a Jew who was *chashud* to resell to an *oved kokhavim* and initially defended the sale, but the sugya establishes that just as it is asur to sell certain items to a non-Jew, it is asur to sell them to a Jew suspected of selling to a non-Jew, leading Rava to pursue the buyer to reverse the sale. The text contrasts Kutim’s reliability regarding *revi’ah*—as evidenced by permissibility of *yichud*, entrusting animals to their shepherds, and leaving children with them—with a baraita that forbids selling them weapons and torture implements like anvils, collars, chains, and shackles, explaining the issur as risk of resale to an *oved kokhavim*. Rav Dimi bar Abba extends the ban to selling weapons to Jewish bandits even if not murderous, because confrontation during crimes can lead to killing when armed.
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