Zevachim 107
Summary
- This segment continues Perek 13 in Zevachim on liabilities for performing sacrificial avodot outside, establishing the azharah for shechitat chutz via derashot other than a rejected kal va-chomer, extending ha'alah b'chutz to cases where the shechitah was outside, deriving zerikah b'chutz with significant nafka minot between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva, and clarifying petur for kemitzah and kabbalat damim b'chutz. It analyzes liability counts when combining avodot, delimits the geographic halachic “outside” including a debate about gag haHeichal, and records a dispute whether ha'alah nowadays incurs liability based on whether kedushah rishonah persists. It presents conceptual frameworks (issur avodah vs. issur shechitah), a Rambam–Raavad dispute regarding ofot, practical impediments to reinstating korbanot cited by the Chafetz Chaim, and positions among Rishonim about the permanence of Kedushat HaMikdash and Kedushat Eretz Yisrael.
- The sugya seeks the azharah for shechitat chutz after noting that the Torah states the onesh of karet for it but its explicit warning is not evident, and it rejects deriving the azharah by a *kal va-chomer* because “וכי מזהירין מן הדין? אפילו מאן דאמר עונשין מן הדין אין מזהירין מן הדין.” Explanations for “אין עונשין מן הדין” are presented, including that the middah of *kal va-chomer* is not for punishments, that “והצילו העדה” curtails such derivations, that human *sevara* is too fallible to ground punishments, and that scaled punishments may fail to atone for graver offenses. The Rambam (Sefer HaMitzvot, Shoresh 14) rules that when an onesh is explicit, an azharah may be learned “מן הדין,” prompting Acharonim (Sha’ar HaMelech, Minchas Chinuch) to ask from this sugya, and the Olat Shlomo suggests the Rambam’s exception applies to mitah or malkot but not to karet.
- Rabbi Yochanan derives the azharah via a *gezeirah shavah* “הויה הויה,” applying “לא ענש אלא אם כן הזהיר” from ha'alah to shechitah so that shechitat chutz necessarily has an azharah. Rashi explains this is not “עונש מן הדין” because a *gezeirah shavah* mefuneh functions “כמי שמפרש בה.” Rabbah cites Rabbi Yonah’s *hekesh* “שם תעלה עולותיך ושם תעשה” to equate the azharah status of ha'alah with other asiyot including shechitah, and Taharas HaKodesh infers that a *hekesh* like a *gezeirah shavah* is “אין אדם דן מעצמו,” distinguishing it from *kal va-chomer* for purposes of azharah.
- The Gemara asks how we know liability for ha'alah b'chutz of items shechted outside (*muk'tarei chutz*), not only of items shechted inside (*muk'tarei panim*). Rav Kahana derives it from “ואליהם תאמר,” which Rashi initially reads as linking to the adjacent parashah of shechutei chutz, but Rav Ashi rejects the orthography and deBei Rabbi Yishmael reads “וְאליהם תאמר” as la’arev parshiyos via the vav, joining ha'alah b'chutz to the context of shechutei chutz. Rabbi Yochanan derives it with “אתיא הבאה הבאה,” aligning ha'alah with shechitah such that cases of outside-shechted offerings are included. Rabbi Beivi challenges the count of thirty-six keritot, arguing it should be thirty-seven due to two distinct ha'alah liabilities, and although Tosafot could answer that the Mishnah in Keritut follows Rabbi Yosi haGelili who exempts *muk'tarei chutz*, the Gemara leaves it as “קשיא.”
- The Mishnah’s liability for zerikah b'chutz is sourced by a beraisa: Rabbi Yishmael derives it from “דם יחשב,” while Rabbi Akiva derives it from “או זבח.” The differing sources yield nafka minot, such as whether one is liable once or twice if he performs zerikah along with ha'alah, and Rabbi Akiva Eiger adds further differences paralleling the later Mishnah (108) where shechitah vs. ha'alah each has a chumrah (e.g., la'hedyot and two people acting together), making zerikah’s status pivot on whether it is annexed to the shechitah or to the ha'alah pasuk. Rabbi Yishmael uses “או זבח” for lechaleik distinct liabilities per korban, Rabbi Akiva learns lechaleik from “לא יביאנו,” Rabbi Yishmael uses “לא יביאנו” to require shalem and not chaser (with Rashi offering three definitions of chaser), and Rabbi Akiva learns shalem from “לעשות אותו.”
- Rabbi Akiva uses “דם יחשב” to include shechitat ha’of b'chutz in the liability, while Rabbi Yishmael learns it from “או אשר ישחט,” and Rabbi Akiva reads that pasuk to obligate the shochet and not the molek, which Rabbi Yishmael derives from “זה הדבר” against a plausible *kal va-chomer*. The Brisker lomdus frames ha'alah b'chutz as an issur avodah b'chutz, while shechitat chutz is an issur shechitah rather than an avodah-issur, which explains why melikah b'chutz is patur. The Rambam (Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 18:8) rules that one who shechts a bird b'chutz and then offers it b'chutz is liable twice because “השחיטה בחוץ כשרה והרי היא כמליקה בפנים,” while the Raavad rejects this sevara and says the Torah equates the chiyuvim of behemah and of, and the Mekdash David explains that the Rambam treats the issur as avodah-based whereas the Raavad treats it as shechitah-based.
- The Gemara asks for the source of petur on ha’kometz and ha’mekabel damim b'chutz and answers that there is no grounds to obligate since the Torah did not ascribe an outside-liability to those avodot. Attempts to derive a chiyuv from shechitah fail because shechitah has the unique pesach disqualification of she’lo le’ochlav, from zerikah fail because a zar is chayav mitah only on an avodah temimah, and from a joint *tzad ha’shaveh* fail, as evidenced by the need for an extra pasuk for zerikah itself indicating that such a *binyan av* is not available here.
- Rabbi Abahu states that one who shechts and sprinkles b'chutz is chayav one according to Rabbi Yishmael and two according to Rabbi Akiva, reflecting whether both acts share one source or draw from distinct p’sukim. Abaye rules that even according to Rabbi Akiva he is liable only once because “שם תעשה” renders them one avodah. In the reverse, one who sprinkles and offers is two according to Rabbi Yishmael and one according to Rabbi Akiva, yet Abaye maintains that even according to Rabbi Akiva it is two because “שם תעלה ושם תעשה” separates them, and if one performs shechitah, zerikah, and ha'alah b'chutz, all agree he is liable twice.
- A beraisa expounds “במחנה” and “אל מחוץ למחנה” to define where outside-liability applies, excluding cases like shechting an olah in the southern Azarah since that area remains ra’ui for shechitat kodshim kalim. Ulla rules that one who shechts on the roof of the Heichal is liable because it is not ra’ui for any shechitat kodshim, and Rava challenges from “אל פתח אהל מועד,” leading to a derivation that “מחוץ למחנה” includes cases such as כולו בחוץ וצוארו בפנים while “אל פתח” excludes the gag, yielding an Amoraic dispute whether gag shechitah is chutz-liability. Acharonim debate whether shechitah in lishkot incurs shechutei chutz, with the Minchas Chinuch, Chazon Ish, and Eilat HaShachar exempting, and Rav Yosef Engel and others obligating.
- The Amoraim dispute whether one who offers b'chutz nowadays is liable, with Rabbi Yochanan obligating because “קדושה ראשונה קידשה לשעתה וקידשה לעתיד לבוא” and Reish Lakish exempting because “קדושה ראשונה קידשה לשעתה ולא קידשה לעתיד לבוא.” The sugya entertains linking this to Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, where Rabbi Yehoshua says “שמעתי שמקריבין אף על פי שאין בית...,” but Ravina tells Rav Ashi that perhaps all agree that the kedushah remains and their statements report distinct mesoros, with the kelai’m serving for tzni’ut. The Chafetz Chaim rules that despite the theoretical allowance, korbanot are not to be reinstated now, citing five impediments: uncertainty of the precise makom haMizbeach, prohibition of entering the Makom due to tum’at met, the need for the tzitz if relying on tum’ah dechuya be’tzibbur, lack of verified kohanim yichus, and lack of techelet for the avnet, while Kranot HaMizbeach contests these and cites a letter of Rabbi Akiva Eiger to the Chasam Sofer urging seeking permission to offer korbanot, though the accepted psak follows the Chafetz Chaim.
- Tosafot infer that Kedushat HaMikdash is not batel while Kedushat Eretz Yisrael may be batel, reasoning that kedushat mechitzot persists and that Yerushalayim is a nachalah whose kedushah endures. Other Baalei Tosafot and the Raavad dispute this distinction, some arguing the opposite or denying any such split, leaving a machlokes Rishonim whether and how the permanence of the two kedushot diverges.
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