Menachos 3
Summary
- The text presents *Menachos* daf 3 as a continuation of a single extended *sugya* with daf 2 about whether a *mincha* offered *shelo lishmah* remains *kasher* and whether it is *oleh l’baalim l’shem chovah*, with the *Mishnah* ruling that it is generally *kasher* but not *oleh*, except *Minchas Chotei* and *Minchas Kenaos*, which become totally *pasul*. It explains an apparent contradiction within two *baraisos* of Rabbi Shimon—one aligning with the *Mishnah* and one claiming that *kol hamenachos shenikmetzu shelo lishman* are both *kesheiros* and *oleh l’baalim*—and lays out three *Amoraic* reconciliations (Rabbah, Rava, and Rav Ashi), with daf 3a largely challenging Rabbah through many *kushyos* and daf 3b presenting Rava’s and Rav Ashi’s resolutions and concluding with analysis of why each approach rejects the others.
- The text states that the *Mishnah* opens the *masechta* by ruling that a *mincha* brought *shelo lishmah* is *kasher* but not *oleh l’baalim l’shem chovah*, except for *Minchas Chotei* and *Minchas Kenaos*, which are *pasul* when done *shelo lishmah*. It states that two *baraisos* record Rabbi Shimon, with one *baraisa* matching the *Mishnah* and the other asserting that all *menachos* whose *kemitzah* is done *shelo lishmah* are *kesheiros* and also *oleh l’baalim l’shem chovah*. It states that three approaches will reconcile this contradiction, and it frames daf 3a as a sustained attack on Rabbah’s approach and daf 3b as presenting Rava’s and Rav Ashi’s approaches and then comparing weaknesses across all three.
- The text attributes to Rabbah the resolution that a *machshavah shelo lishmah* that is obviously contradicted by the actions (*ma’asav mochichin alav*) can be ignored so the offering remains *kasher*, while a *machshavah* that is not obviously contradicted (*lo minchra*) can create *pesul*. It states that Rabbi Shimon’s underlying logic is *doresh ta’ama d’kra*, limiting the *pasuk*-based invalidation of *machshavah shelo lishmah* to the kind of *machshavah* whose error is not evident, and it states that this is connected to the broader *Shas* theme that Rabbi Shimon derives *halachah* from the inferred reason of a *pasuk* even when the *Torah* does not state the reason explicitly. It states that the *Gemara* in *Sanhedrin* teaches that when the *Torah* itself gives the reason for a law, even the *Chachamim* accept *doresh ta’ama d’kra*, and it records that Rav Schachter in *Eretz HaTzvi* notes a parallel in *dinei d’Rabbanan* where sometimes *batel ta’am* removes the *din* and sometimes it does not, tying the distinction to *kol d’tikun Rabbanan k’ein d’Oraisa tikun* and whether the reason is built into the formulation of the *takkanah*.
- The text records the first challenge that an *Olas haOf* whose *melikah* is done *l’maalah* *mishum Chatas haOf* should be valid under Rabbah because the action shows it is an *olah* since *Chatas haOf* is done *l’matah*, and it answers that this is not obvious because *melikah* is valid anywhere on the *mizbe’ach*. It preserves that the text notes a *machlokes Rishonim* whether *melikah* must be on the *mizbe’ach* or can be anywhere in the *azarah*, citing the Raavad in *Maseches Kinnim* as requiring *davka* on the *mizbe’ach* *m’drabbanan* for proximity to *makom hadam*, and the Baal HaMaor as reading *b’chol makom ba’azarah*, and it notes the *Tosefta* version and the Gra’s *hagahah* changing it to *b’chol makom ba’mizbe’ach k’sheirah*. It records a second challenge about *mitzui dam* of *Olas haOf* *l’maalah* *l’shem Chatas haOf* and answers that observers may assume *haza’ah* already occurred and *mitzui* is valid anywhere on the *mizbe’ach*. It records a third case where *Chatas haOf* blood is sprinkled *l’matah* *l’shem Olas haOf* and states that the *Gemara* agrees it is indeed valid because the actions clearly indicate *chatas*, then states that Rabbi Shimon’s statement contrasted *menachos* with *zevachim* and did not directly address *of*, so the text concludes that further challenges must be limited to *zevachim*.
- The text records a challenge that *Kodshei Kodashim* slaughtered in the north *l’shem Kodshim Kalim* should be valid because *Kodshim Kalim* are (assumed) done in the south, and it answers that the *Torah* allows *Kodshim Kalim* to be slaughtered anywhere in the *azarah* and not only the south. It cites *Tosafos* that the question assumes *lechatchilah* one should avoid slaughtering *Kodshim Kalim* in the north to prevent confusion, while the answer rejects that concern and allows even *lechatchilah* anywhere. It records a further challenge that *Kodshim Kalim* slaughtered in the south *l’shem Kodshei Kodashim* should be valid because the location proves it is *kalim*, and it answers that people may assume it is truly *Kodshei Kodashim* and the slaughterer is simply transgressing by slaughtering in the wrong place. It applies that logic back to the pan-case and then rejects the comparison by stating that changing the vessel changes the identity of the *mincha* in the case of *harei alai b’machavas* brought *b’marcheshet*, citing the *Mishnah* that *mah sheheivi heivi* but *yedei nidro lo yatza*, while also raising the possibility of *zu l’havi b’machavas* that would make it *pasul* if brought in the wrong pan. It states that according to the *Rabbanan* this indeed removes *ma’aseh mochiach*, but according to Rabbi Shimon—who holds *af yedei nidro yatza*—the vessel designation is irrelevant and the action still shows what it is.
- The text then challenges Rabbah from gender distinctions, stating that an *olah* slaughtered *l’shem chatas* should be valid because *olah* is male and *chatas* is female, and it answers that *Se’ir Nasi* is a male *chatas*, then refines to *chatas yachid* and also reverses to *chatas yachid* slaughtered *l’shem olah* and answers that the animal’s sex may be obscured by the tail and that, more generally, people do not pay attention to distinguishing *zachar* from *nekeivah* in animals. It brings *Tosafos* in *Sotah* describing Rabbi Yochanan in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai that *tefillah b’lachash* is to avoid embarrassing sinners and that a *chatas* is slaughtered in the same place as an *olah* so people will assume it is an *olas nedavah*, then notes the *Gemara* there assumes observers can recognize gender (especially with a *se’irah*) while this *sugya* assumes people accept what they are told, and it reports *Tosafos*’ answer that curiosity leads people to examine when nothing is said, but when the person declares *l’shem olah* people do not investigate.
- The text then challenges Rabbah from age distinctions, stating that a *Pesach* slaughtered *l’shem Asham* should be valid because one is one-year and the other two-years, and it answers that *Asham Nazir* and *Asham Metzora* undermine the clarity. It refines to *Asham Gezeilos* and *Asham Me’ilos* and reverses the case, and it answers that people are not reliable at judging animal ages because some one-year animals appear two and some two-year appear one. It challenges from wool versus hair by suggesting a *sa’ir* slaughtered *l’shem asham* should be obviously wrong, and it answers that observers might assume it was a black ram that had been shorn. It concludes with the case of an *egel* or *par* slaughtered *l’shem Pesach* or *Asham* and states that the *Gemara* accepts this would indeed be *kasher* because the error is truly obvious, and it resolves that Rabbi Shimon’s statement about *zevachim* being invalid *shelo lishmah* refers to most cases even though occasional obvious-error cases remain *kasher*.
- The text presents Rava’s reconciliation that the *baraisa* allowing *oleh l’baalim* refers to a *kometz mincha l’shem mincha*, while the *baraisa* denying it refers to a *kometz mincha l’shem zevach*, with the distinction that all *menachos* are unified by *v’zos toras haMinchah, torah achas l’chol haMinchos* while no such unification includes *zevachim*. It states that the *Gemara* challenges that Rabbi Shimon’s stated rationale was *ma’aseh mochiach*, and it answers that Rava reads Rabbi Shimon as saying that even though an obvious *machshavah* could have been *posel*, *zos toras haMinchah* makes *mincha l’shem mincha* valid, while *zevachim* do not have that unifying text even though their procedures are similar. It then derives that *zos toras haChatas* would imply *chatas chelev* slaughtered *l’shem chatas dam* or *l’shem chatas avodas kochavim* or *l’shem chatas nazir* or *l’shem chatas metzora* should be valid and effective, and it states the *Gemara* answers that according to Rabbi Shimon it is indeed so. It adds that Rava says the *Rabbanan* distinguish: *chatas chelev* *l’shem chatas dam* or *l’shem chatas avodah zarah* is *kesheirah*, while *l’shem chatas nazir* or *l’shem chatas metzora* is *pasul* because these are treated as having an *olah*-like aspect, and it records that Rav Acha brei d’Rava rules all such cases *l’psula* from *v’shachat osah l’chatas* requiring specificity.
- The text presents Rav Ashi’s reconciliation that saying *machavas l’shum marcheshet* refers to thinking about a different vessel, which does not invalidate because *machshavah* about *mana* does not create *pesul*, while saying *minchas machavas l’shum minchas marcheshet* changes the *shem mincha* and therefore invalidates. It again notes the challenge that Rabbi Shimon explained *kasher* by *ma’aseh mochiach*, and it answers that Rav Ashi likewise reads him as saying that even though an obvious *machshavah* might have been *posel*, the rule still differs between *menachos* and *zevachim* even though *shechitah*, *zerikah*, and *kabbalah* are uniform among *zevachim*. It records Rav Acha brei d’Rava’s question to Rav Ashi about why Rabbi Shimon validates *charivah mishum belulah*, since that seems to be a substantive *mincha* change, and it records Rav Ashi’s answer that it means *l’shem bilah b’alma* rather than renaming the *korban*. It records the counter that perhaps *l’shem shelamim* could likewise mean *l’shem shalom b’alma*, and it answers that *zevach* itself is called *shelamim* in the *pesukim*—*hamakriv es dam hashelamim, hazorek es dam hashelamim*—whereas the *mincha* is not called *belulah* alone, since the *pasuk* says *v’chol minchah belulah ba’shemen* and thus it is called *belulah ba’shemen* but not *belulah* *stam*.
- The text states that the end of the daf will explain why each of the three *Amoraim* does not accept the other two answers and will identify the weak point in each approach. It closes by stating that the continuation will be picked up the next day with this comparative analysis.
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