Menachos 5
Summary
- A sponsored שיעור on מנחות דף ה presents three שיטות about a מנחת העומר brought שלא לשמה and then turns to whether something that is אסור להדיוט can nonetheless be מותר לגבוה. Rav holds a מנחת העומר שלא לשמה is פסול and extends that to אשם נזיר and אשם מצורע, but the גמרא challenges his logic from an אשם מצורע that remains עולה לגבי מזבח even when not performed correctly. Reish Lakish holds a מנחת העומר שקמצה שלא לשמה is כשרה but initially with restricted שיריים until another עומר is brought, and the גמרא reorients his reasoning to the principle that *he’ir mizraḥ matir* even בזמן שבית המקדש קיים. Rava holds the מנחת העומר remains fully effective even with קמיצה שלא לשמה because מחשבה only ruins where all conditions of ראוי לעבודה are present, and then the sugya introduces a קל וחומר about טרפה that is repeatedly countered by examples of apparent אסור להדיוט yet מותר לגבוה, each rejected as *mitzvatah bekakh* or otherwise distinguishable.
- Kenny Scharf sponsors the שיעור לזכות רפואה שלימה for תמר מלכה בת גיטל טובה, with the learning presented as a זכות for her רפואה שלימה בתוך שאר חולי ישראל. The presentation frames the דף as continuing a large sugya rooted in the first משנה of מסכת מנחות about עבודות done שלא לשמה, with special focus on מנחת העומר despite its absence from the משנה’s explicit list of exceptional מנחות.
- Rav states that even though the משנה does not list it, a מנחת העומר brought שלא לשמה is absolutely פסול, and he adds that the first משנה in זבחים is not exhaustive because אשם נזיר and אשם מצורע are also פסול שלא לשמה. Rav’s proposed rationale is that a קרבן that is primarily a מכשיר cannot function לאחר מיתה and therefore cannot retain validity when its הכשר function fails, whereas a מכפר can be brought לאחר מיתה. The גמרא refines this through Rav Pappa citing Rabbi Yirmiyah that no *hechsher kavua* comes לאחר מיתה, while נזיר’s עולה and שלמים are *hechsher she’eino kavua* because גילח על אחד משלשתן יצא.
- A ברייתא challenges Rav by teaching that an אשם מצורע שנשחט שלא לשמו or whose דם is not placed on the בהונות still עולה לגבי מזבח, is טעון נסכים, and requires another אשם to complete the הכשר, creating תיובתא דרב. Tosafot notes that one could have answered *Rav tana hu u’palig*, but the sugya does not adopt that response. The presentation includes an extended aside connecting כפרה לאחר מיתה to כיבוד אב ואם through קידושין ל״א and the phrases הריני כפרת משכבו and זכרונו לברכה לחיי העולם הבא, citing Rashi’s definition and the מרש״ם ח״ג סימן קנ״א via the idea of ערבות, alongside dissenting אחרונים who interpret the phrase as living in a way that reflects credit on the parent.
- Reish Lakish rules that מנחת העומר שקמצה שלא לשמה is כשרה, but שיריה are not eaten until another מנחת העומר is brought to be מתיר the חדש, since the עומר’s role is to permit the year’s new grain and thereby its own שיריים as well. The גמרא questions how it can be offered at all under the rule of ממשקה ישראל מן המותר לישראל and initially attributes the allowance to a principle of *ein meḥusar zeman le’vo bayom*, then attacks that assumption from a ברייתא contrasting עופות and מנחות and from סדרי עבודה in מצורע. The sugya answers that מצורע is different due to *havai’ah* from זאת תהיה תורת המצורע and then challenges again from the פסול created by slaughtering the מצורע’s חטאת before his אשם, explaining the challenge as relating to שחיטה not being עבודה.
- Rav Pappa redefines Reish Lakish’s basis as *he’ir mizraḥ matir*, meaning that on the sixteenth of ניסן sunrise permits חדש even when the בית המקדש stands. The sugya infers this from Reish Lakish’s statement on the משנה that מנחת ביכורים and מנחות accompanying בהמה are פסול before the עומר on the 14th and 15th, but כשר on the 16th even before the עומר, implying sunrise itself permits.
- Rava states that מנחת עומר שקמצה שלא לשמה is כשרה, שיריה נאכלין, and it does not require another מנחת עומר to permit it. Rava explains that מחשבה only takes effect to invalidate in מי שראוי לעבודה, בדבר הראוי לעבודה, ובמקום הראוי לעבודה, excluding a כהן בעל מום, excluding a case like מנחת העומר that is not *ḥazi* as a standard offering because it is חדש, and excluding עבודה when the מזבח is נפגם.
- The presentation states that כפרה can still be achieved לאחר מיתה and aligns that with the idea that certain קרבנות may be brought after the owner’s death, contrasting with a pure מכשיר function that cannot apply after death. It relates this to the obligation to honor parents after death by verbal formulas, brings Rish Lakish’s phrase הריני כפרת רבי חייא ובניו and רבי ישמעאל אומר בני ישראל אני כפרתם, and describes the mechanism as accepting punishment via ערבות. It further cites a halakhic debate about whether heirs must fulfill a deceased person’s commitment to צדקה, reporting that אבקת רוכל obligates the יורשים while תשובת הרמ״א rejects it as a חיוב על הגוף from which one becomes free at death, and it cites a קצות in סימן רצד suggesting that מצוות create a שעבוד on נכסים.
- The sugya initially ties Reish Lakish’s validation of the עומר to the idea that something becoming permitted later the same day is not treated as lacking time, and it tests this with סדרים in מצורע that require repetition when performed out of order. Rav Pappa answers that מצורע has a distinct requirement of *havai’ah* such that תהיה בהוייתה תהא, and the later challenge is framed as focusing on the sequence of שחיטה rather than עבודה. The final resolution attributes Reish Lakish’s view instead to *he’ir mizraḥ matir*, supported by his ruling that on the 16th offerings from new grain are כשר even before the עומר.
- The sugya invokes the principle that offerings must come from what is permitted to ישראל, using the challenge of חדש to question how an invalidating scenario could still allow the offering. A responsum from מענה אליהו applies this principle to water left overnight in a metal vessel that the גמרא in נדה דף יז treats as dangerous, arguing from the ניסוך המים on שבת in סוכה דף מ״ח that what is fit for the מזבח is fit for ישראל.
- A ברייתא derives from מן הבקר that a טרפה is excluded from being brought as a קרבן and proposes a קל וחומר from בעל מום, which is מותר להדיוט but אסור לגבוה, to say טרפה is certainly אסור לגבוה since it is אסורה להדיוט. The sugya repeatedly attempts to undermine the קל וחומר by producing cases that appear אסור להדיוט yet מותר לגבוה, beginning with חלב ודם and rejecting them as parts of an otherwise permitted animal, then with מליקה and rejecting it because קדושתו אסרתו. The sugya explains the phrase ואי משפת as anticipating such refutations and then offers additional candidates, including מנחת העומר, פיטום הקטורת, שבת, and כלאים, while rejecting each as *mitzvatah bekakh* or as having a היתר already embedded in the system such as שבת via מילה and כלאים via ציצית, both characterized as מצוה rather than hedyot use. The narrative ends with the statement that the search for a true counterexample continues to the next day’s learning.
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