Summary
  • Today’s learning is מנחות דף י״ד, returning to the משנה on י״ג עמוד ב׳ and centering on שיטת רבי יוסי about partial *pigul* in שתי הלחם and לחם הפנים. Rav Huna extends רבי יוסי to claim that a מחשבת פיגול on one limb of a זבח only renders that limb *pigul*, but the גמרא brings three rejections and רבי יוחנן concludes that by a זבח, *pigul* in the right thigh renders the left thigh *pigul* as well. רבי יוחנן explains רבי יוסי’s split ruling in breads as תלוי in פסוקים that simultaneously frame them as one unit and as two units, so the status follows how one combines or separates them in מחשבה. The sugya then moves to whether מחשבות of חצי כזית across different עבודות (such as שחיטה and זריקה, and possibly קבלה and הולכה) are מצטרף for *pigul*, and it closes with the framing issue of אין מפגלין בחצי מתיר and whether partial-matir מחשבה yields only “not *pigul*” or also פסול.
  • Today's starting point is the משנה on י״ג עמוד ב׳: if one slaughtered the שני כבשי עצרת with intent to eat one of the loaves of the שתי הלחם למחר, or burned the two בזיכי לבונה of the לחם הפנים with intent to eat one of the סדרים למחר, רבי יוסי rules that only the specific חלה or specific סדר becomes *pigul* with כרת, while the other is פסול without כרת. The חכמים rule that both become *pigul* and one is חייב כרת on either.
  • Rav Huna reads רבי יוסי to mean that a מחשבת *pigul* can apply to part of an offering without spreading to the rest, and he applies that to a זבח as פיגול בירך של ימין לא נתפגל הירך של שמאל. Rav Huna offers either a סברא that מחשבה is not stronger than a מעשה of טומאה, and the comparison is framed through how טומאה relates to limbs and separation, or a פסוק-based derivation from והנפש האוכלת ממנו עונה תשא with a דרשה of ממנו ולא מחבירו. The חידושי הרשב״א on רש״י explains that the חכמים read the same word as ממנו מכל מקום שיאכל ממנו.
  • Rashi is presented as implying that a מחשבת פיגול might isolate a part even while the animal remains one connected unit, while Tosafot is presented as limiting Rav Huna’s idea to a case where the animal is already cut into pieces. The Brisker Rav extends the conceptual reading so that if Rav Huna works even when connected, specificity could narrow the effect to “this *kezayit*,” contrasting with a nonspecific “a *kezayit*” that is assumed to be מפגל the entire offering.
  • Rav Naḥman challenges Rav Huna from a ברייתא about two breads requiring *pigul* “until one is מפגל בשתיהן בכזית,” and the argument turns on whether that implies צירוף across two items in רבי יוסי’s framework. The גמרא answers that the ברייתא can follow רבי and focus on whether halves combine through מחשבה, and it then reframes the language from בשתיהן to בשניהם so the point becomes that one must be מפגל during both כבשים because they are jointly מתיר the bread, rejecting רבי מאיר’s view of מפגלין בחצי מתיר. The גמרא then challenges again via a ברייתא quoted by Rav Ashi in which רבי says משום רבי יוסי that מחשבה “בחוץ בדבר הנעשה בחוץ” creates *pigul* but מחשבה that crosses outside/inside domains does not, and the case of לשפוך שיריים למחר shows that מחשבת פיגול about דם still renders the בשר *pigul* even though דם itself cannot be *pigul*. Ravina brings a third proof from the משנה that one who is קומץ a מנחה with intent to burn the קומץ למחר makes the offering *pigul* with כרת, and since the קומץ itself cannot become *pigul*, the *pigul* necessarily lands on the שיריים despite the מחשבה being on the קומץ.
  • The sugya invokes the משנה in זבחים listing items not subject to *pigul* because they lack a matir, including the קומץ, the לבונה, קטורת, מנחת כהנים, מנחת נסכים, מנחת כהן משיח, and the דם. The argument uses that rule to show that when the Gemara calls a case *pigul* based on מחשבה about דם or about קומץ, it must mean that other components (בשר or שיריים) become *pigul*, undermining Rav Huna’s idea that only the targeted component is affected.
  • רבי יוחנן rules that even for רבי יוסי, by a זבח, if one is מפגל בימין one is מפגל בשמאל, so a limb-focused מחשבה does not isolate the effect. רבי יוחנן explains that the two loaves are governed by competing פסוקים: הכתוב עשאן גוף אחד because they are מעכבי אהדדי with “שתים ולא אחת” and “תהיינה” as לשון עיכוב, and הכתוב עשאן שני גופים because the Torah treats them as separately made with הלוך ודעביד והלוך ודעביד. The rule becomes that if one “mixes” them in מחשבה they combine, and if one “splits” them in מחשבה they split, because the פסוקים support both framings.
  • רבי יוחנן asks whether the same logic applies to לחמי תודה and to מנחת מאפה, including the case associated with רבי שמעון where the offering can be split between רקיקין and חלות. תנא דבי תחליפא ממערבא states that the same principle applies in לחמי תודה and in מנחת מאפה as well, so partial *pigul* can apply to some parts without necessarily applying to the rest. A later note frames a ראשונים debate whether the question is only about different types or even about quantity within a uniform type.
  • A ברייתא states that if during שחיטה one thinks to eat כחצי זית חוץ לזמנו and during זריקה one thinks to eat another כחצי זית חוץ לזמנו, it is *pigul* because שחיטה and זריקה are מצטרפין. One version ties the צירוף to the fact that both are מתירין, while another version argues that if the “bookend” עבודות combine then certainly the closer middle עבודות like קבלה and הולכה combine. A challenge from Levi states that four עבודות do not combine for *pigul*, and Rava answers that this is a dispute between רבי and the רבנן, tying רבי’s view to his ruling in the case of the שני כבשי עצרת and half-*kezayit* מחשבות on the loaves. Abaye suggests that רבי’s leniency might be limited to חצי מתיר וחצי אכילה, while Rava bar Ḥana argues that if רבי treated כולו מתיר וחצי אכילה as *pigul*, he would have decreed on the half-matir case as well, pointing to cases where רבי יוסי and the רבנן treat “not *pigul*” as at least פסול.
  • The sugya frames the issue of אין מפגלין בחצי מתיר as potentially meaning either that it is simply not *pigul* and therefore כשר, or that it is not *pigul* yet still פסול מדרבנן. Evidence is marshaled from רבי יוסי’s ruling of פסול ואין בו כרת in cases like הקטיר לבונתה למחר, and from the חכמים who say אין בו כרת עד שיפגל בכל המתיר while still treating the outcome as פסול. The session ends by locating where to continue: turning back to דף י״ג עמוד ב׳ near the bottom, at the eighth line from the bottom beginning with וכן במנחת חוטא וכן במנחת קנאות, as the גמרא reacts to the framework of partial-matir מחשבה.
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