Menachos 15
Summary
- The משנה rules that if one of the *chalot* of *shivtei ha’atzaret* or one of the *sedarim* of *lechem hapanim* becomes *tamei*, רבי יהודה requires burning both units because *ein korban tzibbur chaluk*, while חכמים require burning only the *tamei* unit and eating the *tahor* unit. The Brisker Rav explains how רבי יהודה’s “both go to burning” can still align with the usual distinction between immediate burning for *pesulo begufo* and delayed burning after *ibbur tzurah*, and he notes a potential complication if one allows burning *basar shenitma* at night. The גמרא limits the משנה’s dispute to לפני זריקה and initially ties it to whether the *tzitz* is *meratzeh* for *akhilot*, but rejects that approach through several challenges and concludes with רבי יוחנן that רבי יהודה’s reason is exactly his stated principle that a public offering is not divided. The later משנה and גמרא establish that the animal component can create *piggul* for accompanying bread, but the bread cannot create *piggul* for the animal, and they analyze partial-*kezayit* intent, *kal vachomer* attempts, and parallel cases for תודה and for כבשים, ending with a question about what “חבירו” means when one slaughters a sheep with intent to eat its “companion” tomorrow.
- The משנה states that if one *challah* or one *seder* becomes *tamei*, רבי יהודה says both go out to *beit hasreifah* because *ein korban tzibbur chaluk*. The חכמים say the *tamei* unit is treated in its *tumah* and burned, while the *tahor* unit is eaten.
- The Brisker Rav reads “שניהם יצאו לבית השריפה” as implying one shared דין for the burning of the *tamei* unit and the *tahor* unit, and he finds this difficult because the *tamei* bread has *pesul haguf* and should burn מיד, while the *tahor* bread lacks *pesul haguf* and ordinarily waits until *ibbur tzurah*. The text cites פסחים דף לד עמוד ב that “כל שפסולו בגופו ישרף מיד” while “בדם ובבעלים תעובר צורתן,” and it cites רש״י that *ibbur tzurah* means *pesul linah* by leaving it overnight. The Brisker Rav answers that the *tumah* occurs on יום טוב for *shivtei ha’atzaret* and on שבת for *lechem hapanim*, and since one does not burn *kodashim* on שבת ויום טוב nor at night, the burning happens only the next day, by which time the *tahor* unit has *ibbur tzurah*, so both are burned together in practice. The text then notes that this depends on assuming one does not burn *kodashim* at night, cites the Rambam in פסולי המוקדשין פרק יט and the כסף משנה that *piggul* and *notar* are burned only by day, and brings רבי עקיבא איגר’s inference that *basar shenitma* may be burned at night, which would revive the original difficulty.
- The גמרא quotes רבי אלעזר that the dispute is לפני זריקה, meaning before זריקת הדם for the *chalot* of *shivtei ha’atzaret* and before הקטרת הבזיכין for *lechem hapanim*. The גמרא states that לאחר זריקה everyone agrees: “הטמא בטומאתו והטהור יאכל.”
- Rav Pappa explains that the dispute before זריקה is whether the *tzitz* is *meratzeh* for *akhilot*, with the רבנן holding “הציץ מרצה על אכילות” and רבי יהודה holding “אין הציץ מרצה על אכילות.” רש״י explains that even when the *tzitz* is *meratzeh*, it makes the זריקה a valid זריקה and the offering a valid offering, but it does not permit eating the *tamei* portion. The text adds background that *ritzui tzitz* applies to *tumah* of the offering, based on “ונשא אהרן את עון הקדשים,” and that the *tzitz* is *meratzeh* on *tum’at dam*, *tum’at kometz*, and *tum’at levonah*, with a further debate about *tum’at olin*, and the present issue is the debate about *tum’at akhilot*. The text states that the *tzitz* is not *meratzeh* for *tum’at haguf* of the כהן, only for *tumah* in the korban.
- The גמרא challenges Rav Pappa three times: it cites a ברייתא about one *bazich* becoming *tamei* where רבי יהודה still says both are done *betumah* due to *ein korban tzibbur chaluk* even though the *tzitz* is accepted as *meratzeh* on *olin*; it cites Rav Ashi’s proof that רבי יהודה rules that even if one שבט is *tamei* and others are *tahor* the ציבור offering is done *betumah*, where *tzitz* is irrelevant because it does not atone for *tum’at haguf*; and it cites Ravina’s proof from the משנה’s own stated reason that רבי יהודה should have said “לפי שאין הציץ מרצה על אכילות” if Rav Pappa were correct. The גמרא concludes with רבי יוחנן that it is a “לימוד ערוך” for רבי יהודה that *ein korban tzibbur chaluk*, and this is his reason rather than *tzitz* atonement.
- The text explains, in the name of ביאור הדף citing קובץ שיעורים בחולין אות ל״ג by ר' אלחנן, that *tum’at hakorban* is a דין פסול within פסולי הקרבנות, so *ritzui tzitz* addresses that פסול. The text contrasts this with a כהן who is *tamei*, where the יסוד is a דין איסור והיתר on the person, not an intrinsic פסול in the offering, so *ritzui tzitz* is not needed there and the framework differs based on whether the issue begins as פסול or begins as איסור.
- The משנה states: “התודה מפגלת את הלחם והלחם אינו מפגל את התודה.” The משנה explains that if one slaughters the תודה with intent to eat from it tomorrow, both the תודה and the bread are *piggul*, while if one slaughters with intent to eat from the bread tomorrow, the bread is *piggul* and the תודה is not. רש״י explains “the תודה is not *piggul*” as meaning one who eats it is not liable to כרת, and the קרן אורה infers from רש״י that the תודה is nevertheless פסול even if it is not *piggul*. The שפת אמת explains that a מחשבת *piggul* during the עבודה creates a פסול in the act itself even when it does not generate *piggul* status for that component, so the שחיטה is a פסול מעשה and can invalidate even where it does not create כרת-level *piggul*, and the עולת שלמה applies this to the case on דף י״ב עמוד ב׳ where the non-targeted portion becomes פסול without כרת because the עבודה itself was performed with a פסול מחשבה.
- The משנה states: “הכבשים מפגלין את הלחם והלחם אינו מפגל את הכבשים,” and it parallels the תודה case by ruling that intent to eat the כבשים tomorrow makes both sheep and bread *piggul*, while intent to eat the bread tomorrow makes the bread *piggul* and the sheep not *piggul*. The גמרא rejects explaining this through Rav Kahana’s idea that *lachmei todah* are called “תודה,” since that naming does not exist for calling the bread “כבשים.” The גמרא instead gives the principle “לחם גלל תודה ואין תודה גלל לחם,” and likewise “לחם גלל כבשים ואין כבשים גלל הלחם,” with רש״י stating that the animal is עיקר and the bread טפל because the שחיטה of the animal is מקדש the bread, as learned from “יקריב קרבנו” that the bread becomes קדוש only with the שחיטת הזבח.
- The גמרא says that if only תודה were taught one might think the bread cannot affect the animal there because they are not mutually bound by תנופה, but for כבשים where they are bound by תנופה one might think the relationship becomes reciprocal, so both are needed. The רש״ש challenges this because רש״י and the Rambam state that by תודה there is also תנופה together with the bread, which appears to contradict the גמרא’s distinction. The Brisker Rav answers that even if they are waved together in practice, by תודה the חיוב תנופה for the animal and for the bread are two separate מחייבים, while by כבשי עצרת the תנופה is one unified מחייב, so the גמרא’s distinction is למדני rather than practical.
- The גמרא presents a question from Rav Asi to Rav about slaughtering a תודה with intent to eat a half-*kezayit* of the animal and a half-*kezayit* of the bread tomorrow, and it focuses on whether the components combine to render the bread *piggul* while assuming the animal itself will not become *piggul*. Rav answers that the bread becomes *piggul* and the תודה does not become *piggul*. The גמרא asks why a *kal vachomer* does not exempt the bread, and it compares this to a case where someone plants seeds in another’s vineyard producing *kil’ei hakerem*, where the חכמים forbid the seeds but permit the vines, and it frames a parallel *kal vachomer* that would have permitted the seeds. The גמרא answers that the vineyard case is governed by a rabbinic penalty structure, expressed as “קנבוס ולוף אסרה תורה” and other seeds being treated as מדרבנן with a קנס on the wrongdoer, and it therefore does not undermine applying the reasoning in the *piggul* context. The text then records three approaches to “קנבוס ולוף אסרה תורה”: רש״י and Rambam that only these are אסור מן התורה, תוספות and מלאכת שלמה that these are in addition to the חמשה מיני דגן, and שיטה ומקבצת that reads the phrase as rhetorical and holds all seeds are אסור מן התורה.
- The text records an alternate version that repeats the half-*kezayit* question and the *kal vachomer* and vineyard analogy but applies it to slaughtering the כבשים with intent to eat a half-*kezayit* of the sheep and a half-*kezayit* of the bread tomorrow, with the same ruling that the bread becomes *piggul* and the sheep do not become *piggul*. The גמרא states that if the דין is taught by תודה it is certainly true by כבשים, while if it is taught by כבשים one might have thought it applies only there because the כבשים are bound to the bread through תנופה, unlike תודה.
- The text brings a question asked about slaughtering one כבש with intent to eat “חבירו” tomorrow and asks whether “חבירו” refers to the other כבש or to the bread. The response attempts to infer from a teaching that uses “מחבירו” as referring to the other כבש, but the גמרא rejects the inference by saying it may be a case where he explicitly said “חבירו כבש,” and it leaves open that saying only “חבירו” might mean the bread.
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