Menachos 3 - Cycle 4
Summary
- Today’s *shiur* on Menachos daf 3 opens on daf 2b and continues the Gemara’s effort to reconcile contradictory *beraisos* in Rabbi Shimon about a *korban minchah* brought *shelo lishmah*. The sugya challenges Rabbah’s distinction between cases where the improper intent is *minkar* versus *lo minkar* through a series of comparisons to *ofos* and *zevachim*, repeatedly testing whether “*ma’aseh mochi’ach*” removes *shinui kodesh* or whether observers can still attribute what happened to error. The Gemara then presents additional reconciliations from Rava and Rav Ashi, derives principles such as “Torah achas lechol hamenachos” and its potential extension to *chata’os*, and concludes by explaining why each approach rejects the others.
- Today’s *shiur* begins from the earlier contradiction in Rabbi Shimon about a *minchah* brought *shelo lishmah* and the proposed reconciliations of Rabbah, Rava, and Rav Ashi. Rabbah reconciles the *beraisos* by distinguishing between a case where the improper thought is *minkar* and discounted versus a case where it is *lo minkar* and the *minchah* becomes *pasul*. The Gemara now questions Rabbah’s approach using a סימן: עולה, מלק, וגמיצה, חטאת עוף, קודשי קודשים, קודשים קלים.
- The *shiur* reviews *Zevachim* laws that *olas ha’of* has *melikah* on the top of the *mizbe’ach*, the head is separated, and the blood is squeezed on the upper half, with two explanations of *mitzuy*. The *avodah* of *melikah*, *haza’ah*, and *haktarah* is tied to the verse “ומלק את ראשו והקטיר המזבחה ונמצה דמו על קיר המזבח,” and the Gemara learns that just as *haktarah* is at the top, so too *melikah* and *mitzuy hadam* are *berosh hamizbe’ach*. The *chatas ha’of* is performed differently: its *melikah* may be done anywhere on the *mizbe’ach*, the head is not separated, *haza’as dam* goes on the lower half, the meat is eaten, and the remaining blood is squeezed to the *yesod* as in “והנשאר בדם ימצה אל יסוד המזבח,” with a discussion whether this *mitzuy* is essential.
- The Gemara asks that if “obvious” conduct removes disqualification, then an *olas ha’of* done on the upper half *leshem chatas ha’of* should be *kasher* because “דשמא מוכיח עליה,” since a *chatas ha’of* is normally done below. The Gemara responds that *chatas ha’of* done above is still valid, since “מליקה בכל מקום במזבח … כשירה,” so upper placement does not prove it is not *chatas ha’of*. The *Shitah* explains that *melikah* itself may not be readily identifiable to all depending on whether it is on one or two *simanim*, and *Toras HaKodesh* adds that Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon hold on *Zevachim* 65b that by a bird the head can be separated even for *chatas*, removing that distinction.
- The Gemara asks that *mitzuy* of an *olas ha’of* above *leshem chatas ha’of* should also be *kasher* because the act seems to prove it is an *olah*, given that *chatas* involves *haza’ah* first and *mitzuy* to the *yesod*. The Gemara answers “דילמא מיצוי דבתר הזאה הוא,” since *chatas ha’of* also has *mitzuy*, and it further cites “מיצוי דם בכל מקום במזבח,” so observers may not read the act as conclusively *olah*. The *Chazon Ish* explains that since *chatas ha’of* can be *kasher* even without *mitzuy*, doing *mitzuy* in the “wrong” place is no worse than omitting it.
- The Gemara asks that if a *chatas ha’of* has *haza’ah* below and one says it is *leshem olas ha’of*, the act should prove it is *chatas* because *olah* is above and uses *mitzuy* rather than *haza’ah*. The Gemara answers “הכי נמי,” that when it is obviously incorrect, the *korban* remains *kasher* following the line attributed in the *shiur* to Rava’s reasoning. The *mefarshim* note the Gemara could also have asked from *melikah* location itself, and Tosafos explains the Gemara keeps the question symmetrical with the earlier direction of the challenge.
- The Gemara challenges further with *kodshei kodashim* slaughtered in the north *leshem kodshim kalim*, arguing the location should prove it is *kodshei kodashim* since *kodshim kalim* are done in the south. The Gemara answers that the Torah’s requirement for *kodshim kalim* does not exclude the north, since “בכל מקום בעזרה” applies, and Tosafos explains the initial assumption that *kodshim kalim* are generally done in the south because *kodshei kodashim* are restricted to the north. The Gemara then considers *kodshim kalim* slaughtered in the south *leshem kodshei kodashim* and answers that observers may still say it is *kodshei kodashim* and the slaughterer simply violated the rule, “ומבר הוא דעבר ושחט בדרום.”
- Rashi asks that if observers can always assume error, earlier challenges should fall away, and Rashi answers that people may attribute one deviation to error but not multiple deviations together. The Brisker Rav offers a different approach: when the mistaken act resembles a plausible *avodah* location for some *korbanos*, it does not alert observers, whereas the *avodos* of *chatas ha’of* and *olas ha’of* are so distinct that incorrect performance becomes “*ma’aseh mochi’ach*.” Tosafos states the original *hava amina* that *kodshim kalim* are never brought in the north, and *Asvan D’Oraisa* in the name of Rabbi Yosef Engel explains a practical reluctance to bring *kodshim kalim* where *kodshei kodashim* are slaughtered due to *bizayon*, though the Gemara maintains the halacha permits it.
- The Gemara returns to the earlier *minchah* case of *machavas* versus *marcheshes* and asks that perhaps one who says *marcheshes* but brings a *machavas* is simply mistaken. The Gemara answers that if one vowed “הרי עלי במחבת” and brought *marcheshes* or vice versa, “מה שהביא הביא” but “ידי נדרו לא יצא,” so what is brought becomes that type of *minchah* despite not fulfilling the specific vow. The Gemara then raises the case “זו להביא במחבת” where the flour is designated and if brought in the other vessel “הרי זו פסולה,” since the flour acquired that specific *kedushah*.
- The Gemara says that according to the Rabbanan, where designation to a specific vessel makes the alternative *pasul*, one cannot rely on *ma’aseh mochi’ach* because the prior designation might control. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Shimon holds “שאף ידי נדרו יצא” because “קביעותא דמנא לאו כלום הוא,” and he does not distinguish between “זו” and “עלי.” The *shiur* presents this as making *machavas* and *marcheshes* interchangeable for Rabbi Shimon, so saying the wrong one does not create disqualification.
- The Gemara asks that *olah* slaughtered *leshem chatas* should be *kasher* because *olah* is male and *chatas* is female, but it answers that *chatas nazir* exists and involves a male, so the mismatch is not absolute. The Gemara asks further about explicitly saying *chatas yachid* with a male, and about *chatas yachid* (female) slaughtered *leshem olah*, and answers that in some cases the relevant anatomy is covered by the tail, and then concludes more generally that “בין זכר לנקבה לאו אטו דעת אינשי,” people do not reliably pay attention to sex.
- The Gemara asks that *pesach* slaughtered *leshem asham* should be *kasher* because *pesach* is בן שנה while *asham* is בן שתי שנים, and answers that *asham nazir* and *asham metzora* are also בן שנה so the statement is not necessarily false. The Gemara then asks about explicitly naming *asham gezeilos* and *asham me’ilos* and the reverse case, and answers “בין בן שנה לבין בן שתי שנים לאו אטו דעת אינשי,” since animals can appear younger or older than their true age.
- The Gemara asks about a *se’ir* of *chatas* slaughtered *leshem asham* and suggests wool versus hair should reveal the mismatch. The Gemara answers that people may interpret a dark male animal as appearing like hair while still being wool, so it is not necessarily discernable.
- The Gemara asks that if an *egel* for *olah* or *shelamim* or a *par* for *chatas* is slaughtered *leshem pesach* or *asham*, it should be *kasher* because such a claim is patently false. The Gemara agrees “אין הכי נמי,” and explains that Rabbi Shimon’s statement that *zevachim* are not like *menachos* refers to “רוב זבחים,” where the mismatch is not obviously impossible. The *shiur* adds that *rishonim* note the earlier answer of “מעבר עבר” need not be maintained, and that in cases of clear impossibility Rabbi Shimon can agree there is no *shinui kodesh* problem even by animal offerings.
- Rava offers a different reconciliation: the *beraisa* permitting applies to “בקמץ מנחה לשם מנחה,” while the disqualifying *beraisa* applies to “בקמץ מנחה לשם זבח.” Rava grounds the first in “זאת תורת המנחה,” teaching “אחת לכל המנחות,” while rejecting extension to *zevachim* because “זאת תורת המנחה לזבח לא כתיב.” Rav Pappa challenges that Rabbi Shimon’s reason in the *beraisa* is “משום דמחשבה ניכרת,” and the Gemara explains that Rava reads Rabbi Shimon as saying the verse validates even when the thought is not *minkar*.
- The Gemara explains “אבל בזבחים אינו כן” as meaning that even though there is “שחיטה אחת לכולן,” the verse-based unification applies only to *menachos* and not to animal offerings. The Gemara then asks that if so, slaughtering *chatas chelev* *leshem chatas stam* or *leshem chatas avodah zarah* or *leshem chatas nazir* or *leshem chatas metzora* should be *kasher* from “זאת תורת החטאת,” implying “תורה אחת לכל חטאת.” The Gemara answers that according to Rabbi Shimon this extension is correct, while for the Rabbanan the Gemara presents Rava’s view that *chatas* brought for other *kareis*-type *chata’os* remains *kasher* but switching to *chatas nazir* or *chatas metzora* fails because those are “לדורון נינהו” and differ in purpose from atonement for sin.
- Rav Acha brei d’Rava teaches “לכולה פסולה” for switching one *chatas* for another, based on “ושחט אותה לחטאת,” requiring it to be slaughtered specifically for that *chatas*. This approach rejects the broader “Torah achas lechol chata’os” application in practice for *shinui kodesh* within *chata’os*.
- Rav Ashi reconciles Rabbi Shimon by distinguishing “בקמץ מחבת לשם מרחשת” from “בקמץ מנחת מחבת לשם מנחת מרחשת.” The Gemara explains that saying *machavas* versus *marcheshes* without “*minchah*” means “במנא קא מחשב,” a vessel-focused thought that “לא פסלה,” while using “*minchas*” means “במנחה דפסול בה מחשבה קא מחשב” and disqualifies. The Gemara aligns this with the *beraisa*’s “שמא מוכיח עליו” by reading it as applying even where the thought is *minkar* yet still not disqualifying when it is merely a vessel-thought.
- The Gemara explains that even though “שחיטה אחת לכולן,” “זריקה אחת לכולן,” and “קבלה אחת לכולן,” animal offerings remain *pasul* under wrong intent because “זביחה דפסול בה מחשבה קא מחשב,” meaning the disqualifying thought targets the *korban* itself.
- Rav Acha brei d’Rava asks how Rav Ashi can validate *chareivah* *leshem belulah*, since this is not a vessel distinction but a *minchah* characteristic. Rav Ashi answers that saying *belulah* is “לשום בילה קאמר,” focusing on the mixing manner rather than the *minchah* identity, so it remains in the category of a non-disqualifying thought.
- The Gemara challenges that if omitting “*minchah*” changes meaning, then saying “לשום שלמים” without “*korban*” should also be read as non-*korban* intent. The Gemara answers that “שלמים” is the name of the *korban* itself, as in “המקריב את דם השלמים,” while a *minchah* is not called *belulah* alone, since the verse says “וכל מנחה בלולה בשמן,” making “בלולה בשמן” the term but not “בלולה סתמא.”
- The Gemara concludes that Rav Ashi and Rava reject Rabbah because they do not accept that “מחשבה דמינכרא פסלא רחמנא,” and they hold that greater obviousness can increase, not decrease, concern for disqualification. The Gemara says they reject Rava’s approach because the derashah “זאת תורת המנחה” as “תורה אחת לכל המנחות” is “לא משמע להו.” The Gemara says they reject Rav Ashi’s approach because of the difficulty raised by Rav Acha brei d’Rava regarding *chareivah* and *belulah*, where the leniency cannot be attributed simply to disregarding the vessel.
Previous Page
Next Page
Daf Images are property of Vagshal and may not be reproduced.
Suggestions