Menachos 3
Summary
- An ongoing analysis of *shitat Rabbi Shimon* in Menachot דף ג weighs when a *machshava shelo lishmah* invalidates a *mincha* and whether the idea of *ma'asav mochichin alav* extends to *zevachim*. The sugya tests multiple parallel cases in *kodshei kodashim*, *kodshim kalim*, *olah*, *chatat*, *pesach*, and *asham* to see when an action makes the stated intent implausible, and it concludes that this works only in limited subsets of sacrifices. The Gemara then resolves an apparent contradiction in Rabbi Shimon through three approaches—Rabba, Rava, and Rav Ashi—each framing differently whether an “obviously false” intent helps or harms and whether the verse וזאת תורת המנחה creates a special rule for *menachot*. The discussion extends to the scope of “one Torah” language by *chatat* and ends with Rabbi Oshaya asking Rabbi Asi for Rabbi Shimon’s view on *mincha l’shem zevach*, with Rabbi Asi declining because Rabbi Shimon’s underlying reasoning remains unclear.
- A sponsor is stated לעילוי נשמת מרדכי צבי בן יעקב משה נשמה should have an עליה. The learning begins on Menachot דף ג around the eighth line at the two dots with the words קדשי קדשים ששחטם בצפון, while continuing the earlier thread about Rabbi Shimon.
- Rabbi Shimon accepts a *hekesh* between *zevachim* and *menachot* that teaches that just as a *korban* done שלא לשמה is פסול, so too a *mincha* done שלא לשמה is פסול, but not across the board. A *mincha* performed שלא לשמה is כשר when מעשיו מוכיחין עליו and the action shows what is really being done, such as a מנחת מחבת where the person says the קמיצה is for a מרחשת but a מחבת is visibly used. The framing is that actions override words even though his words and *machshava shelo lishmah* point elsewhere.
- The Gemara initially assumes there is never a case in *regular korbanot* where Rabbi Shimon’s rule applies and that it is exclusive to *menachot*, and then it challenges that assumption. It asks about קדשי קדשים ששחטם בצפון לשם קדשים קלים, proposing they should be accepted because the north slaughter proves they are *kodshei kodashim*, but it answers that *kodshim kalim* may be slaughtered anywhere in the *azarah*, so the action does not prove anything. It then asks about קדשים קלים ששחטם בדרום לשם קדשי קדשים and rejects it because people might say it is really *kodshei kodashim* and the person merely violated and slaughtered in the south, creating a mistaken permission.
- The Gemara compares that public-confusion concern to a *mincha* case, where a מחבת is done לשם מרחשת, and answers that in vows it can be valid because a person who vowed a מחבת and brought a מרחשת, or vowed a מרחשת and brought a מחבת, מה שהביא הביא though he is not יוצא his נדר. A stricter case arises when he says זו להביא במחבת והביא במרחשת, or the reverse, which a Mishnah states is פסולה, creating an apparent parallel to the *zevachim* concern. The Gemara says that according to רבנן it is indeed פסולה, but according to רבי שמעון it is not, because רבי שמעון holds אף ידי נדרו יצא and therefore קביעותא דמנא ולאו כלום הוא, and it makes no difference whether he said זו or עלי.
- The Gemara proposes that an עולה slaughtered לשם חטאת should be valid because the olah is male and the chatat is female, but it answers that a שעיר נשיא is a male chatat and removes certainty. It then sharpens the case to חטאת יחיד and also asks the reverse, חטאת יחיד ששחטה לשם עולה, and answers that the gender may be hidden by the tail and that even with a goat, between זכר לנקבה לאו אדעתיה דאינשי because people do not focus on the distinction. It similarly asks about פסח slaughtered לשם אשם based on age differences and answers that אשם נזיר and אשם מצורע can be within the first year like a פסח, and even when specifying אשם גזילות or אשם מעילות, it answers that between בן שנה לבן שתים לאו אדעתיה דאינשי because some one-year animals look two and some two-year animals look one. It further asks about a goat slaughtered לשם אשם on the basis of wool versus hair and answers that observers may say it is a black ram, so the mismatch is not obvious.
- The Gemara asks about עגל ופר slaughtered לשם פסח ואשם and states that these cannot be פסח or אשם, so the sacrifice should be valid under Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara agrees with אינהי נמי and then reinterprets what Rabbi Shimon meant by “zevachim,” explaining that it means רוב זבחים rather than all, so there are limited cases in which the action makes the stated intent irrelevant and the offering remains valid.
- The Gemara returns to the original contradiction: one baraita in Rabbi Shimon says any *mincha* brought שלא לשמה is כשר and counts for the owner, while another says it is either פסול or at best כשר but does not count. Rava says לא קשיא and distinguishes between קומץ מנחה לשם מנחה, which is validated by וזאת תורת המנחה and תורה אחת לכל המנחות, and קומץ מנחה לשם זבח, which is פסול because וזאת תורת המנחה וזבח לא כתיב. When challenged from the baraita’s phrase מפני שמעשיו מוכיחין עליו, the explanation is reframed that even though the *machshava* is not recognizable as true and should invalidate, the verse creates the validation across *menachot*.
- The narrative states that this understanding reverses how “מינכרא” was understood earlier, because here Rava treats a “clearly false” intent as a reason to invalidate and needs the verse to make it valid. The text contrasts this with Rabba, who had treated the action contradicting the statement as a reason the thought does not invalidate, making Rava the opposite of Rabba on this point. The continuation “אבל בזבחים אינו כן” is explained as applying because the verse only says וזאת תורת המנחה and does not include *zevach*, so the special leniency does not extend to sacrifices even if there is a unified process of שחיטה, קבלה, and זריקה.
- The Gemara asks whether by the same logic a חטאת חלב slaughtered לשם חטאת דם, חטאת עבודת כוכבים, חטאת נזיר, or חטאת מצורע should be כשר because זאת תורת החטאת implies תורה אחת לחטאות, and it answers that for Rabbi Shimon it is indeed valid. It then presents Rava’s statement for the Rabbanan that חטאת חלב slaughtered לשם חטאת דם or עבודת כוכבים is כשירה because these share the same כרת-based category, but לשם חטאת נזיר or לשם חטאת מצורע is פסולה because דהני עולות בהדייהו נינהו and a confusion may arise. It adds that Rav Acha brei d’Rava teaches that all such switches are פסול due to ושחט אותה לחטאת, requiring it to be slaughtered for that specific *chatat*.
- Rav Ashi offers a third resolution: one baraita is קומץ מחבת לשם מרחשת, which is כשר because the intent is about the vessel and מחשבה במנא לא פסלה, while the other is קומץ מנחת מחבת לשם מנחת מרחשת, which is פסול because the intent is about the *mincha* itself and מחשבה there can invalidate. The same baraita language about מעשה מוכיח is again reframed so that even though the thought seems implausible and should invalidate, the first case survives only because the statement is not framed as a different *mincha* but as a vessel-reference.
- Rav Acha brei d’Rava asks Rav Ashi why a dry *mincha* (*harivah*) intended לשם בלולה is כשר, and Rav Ashi answers that it means לשם בילה בעלמא and does not constitute an invalidating designation of a *korban*. The Gemara then challenges that if so, slaughtering a sacrifice לשם שלמים should also be explainable as “peace” rather than a *korban*, and it answers that a sacrifice is itself called שלמים in Tanakh, so the default meaning is the *korban* category. It contrasts that with *mincha*, which is not called בלולה without saying בלולה בשמן, so בלולה alone does not name a *mincha* type and remains non-invalidating language.
- The text states that Rav Ashi and Rava do not accept Rabba because they hold the opposite, that מחשבה דמינכרא פסל רחמנא. It states that Rabba and Rav Ashi do not accept Rava because וזאת תורת does not imply to them an all-purpose היתר. It states that they do not accept Rav Ashi because of the קושיא of Rav Acha brei d’Rava, even though Rav Ashi answered it.
- The Gemara says what was obvious to Rabba from one side and to Rava from the other becomes a question for רבי אושעיא, who asks, and some say he asked רבי אסי, about מנחה לשם זבח with an orally stated intent and what Rabbi Shimon holds. The two sides are whether Rabbi Shimon’s reason is that מחשבה דמינכרא does not invalidate, which would make it valid because it is obviously not a *zevach*, or whether the reason is the verse וזאת תורת המנחה with וזבח לא כתיב, which would make it invalid. Rabbi Asi answers, כלום הגענו לסוף דעתו של רבי שמעון, and he cannot answer because he does not resolve the contradiction like Rabba due to Abaye’s question, nor like Rava due to the issue of וזאת תורת המנחה, nor like Rav Ashi due to the question of Rav Acha brei d’Rava.
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