Menachos 5 - Cycle 14
Summary
- Today’s *shiur* on Menachos 5a opens with Rav’s ruling that an *asham metzora* offered *shelo lishmah* is entirely *pasul*, and the Gemara rejects Rav from a *baraisa* that treats such an *asham* as offered on the *mizbeach* with *nesachim* while still requiring another *asham* to be *motzi* the owner’s obligation. The *shiur* then follows Reish Lakish and Rava on the status of *kemitzas ha’omer* done *shelo lishmah*, the question of how a korban from *chadash* can be valid under the rule of *mimashkeh Yisrael*, and the conclusion that *he’eir mizrach matir* even when the *Beis HaMikdash* stands. The presentation broadens into defining *mimashkeh Yisrael* through the dispute of Rashi and Tosafos, applying it to cases like *terumah* wine and uncovered liquids, and connecting it to broader issues such as Noach’s korbanos and the Rambam–Raavad dispute over *mor* in the *shemen hamishchah* and *ketores*. The *shiur* also analyzes the special insistence on order in the metzora’s process through “זאת תהיה,” brings challenges and answers in the Gemara’s back-and-forth, and ends with a *baraisa* deriving the exclusion of a *tereifah* from korbanos and why logical arguments and counterexamples like *melikah* and *minchas ha’omer* do not suffice.
- Today’s *shiur* begins on Menachos 5a at the top line “מיעט ב.” Rav rules that an *asham metzora* brought *shelo lishmah* is entirely *pasul*. A *baraisa* states that an *asham metzora* that is slaughtered *shelo lishmah* or whose blood is not placed on the *behonos* is offered on the *mizbeach* and requires *nesachim*, yet it still requires another *asham* to be *machshir* the owner. The Gemara frames its challenge specifically from the case of *shelo lishmah*, and the Gemara concludes “תיובתא דרב,” refuting Rav from this *baraisa*, while Tosafos and other *Rishonim* note that the Gemara could have answered “Rav *tanna* ופליג” but does not.
- Reish Lakish states that *kemitzas ha’omer* done *shelo lishmah* is *kesheirah*, but “לא עלה לבעלים לשם חובה.” The *shirayim* are normally eaten by *kohanim*, but here they are not eaten until another *minchah* is brought to permit them. The explanation given is that *minchas ha’omer* on the second day of Pesach exists to permit *chadash*, so when it is not brought properly it does not effect the permission of the new grain, described as new barley.
- The Gemara asks “מיקרב היכי קרבה” because a korban must come from “ממשקה ישראל,” derived from the verse in Yechezkel: “ושה אחת מן הצאן מן המאתים ממשקה ישראל למנחה ולעולה ולשלמים לכפר עליהם נאם ה' אלהים.” Rashi on Yechezkel explains that “משקה” means any consumable, so a korban cannot come from something that may not be consumed. The *Rishonim* ask how *minchas ha’omer* can be valid at the moment of offering if *chadash* is not yet permitted for eating, and the Rashba answers with “הקרבתו והתירו באים כאחת,” though other *Rishonim* challenge that the permission arrives only at *haktaras ha’kometz*. A suggested resolution is “מצותו בכך,” that the Torah’s commanded structure resolves the problem only when the korban is brought properly, while the improperly brought case renews the *mimashkeh Yisrael* question.
- The *shiur* presents two conceptual explanations of *mimashkeh Yisrael*: a person should not place on the *mizbeach* something he cannot eat, or the disqualifying factor is the same reason that makes the item forbidden for human consumption. A practical *nafka minah* is wine of *terumah*: Rashi holds it should not be used for *nesachim* because not all of *Klal Yisrael* may drink it, while Tosafos permits it because the prohibition does not apply to everyone since *kohanim* may drink it. Another question concerns a drink left *meguleh* that may not be consumed, and whether that creates a *mimashkeh Yisrael* problem depending on whether the rule depends on who may drink it or on the nature of the prohibition.
- The *shiur* raises the question of Noach bringing korbanos when people were not permitted to eat animals, and how that does not violate *mimashkeh Yisrael*. The *Oneg Yom Tov* answers that since such animals ultimately become permitted food, the concern of *mimashkeh Yisrael* does not apply. The *Pardes Yosef* answers that *mimashkeh Yisrael* was stated to *Yisrael* and not to *Bnei Noach*, so Noach’s korbanos do not pose the problem.
- The *shiur* connects *mimashkeh Yisrael* to the Rambam–Raavad dispute about *mor* in *shemen hamishchah* and *ketores*. The Rambam in Hilchos Klei HaMikdash 1:3 writes: “המור הוא הדם הצרור בחיה שבהודו הידועה לכל שמתבשם בה בני אדם בכל מקום,” identifying it with musk, and he explains “מר דרור” as pure, unfalsified *mor* due to common counterfeiting. The Raavad rejects using animal blood in holy service, stating “אין דעתי מקבלת שיכנסו במעשה הקודש” and “כל שכן דם חיה טמאה,” and the Chasam Sofer (Shu”t Orach Chaim siman 39) grounds the Raavad’s objection in *mimashkeh Yisrael*. The *shiur* brings approaches defending the Rambam, including the Radbaz’s view that it comes from a kosher animal or that it is a secretion and not actual blood, and Rabbeinu Yonah’s view that a significant transformation from blood into musk removes the original non-kosher status.
- The *shiur* asks why *minchas ha’omer* is not mentioned in *Musaf* on the second day of Pesach and why it does not generate full Hallel, even though it is a new korban. The *Birkhei Yosef* is cited as quoting an opinion that included “מוספי וקרבן מנחת העומר,” though that is not the prevailing *minhag*. The suggested explanation is that Hallel and Musaf additions follow korbanos tied to the *Yom Tov*, while the Gemara frames *minchas ha’omer* as tied to permitting *chadash* rather than to the *Yom Tov* itself, and an additional reason is that Reish Lakish’s approach shifts the permission to the day itself.
- Rav Ada bar Ahavah explains Reish Lakish as holding “אין מחוסר זמן אלא ביומו,” so since later in the day the *chadash* will become permitted, the offering is not blocked by *mimashkeh Yisrael*. The *shiur* reports that this approach can be read as relying on a later offering to fix the issue, which remains difficult because the item was not permitted at the time of the first offering. A *peshat* from the *Rishonim* is presented that even if a korban is needed to permit *chadash* on 16 Nisan, once the day passes everyone agrees *chadash* is permitted, so within the day it is not treated as a continuing lack of permissibility.
- A *baraisa* teaches “יש בעופות שאין במנחות” and “יש במנחות שאין בעופות,” listing that birds can be brought as a joint donation by two people, serve *mechusrei kapparah*, and are “הותרו מכלל איסור בקודש” through *melikah*, none of which applies to *menachos*. The *baraisa* also lists that *menachos* require a *kli*, *tenufah*, and *hagashah*, and include a public offering such as *minchas ha’omer*. The Gemara challenges that if Reish Lakish’s case of *minchas ha’omer* *shelo lishmah* creates an offering from *chadash* that cannot be eaten, then *menachos* would also exhibit “הותרו מכלל איסור בקודש,” and the Gemara answers that once 16 Nisan arrives it is not an active prohibition, expressed as “דלאו איסורא הוא.”
- Rav Shesh challenges from laws of metzora that require repeating procedures when done out of order, such as placing oil before blood or placing oil on the *behonos* before the seven sprinklings, each time requiring “ימלאנו שמן” and repetition. Rav Pappa answers “שאני הלכות מצורע” because the Torah states “וזאת תהיה תורת המצורע,” interpreted as “תהיה בהווייתה תהא,” requiring the exact order. The *Divrei Yoel* of the Satmar Rebbe explains that metzora’s process is designed as *teshuvah* training in rule-following, because the metzora’s failure reflects acting as though rules do not bind him, and therefore the Torah makes order indispensable.
- Rav Pappa raises a further case: if the metzora brings his *chatas* before his *asham*, the law is “לא יחממנו בדמו” but rather “תעובר צורתה” and “תצא לבית השרפה.” The *Rishonim* explain that “תעובר צורתה” means waiting until tomorrow so that *linah* clearly renders it *pasul*, preventing observers from misunderstanding why the blood is discarded. The Gemara clarifies that Rav Pappa’s question assumes *havayah* might apply only to internal *avodah* steps, while *shechitah* is “לאו עבודה,” and therefore if “אין מחוסר זמן ביום” were true one could stir the blood and proceed, but the Gemara concludes that this assumption is rejected.
- The Gemara returns to explain Reish Lakish’s basis as “דהאיר מזרח מתיר,” that dawn itself permits *chadash*. רבי יוחנן וריש לקיש דאמרי תרווייהו extend this even “בזמן שבית המקדש קיים,” so permission does not depend on the korban for the basic status of permissibility. The *Shaagas Aryeh* explains that delaying eating until after the korban is a *mitzvas aseh*, while *mimashkeh Yisrael* operates only where the item is forbidden by a *lav*. The *Oneg Yom Tov* explains two layers of *issur*—*issur cheftza* ends at dawn on 16 Nisan while an *issur gavra* persists until the korban—so *mimashkeh Yisrael* is not triggered once the *issur cheftza* has lifted.
- The Gemara states that Reish Lakish did not say the rule explicitly but it is inferred “מכללא איתמר” from a Mishnah: “אין מביאין מנחות” and related offerings before the omer, and if one did so before the omer it is *pasul*, while before the *shtei halechem* it is ideally not brought but if brought it is *kasher*. רבי יצחק בשם ריש לקיש limits the *pesul* to the 14th and 15th of Nisan, but on the 16th “אם הביא כשר,” implying “היתר מזרק מתיר,” that the day’s arrival permits.
- Rava rules that *minchas ha’omer* whose *kemitzah* is done *shelo lishmah* is *kesheirah*, its *shirayim* are eaten, and it does not require another *minchah* to permit it. Rava explains that disqualifying thought operates only “במי שראוי לעבודה,” “בדבר הראוי לעבודה,” and “במקום הראוי לעבודה.” A *kohen ba’al mum* is excluded as “מי שראוי,” *minchas ha’omer* is excluded as “דבר הראוי” because “חידוש הוא” due to its role in permitting *chadash* and its barley nature, and a damaged *mizbeach* is excluded as “מקום הראוי” based on “וזבחת עליו.” The *shiur* records questions about barley offerings such as *minchas k’naos* and answers that the omer uses fine barley flour while the sotah uses coarse, or that the omer’s purpose of permitting *chadash* is uniquely different from the sotah’s purpose of *birur avon*.
- A *baraisa* expounds the verse “אדם כי יקריב מכם קרבן לה' מן הבהמה מן הבקר ומן הצאן תקריבו את קרבנכם,” and the extra “מן הבקר” teaches “להוציא את הטרפה.” The *baraisa* proposes a *kal vachomer* from *ba’al mum* to *tereifah*, and it is challenged by *chelev* and *dam* that are forbidden to eat yet offered on the *mizbeach*, answered by “שכן באו מכלל היתר.” The *kal vachomer* is challenged again by *melikah* where an act that would make a bird a *neveilah* for a *hedyot* is permitted for the *mizbeach*, and it is answered by “שכן קדושה אוסרתה.” The Gemara identifies the attempted refutation as “מנחת עומר תוכיח,” since it can be forbidden to a *hedyot* as *chadash* yet permitted for the *mizbeach*, and the Gemara responds “שכן מתרת,” then shifts to the shemittah-year omer under רבי עקיבא’s view that *sefichin* are forbidden, and further questions are raised about permitting *chadash* in *chutz la’aretz* and “שכן בא להתיר לאו שבתוכו.” The final distinction stated is “מה למנחת עומר שכן מצותה בכך,” because the Torah explicitly commands bringing the omer from *chadash*, while the Torah never commands bringing a *tereifah*, leaving the need for the verse-based exclusion in place.
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