Summary
  • Today's שיעור frames the sugya around whether *kedusha* takes effect “in halves,” using the invalidation of *dam* split into two *kelim* as a springboard and then contrasting it with *Chavitei Kohen Gadol*, which is offered half in the morning and half in the afternoon. The text sets out רבי יוחנן’s position that אין קדושה לחצאין for *chavitim* and רבי אלעזר’s position that קדושה לחצאין because they are offered in halves, then tests whether and how these rules transfer across different *korbanos* and different types of *avodah*. It brings in explanations from רש״י and the סטייפלר about ויצא לחולין through the lens of קדושת הגוף versus קדושת דמים and *pidyon*, uses תוספות and the שפת אמת to refine how comparisons between *menachos* and blood *korbanos* work, and develops the “כיון שהגיע זמן לפרק כמאן דפרקה דמי” principle in *lechem hapanim* alongside disputes about missing *shiyarei menacha*. It then connects the sugya to halachic timing for *Musaf* (מגן אברהם versus טור) and brings a מהרש״ם application to defining רשות הרבים דאורייתא, before returning to the core: reconciling רבי יוחנן, רב, and שמואל on partial measures and which ingredients or vessels confer *kedusha*, and revisiting רבי אלעזר’s ruling that a *kemitza* performed in the היכל is כשרה and the derashos from וקמץ משם.
  • The text states that when the *dam* of a *korban* is placed into two separate *kelim*, that *dam* is invalidated for זריקת הדם. The *Gemara* attempts to extrapolate from this rule to other contexts, asking whether רבי אלעזר holds that *dam* becomes *kadosh* only when the entire amount is in one *kli*. The sugya uses that attempted extrapolation as the basis to question comparisons between different areas of *kodshim*.
  • The text states that *Chavitei Kohen Gadol* comes from an עשרון איפה of flour, is made in a מחבת, and is burned on the מזבח half in the morning and half in the afternoon. The text presents רבי יוחנן’s ruling אין קדושה לחצאין, explained by רש״י as meaning that if half the ingredients are put into one *kli* and half into another, it does not receive *kedusha* and ויצא לחולין. The text presents רבי אלעזר’s ruling that מתוך שקרבה לחצאין, קדושה לחצאין, so one can be מקדיש it half and half.
  • The text reports that the סטייפלר challenges how רש״י can say ויצא לחולין when the item already had קדושת פה from designation for *chavitim*. The text states the סטייפלר’s distinction between קדושת גוף, which cannot be redeemed, and קדושת דמים/קדושת פה, which can have פדיון. The text states that, according to the סטייפלר, רש״י’s ויצא לחולין means that since it cannot be used for the *korban* אליבא דרבי יוחנן, it can be redeemed and thereby leave its restricted status.
  • The text explicitly raises the question whether רבי אלעזר’s קדושה לחצאין requires a strict fifty-fifty split, because the *chavitim* is offered half morning and half afternoon, or whether other proportions would still qualify so long as it is not done all at once. The text positions this as a necessary clarification of what “לחצאין” means in practice.
  • The text asks why one would learn from *menachat chavitim* to a regular animal *korban* when a regular *korban* is not offered half morning and half afternoon. The text presents תוספות’ answer that animal *korbanos* also have multiple הזאות, and each הזאה is treated as a separate הזאה, creating an analogy to halves. The text presents the שפת אמת’s question that the halves of *chavitim* are temporally divided while the הזאות are all part of one *korban*, and then states the שפת אמת’s resolution that *chavitim* is one large *korban* offered in two stages, so its *kedusha* in halves can still be compared to a unified *korban* structure.
  • The text states that the *Gemara* considers whether רבי אלעזר avoids learning מילתא ממילתא across different types of *kodshim*. The text brings רבי אלעזר’s statement מנחה שקמצה בהיכל כשרה, justified because a precedent exists in סילוק בזיכין. The text then states the answer that רבי אלעזר is comfortable learning מנחה ממנחה, since לחם הפנים is treated as an *avodah* of a *menacha*, but a *korban* with *dam* and a *menacha* are too different to learn one from the other.
  • The text cites a ברייתא that before פירקה, if the *lechem hapanim* crumbles it is פסול and אין מקטירין עליה את הבזיכין, while after פירקה, if it crumbles the *lechem* is פסול for eating but מקטירין עליה את הבזיכין. The text reports רבי אלעזר’s view that לאו פירקה ממש, and that once the time arrives to remove it, the halacha treats it כמי שפרקה דמי, tied to a schedule described from a משנה in פסחים about the מוסף and the בזיכין. The text records the ברכת חנוך’s problem from מגילה כ״א ע״א that the *avodah* of בזיכין can be done all day, and the מקדש דוד’s answer that the requirement is seven full 24-hour periods on the שלחן, with “time to remove” meaning the earliest standard time (רש״י: typically the seventh hour) after which it is treated as removed even if not yet removed.
  • The text asks why burning the בזיכין after crumbling is not like מנחה שחסרה קודם קמיצה, and answers that a regular מנחה is לא ברור ברירו קמיצה דמי because until קמיצה one cannot identify what will be the קומץ, while the בזיכין are הא ברור ברירו קמיצה דמי because they are already the identified קומץ. The text then presses that it should still be like שירים שחסרו בין קמיצה להקטרה, where אין מקטירים קומץ עליהם, and answers that this is a מחלוקת תנאים on דף ט and that רבי אלעזר follows the view that missing שירים between קמיצה and הקטרה does not prevent burning the קומץ.
  • The text states that the sugya implies a proper time for *Musaf* around seven hours into the day and questions whether one should wait that late. The text attributes to the מגן אברהם that the Torah’s phrase ביום השבת indicates that a good part of the day should pass, so one prays *Musaf* after שחרית and later in the day, after the sixth or seventh hour. The text attributes to the טור the disagreement that one may pray *Musaf* earlier, as long as it is after שחרית.
  • The text states a major מחלוקת ראשונים about whether 600,000 people passing daily is required to define רשות הרבים דאורייתא, as presented with reference to the ביאור הלכה’s long introduction. The text states the מהרש״ם’s suggestion that even under the lenient view requiring 600,000 daily, the sugya’s concept of “כיון שהגיע זמן” implies that potentiality can be treated as actuality. The text states his proposed application that a large road that is capable of accommodating 600,000 and sometimes has 600,000 might already be treated as רשות הרבים even if one cannot prove 600,000 pass every day, which would affect whether an עירוב can help.
  • The text restates the dispute: רבי יוחנן says אין קדוש לחצאים for *chavitim*, and רבי אלעזר says קדוש לחצאים. The text states that רב אחא asks מאי טעמא דרבי יוחנן, and תוספות asks why this is a question given the earlier comparison to *dam*. The text provides two תוספות answers: one is that the verse says מנחה מחציתה, implying a basis to allow halves, and the other is that *chavitim* is fundamentally different from *dam*-based *korbanos* because it is offered in halves, so the *dam* rule should not drive the *chavitim* rule.
  • The text cites the קרן אורה that the dispute between רבי יוחנן and רבי אלעזר addresses two subjects, with רבי יוחנן holding that halves of *chavitim* do not attain קדושת הגוף, while רבי אלעזר holds they do and they are fit for הקרבה. The text states that this framing explains the *Gemara*’s challenge to רבי יוחנן as asking why, even if there is no קדושת הגוף, there should not at least be קדושת דמים.
  • The text brings a משנה that חביתי כהן גדול לא היו באים חצאין, rather he brings an עישרון שלם and then divides it. The text brings the ברייתא’s derivation from מחציתה בבוקר that one brings a whole and then splits it, rather than bringing separate half-measures from home morning and evening. The text answers for רבי אלעזר that this is למצוה, while בדיעבד halves work.
  • The text records רב גביהה מבי כתיל’s challenge that the verse calls it חוק עולם, implying strict requirement, and then states רב אשי’s answer that the חוק requirement is only to bring the full עישרון from his house as one unit, while the act of placing into a *kli* and being מקדיש can still be done half-half.
  • The text asks whether רבי יוחנן truly holds that halves cannot work, citing a separate ruling: for a *menacha* that requires an עישרון, if one separated חצי עישרון with intent to add, רב says לא קדש and רבי יוחנן says קדש. The text asks why, if רבי יוחנן rejects halves for *chavitim*, he does not apply that to other *menachos*, and then rejects the idea that רבי יוחנן avoids learning across cases by citing his ruling that שלמים ששחטן בהיכל כשרים, based on “שלא יהא טפל שלך חמור מן העיקר.” The text records עולת שלמה’s inference from the wording שלמים ששחטו that this is בדיעבד, adds his claim that אל יבא בכל עת אל הקדש creates a problem of ביאה ריקנית, and records the יד דוד’s disagreement that the לימוד itself implies the entry is not ביאה ריקנית.
  • The text answers the half-עשרון question with שאני בדעתו להוסיף, distinguishing a partial act accompanied by intent to complete from a partial act standing alone.
  • The text notes an *acharonim* debate stemming from “פתח אהל מועד,” which is used to derive that שחיטה requires the door of the בית המקדש to be open. The text states the question whether, when שחיטה is performed in the היכל itself בדיעבד, the “door open” requirement still applies or not.
  • The text cites a derasha from the נשיאים’ offerings: “מלאים” teaches that a *kli* cannot be מקדש unless it is full. The text attributes to רבי יוסי that this applies when אין דעתו להוסיף, but when דעתו להוסיף, then even before the full measure is present, ראשון ראשון קדוש.
  • The text asks which view רב follows regarding *chavitim* and states that since רב elsewhere learns across *menachos* (e.g., a *menacha* becomes קדוש even without שמן by analogy to לחם הפנים, without לבונה by analogy to מנחת נסכים, and without both by analogy to מנחת חוטא), he clearly does learn מילתא ממילתא. The text concludes בעל כרחך that רב holds like רבי יוחנן that אין קדושה לחצאין for *chavitim*, and therefore his view that partial *kedusha* is ineffective elsewhere coheres.
  • The text states רב’s teaching that a standard *menacha* becomes קדושה בכלי even lacking שמן (since לחם הפנים lacks oil), lacking לבונה (since מנחת נסכים lacks frankincense), and lacking both (since מנחת חוטא lacks both). The text then asks whether שמן alone or לבונה alone can become *kadosh*, and states רב’s answers: שמן alone becomes *kadosh* like לוג שמן של מצורע, and לבונה alone becomes *kadosh* like לבונה הבאה בבזיכין, with an added note that some ראשונים understand there is an opinion later that one can bring a *korban* of levona alone.
  • The text then brings רבי חנינא’s opposing view: לא זו קדושה בלא זו ולא זו קדושה בלא זו, requiring all ingredients together. The text asks, according to רבי חנינא, why the עשרון vessel was anointed, and answers it was for מנחת חוטא, and asks why the לוג vessel was anointed, answering it was for לוג שמן של מצורע.
  • The text states that שמואל agrees with רב and cites a משנה in זבחים פ״ח ע״א that liquid-measure vessels sanctify liquids and dry-measure vessels sanctify dry, but כלי הלח does not sanctify dry and מידת היבש does not sanctify liquid. The text attributes to שמואל a limitation that this is said about מידת הלח, but in מזרקות, which are used for *dam*, they can sanctify “dry,” based on the verse about the נשיאים’ offering including a מזרק with “מלאים סולת בלולה בשמן למנחה.” The text records רב אחא מדפתי’s challenge that this proves only a mixed *menacha*, and the text answers that the point is the “יבש שבה,” meaning parts not fully mixed still become *kadosh*, and alternatively that relative to *dam* even *menacha* is treated כיבש דמיא for this rule.
  • The text returns to רבי אלעזר’s statement that מנחה שקמצה בהיכל כשירה, grounded in the precedent of סילוק בזיכין being a form of *kemitza* done in the היכל. The text brings רב ירמיה’s objection from the verse “וקמץ משם,” understood as requiring the place where the כהנים stand in the עזרה, with a separate רבי יוסי derasha using “וקמץ משם” to require fixing a left-hand *kemitza* by redoing it in the right hand in the same place.
  • The text presents a version where the questioner also answers, and another where אביי explains that “וקמץ משם” is needed to validate *kemitza* anywhere in the עזרה and not restrict it to the צפון via comparisons to עולה, חטאת, or אשם, with each attempted comparison rejected for distinct reasons including כליל, כפרת חייבי כריתות, and שכן מיני דמים. The text then gives רב אשי’s framing that “וקמץ משם” is needed to prevent assuming *kemitza* must occur specifically at the קרן דרומית מערבית like הגשה, concluding that the verse teaches broader validity of location for *kemitza* than that corner.
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