Menachos 14
Summary
- The text learns זבחים דף יד starting יג עמוד ב and frames *piggul* as a *machshava* of *chutz lizmano* that must occur during a *matir* and must be directed at something, then applies this to שתי הלחם and לחם הפנים with a dispute between רבי יוסי and חכמים whether *piggul* spreads beyond the specific item intended. It brings רב הונא’s explanation that רבי יוסי limits *piggul* to the specific limb intended and supports it with *sevara* and a פסוק, then challenges this with multiple sources and concludes that רב הונא’s reading is rejected. It reinterprets רבי יוסי through רב יצחק as a unique Torah structure that makes the two breads both “one body” and “two bodies,” and extends the framework to לחמי תודה and מנחת מאפה. It then analyzes when separate *avodot* or separate *matirim* combine for *piggul*, distinguishes רבי from רבנן, and explains why certain *gezeirot* exist in other cases but not in רבי’s case of two halves across two כבשים.
- Hello to all today’s זבחים דף יד begins יג עמוד ב near the bottom about a quarter of the way up, and today’s דף is sponsored לעילוי נשמת מרת מרים שרה בת יעקב משה, with the wish that her נשמה should have an עליה. The learning continues the first משנה in the פרק about ways to פסול by *piggul*, defined as *machshava* of *chutz lizmano*, requiring that the *machshava* be during one of the *matirim* and be about something, whether during the קומץ about the קומץ or during the קומץ about the שיריים.
- The text defines שתי הלחם as the two breads of חמץ brought on שבועות with two כבשים and presents them as linked. It defines לחם הפנים as the weekly showbreads, twelve breads with two בזיכין of לבונה, and states that the בזיכין are the *matirim* that permit eating the לחם הפנים when the בזיכין are offered on the מזבח. The משנה rules that if one slaughtered the two כבשים intending to eat one of the two חלות tomorrow, or offered the two בזיכין intending to eat one of the סדרים tomorrow, רבי יוסי says only that חלה or that סדר becomes *piggul* with כרת while the other is פסול without כרת, and חכמים say both become *piggul* with כרת.
- Rav Huna states that רבי יוסי holds: פיגול בירך שימין לא נתפגל בירך שמאל, meaning a *machshava* of *piggul* about one part does not spread to the rest. Rav Huna explains this either as *sevara*, that *machshava* is not stronger than *tumah* and one טמא limb does not make the whole thing טמא, or from the פסוק והנפש האוכלת ממנו עונה תשא, derived as ממנו ולא מחבירו so כרת applies only to what the *machshava* targeted.
- Rav Nachman challenges Rav Huna with a ברייתא: לעולם אין בו כרת עד שיפגל בשניהם בכזית, read as requiring *piggul* across both breads with a כזית total, implying בשניהם אין באחת מהן לא. The text argues it cannot be רבנן because according to חכמים even one loaf would spread to all, so it seems to be רבי יוסי, and it then questions how two separate breads could combine if Rav Huna treats parts as separate entities. The גמרא answers that the ברייתא is רבי, supported by a second ברייתא in which רבי says a case is כשר when each כבש is slaughtered with half-כזית intent toward separate loaves, but if the intent is a combined כזית from both loaves then it מצטרף.
- The גמרא asks how רבי fits with either רבנן or רבי יוסי and answers that it is לעולם אליבא דרבנן with a textual change from בשתיהן to בשניהם, interpreting it as requiring *machshava* during both כבשים rather than about both loaves. It says this comes לאפוקי מדרבי מאיר who holds מפגלין בחצי מתיר, and teaches that one cannot be מפגל with only half of a *matir* because each כבש functions as a חצי מתיר for the linked breads. The text then questions the fit of the word לעולם and presents a framing in which ריש לקיש reads the requirement as applying “in both” dimensions, aligning with רבי יוסי and excluding both רבי מאיר and רבנן, making לעולם fit more broadly.
- Rav Ashi brings a ברייתא where רבי says משום רבי יוסי: פיגל בדבר הנעשה בחוץ פיגל בדבר הנעשה בפנים לא פיגל, with “outside” and “inside” defined relative to outside or inside the היכל for חטאות פנימיות. It rules that slaughtering outside with intent to sprinkle tomorrow is not *piggul* because the intent targets an inside act, and that sprinkling inside with intent to pour שיריים or burn אימורים tomorrow is not *piggul* because the intent targets outside acts, but slaughtering outside with intent to pour שיריים or burn אימורים tomorrow is *piggul*. The text analyzes לשפוך שריים לפגולי מאי and concludes it must be to make the בשר *piggul* even though the *machshava* was not about the בשר itself and even though blood is listed among אלו דברים שאין חייבין עליהם משום פגול. It infers that if *machshava* about שיריים can render meat *piggul*, then *machshava* about one limb should extend to others, undermining Rav Huna’s limitation.
- Ravina cites the earlier משנה: הקומץ את המנחה כדי לאכול שיריה או להקטיר קומצה למחר, with the ruling that מודה רבי יוסי בזה שפיגול וחייבין עליו כרת. The text asks להקטיר קומצו לפגולי מאי and concludes it must render the שיריים *piggul* because the קומץ itself is listed among items without liability for *piggul*. It again infers that if intent about the קומץ makes the שיריים *piggul* despite not being the object of the intent, then intent about a limb should certainly spread, further rejecting Rav Huna’s reading.
- Rav Yitzchak explains that רבי יוסי’s reasoning in the משנה depends on the Torah treating the breads as both גוף אחד and שני גופין. He derives “two bodies” from שתים שני עשרונים and “one body” from סולת תהיינה as an *havai* language that makes them מעכב each other, and he adds that they are also treated as separate because each loaf is done separately in formation. He applies this to reconcile the sources by stating that when the intent “mixes them” with half-כזית on each, the Torah’s גוף אחד aspect allows צירוף, and when the intent “splits them” by targeting only one, the Torah’s שני גופין aspect limits *piggul* to that unit.
- Rav Yitzchak asks about *piggul* in לחמי תודה and in מנחת מאפה, with the תודה described as coming with forty breads in four styles and the מנחת מאפה described as permitting a mix of loaves and *rekikin*. The question is whether *piggul* targeting one style or one subset spreads to the others under the same dispute of רבי יוסי and חכמים. Rav Tachlifa Marava teaches that וכן אתה אומר בלחמי תודה וכן אתה אומר במנחת מאפה, applying רבי יוסי’s approach there as well.
- A ברייתא teaches that if at שחיטה one intends to eat a half-כזית *chutz lizmano* and at זריקה one intends another half-כזית *chutz lizmano*, the offering is *piggul* because שחיטה וזריקה מצטרפין. One view limits this to שחיטה and זריקה as the primary *matirim* and excludes קבלה והולכה, while another view reasons that if distant steps combine then certainly adjacent steps like קבלה והולכה combine. A contrary ברייתא of לוי states that four עבודות אין מצטרפות לפגול—שחיטה וזריקה קבלה והולכה—and רבא resolves the conflict by attributing one to רבי and one to רבנן, tying רבי’s view to his ruling that two half-כזית intentions across the two כבשי עצרת do not combine and the case remains כשר.
- Abaye suggests that רבי’s non-combination may apply only to חצי מתיר וחצי אכילה, and questions whether רבי might still combine when each is כולי מתיר with half-אכילה, which would affect whether separate full *matirim* can combine. Rabba bar Rav Huna argues that if רבי allowed כולי מתיר וחצי אכילה then he should decree חצי מתיר וחצי אכילה as פסול, paralleling how רבי יוסי and חכמים make *gezeirot* in other areas. The response rejects the comparison and explains that those *gezeirot* are made only when there is a true parallel case that could be fully *piggul*, such as רבי יוסי’s concern of קומץ דלבונה אטו קומץ דמנחה, חכמים’ concern of קומץ אטו קומץ דמנחת חוטא, their concern about לבונה אטו לבונה הבאה בבזיכין, and analogous concerns with כבשים and בזיכין, while no parallel fully-*piggul* case exists for חצי מתיר וחצי אכילה across two כבשים. The text supports this logic from the משנה where חכמים explicitly agree with רבי מאיר in מנחת חוטא ומנחת קנאות that if one was מפגל in the קומץ then it is *piggul* because the קומץ is the *matir*, reading that explicit clause as signaling that פסול rulings elsewhere rest on the presence of a comparable case.
- The text ends by stating that the learning stops here for today and will continue tomorrow.
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