Menachos Daf 14 - Does Piggul on One Leg Affect the Other Leg
Summary
- Today’s *daf* is Menachos 14, continuing from 13b after the *Mishnah*, with sponsorships given *l’ilui nishmas* and in memory of named relatives. The *Gemara* develops the dispute between Rabbi Yosi and the Chachamim about whether a *machsheves pigul* on part of a *korban* makes the entire offering *pigul* or only the specific component, and it tests the scope of Rabbi Yosi’s rule across different contexts. It rejects Rav Huna’s extension that *pigul* on one severed limb does not affect another limb of the same animal, then reframes Rabbi Yosi’s position as dependent on how the Torah sometimes treats paired items as one unit and sometimes as two. It then applies Rabbi Yosi’s framework to multi-type breads of a *korban todah* and a mixed *minchas ma’afeh*, and proceeds to a separate question of whether partial *machshavos* across different *avodos* combine to create a *kezayis* of *pigul*, including when and why Chazal declare a case *pasul* even without *kares*.
- Today’s *shiur* is sponsored by Dr. David Lander and his wife and children *l’ilui nishmas* his mother גולדה בת שמחה עליה השלום, נשמה שתהיה לה עליה. It is also sponsored by Charlie and Mimi Gershbaum in memory of Hilda Gershbaum, הינדא רחל בת יעקב חנן on her fifth יארצייט, the נשמה שתהיה לה עליה. It is also sponsored by Isaac Gelandauer *l’ilui nishmas* his father אברהם בן יונתן יהודה אמרי Gelandauer, with the יארצייט tomorrow, the נשמה שתהיה לה עליה.
- Rav Huna says that Rabbi Yosi holds that if one has *pigul* in the right thigh, the left thigh does not become *pigul*. Rav Huna grounds this either in *sevara*, that thought should be no more powerful than an act of *tumah* applied to one severed limb, or in a verse, reading *mimenu* as limiting *kares* to the piece directly targeted by the *machshavah* and not to its counterpart.
- Rav Nachman challenges Rav Huna from a *baraisa* about the *shtei halechem* and the *kivsei atzeres*, reading it as requiring *pigul* “in both” to generate *kares*, which undermines the claim that Rabbi Yosi treats connected parts as fully separate for *pigul*. The *Gemara* explores whether the *baraisa* could instead be Rabbi’s view about combining half-*kezayis* intentions across two sheep as half-*matir*, but it concludes that the wording *l’olam* forces the reading that excludes both Rabbi Meir’s rule of *mefaglin b’chatzi matir* and the Chachamim’s rule of *pigul* spreading to the entire unit, leaving the *baraisa* aligned with Rabbi Yosi and preserving the challenge to Rav Huna.
- Rav Ashi brings a second proof from רבי אומר משום רבי יוסי about *parim u’se’irim hanisrafim*, where a *machshavah* made outside about an outside act creates *pigul*, but a mismatch of outside-thought about inside-act, or inside-thought about outside-act, does not. The *Gemara* infers that the case of intending to spill the *shirayim* “tomorrow” cannot make the blood *pigul* because blood is among the items that do not generate liability for *pigul*, so the *pigul* must attach to the meat even though the thought was not about the meat itself, and that makes it all the more so that *pigul* in one thigh should affect the other.
- Ravina brings a third proof from a *baraisa* where Rabbi Yosi agrees that a *minchah* becomes *pigul* with *kares* liability when the *kmitzah* is taken with intent to eat the remnants or to burn the *kometz* “tomorrow.” The *Gemara* again reasons that the *kometz* itself cannot be the locus of *pigul* liability, so the thought about burning the *kometz* must render the *sheyarei ha’minchah* *pigul*, and that again supports that intent about one component can render a different component *pigul*, contradicting Rav Huna’s severed-limb limitation.
- Rabbi Yochanan therefore states that Rabbi Yosi does not hold like Rav Huna and that *pigul* on one thigh makes the other thigh *pigul* as well.
- Rabbi Yochanan explains that Rabbi Yosi’s rulings about the *shtei halechem* are not contradictory because the Torah itself treats them both as one unit and as two units. The Torah makes them one unit in that they are mutually indispensable, as indicated by the requirement of “שתים” and “תהיינה,” and it makes them two units in that each loaf is prepared separately, “הא לחוד עבידא והא לחוד עבידא.” Rabbi Yosi’s rule therefore follows the framing of the *machshavah*: when one mentally combines them by intending a full *kezayis* from both, they combine; when one mentally separates them by directing the intent only to one loaf, the other remains only *pasul* without *kares*.
- Rabbi Yochanan asks whether *pigul* in one type of the *lachmei todah* affects the other types, and similarly whether *pigul* in one form of a mixed *minchas ma’afeh* affects the other form. Rav Tachlifa from the West teaches that Rabbi Yosi applies the same principle there, so *pigul* in one *min* affects only that *min* and not the others, paralleling Rabbi Yosi’s approach to the two loaves and the two arrangements of *lechem hapanim* rather than the thighs of one animal.
- A *baraisa* states that if one thinks to eat a half-*kezayis* at *shechitah* and another half-*kezayis* at *zerikah*, the intentions combine and the offering is *pigul*, because *shechitah* and *zerikah* combine. One view limits this to those two *avodos*, while another infers that if even the far-apart pair combines then adjacent *avodos* like *kabbalah* and *holachah* combine all the more.
- Levi teaches that the four *avodos* do not combine for *pigul*, and Rava resolves the contradiction by attributing the views to a dispute between Rabbi and the Chachamim, citing Rabbi’s ruling about the two *kivsei atzeres* and half-*kezayis* intentions on the *shtei halechem* that it remains *kasher*. Abaye challenges the analogy by distinguishing Rabbi’s case of half-*matir* from a case of full-*matir* at each stage, and Rav Pappa bar Huna argues that if Rabbi treated full-*matir* plus half-*achilah* as *pigul* he should at least decree *pasul* in the half-*matir* case, since both Rabbi Yosi and the Chachamim are shown elsewhere to decree *pasul* in near-*pigul* scenarios.
- Abaye answers that those decrees rest on specific comparable cases, such as Rabbi Yosi’s decree about intent for *levonah* modeled on intent for the *kometz* of the *minchah*, and the Chachamim’s decree about *kometz* or *levonah* modeled on cases where those are the sole *matir*, including *minchas chotei* and *minchas kena’os*. The *Gemara* supports that rationale from the fact that the *baraisa* explicitly notes the Chachamim’s agreement with Rabbi Meir that in *minchas chotei* and *minchas kena’os* *pigul* in the *kometz* yields *kares*, implying that the earlier *pesul* is driven by resemblance to those true-*pigul* cases.
- The *shiur* ends by stating that tomorrow will continue from the *Mishnah* at the bottom.
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