Menachos 22
Summary
- Today’s learning continues the discussion in *Menachos* daf כ״א עמוד ב and moves into themes that reach toward daf כ״ו, centering on what items in the *Mikdash* come *משל ציבור* versus from an individual, why a *תנאי בית דין* is needed for *כהנים* to use *מלח* according to בן בוכרי, how *עצים* are proven to be *משל ציבור* and possibly required to be *חדתא*, and how mixtures affect validity in *מנחות* and *דמים*, including רבי יהודה’s principle that *מין במינו אינו בטל* and the debate whether the Torah’s source teaches that rule or instead teaches that *עולין* do not nullify each other.
- Today begins from the point that *כהנים* are allowed to use the *מלח* of the *ציבור*, because even *ישראל* may salt their *קרבן* with the *מלח* of the *ציבור*. Mordechai tells Rav Ashi that Rav Shisha brei d’Rav Idi says the need for a *תנאי בית דין* is only according to בן בוכרי, who holds *כהנים* are not *חייב* in *שקלים*, so without a special stipulation one would think they have no share in salt bought from communal funds. The *גמרא* frames the *חידוש* as the assumption that only *ישראל*, who have a *לשכה*, are granted the *מלח*, while *כהנים* who lack a *לשכה* would not be granted it, and it teaches that *כהנים* are included as well.
- A *משנה* is cited in the style of *עדיות*: Rabbi Yehuda testifies that בן בוכרי in Yavneh says, “כל כהן ששוקל אינו חוטא,” implying a *כהן* is not obligated in *מחצית השקל* but is not considered sinful for donating. The reason given is that one might have thought donating would be an issue of *חולין בעזרה*, yet בן בוכרי says it is still not a sin. Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai replies that “לא כי אלא כל כהן שאינו שוקל חוטא,” and Rashi explains he learns inclusion of all tribes from “זה יתנו” and reads “כל העובר” as “כל העובר בים סוף,” which includes *שבט לוי*. Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai says *כהנים* exempt themselves by a self-interested *דרשה* from “וכל מנחת כהן כליל תהיה לא תאכל,” claiming that if they contributed to communal *מנחות* like *שתי הלחם* and *לחם הפנים* those would become a *מנחת כהן* and could not be eaten, so they conclude they must not be obligated in *שקלים*.
- The *גמרא* asks why a donating *כהן* is “אינו חוטא” if he is bringing non-obligatory money, raising the concern of *חולין בעזרה*. The answer is that he brings and then gives it over to the *ציבור*, treating it as a gift that becomes communal property. This supports the earlier application that even if *כהנים* do not pay *שקלים* according to בן בוכרי, they still may use communal salt through the *תנאי בית דין*.
- Tosafos (*ד״ה כל*) says that if exemption is based on “כל העובר על הפקודים” meaning only those who are *נפקד*, then *לויים* should also be exempt, not only *כהנים*. The Ramban disagrees and holds the exemption applies only to *כהנים* while *לויים* are obligated according to everyone. Tosafos in *Arachin* explains that the language focuses on *כהנים* because Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai’s critique of “הכהנים דורשין מקרא זה לעצמן” connects specifically to the *מנחת כהן* verse. Tosafos Yom Tov in *Shekalim* says it is difficult that בן בוכרי would mention only *כהן* and not *לוי*, and suggests the formulation may not preserve בן בוכרי’s exact wording, but is phrased for the dialogue with Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai.
- Rabbi Akiva Eiger (teshuvah סימן ט) writes that women are exempt from *תפילת מוסף* because it corresponds to the *קרבן מוסף* and women are not obligated in *מחצית השקל*. The *Be’er Yitzchak* notes that according to this linkage, בן בוכרי’s view would imply *כהנים* and *לויים* are exempt from *מוסף* as well, since they are not obligated in *שקלים* by that approach. Other *אחרונים* argue that even if a group is not *חייב* to pay, *מחצית השקל* may still be given on their behalf, making them connected to the communal *קרבנות* and therefore connected to *מוסף*. The explanation is given that the daily prayers involve *רחמי*, while *מוסף* is framed as more purely corresponding to the *קרבן*, and the *Tzlach* also exempts women from *מוסף* but on the basis of *מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא*. The *Steipler* quotes *Amudei Or* that women receive *כפרה* from communal offerings, which supports arguing that they should still pray *מוסף*.
- The question is raised why the *דרשה* of the *כהנים* about “וכל מנחת כהן כליל תהיה” is not accepted as decisive. Rashi says the verse applies to a *מנחת כהן* brought by an individual, but a *מנחת ציבור* follows the *רוב*, and since most of the public are not *כהנים*, the offering is not labeled *מנחת כהן* and may be eaten. The *Mishneh LaMelech* explains that under Rashi’s approach the *מטבעות* of the *כהנים* are *בטל ברוב* among the coins of *ישראל*, and the *כהנים* reasoned that a coin should not become *בטל* because it is a *דבר חשוב*.
- The *גמרא* treats it as obvious that *לבונה* comes from home while *עצים* are *משל ציבור*, and asks the source for the wood rule. Tosafos asks why the wood could not be learned by a *בנין אב* from salt, since both are used for all offerings and salt is derived *משל ציבור* through a *גזירה שוה* of “ברית ברית.” The *Minchas Taharah* answers that in *Zevachim* there is a doubt whether something learned from a *גזירה שוה* can then teach further via *בנין אב*, so the *גמרא* seeks a different source.
- A *ברייתא* teaches that one might think a person who says “הרי עלי עולה” must bring wood from home like he brings *נסכים* from home, and it answers from “על העצים אשר על האש אשר על המזבח.” Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon learns: just as the *מזבח* is *משל ציבור*, so too *עצים* and *אש* are *משל ציבור*. Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua learns: just as the *מזבח* was not used by a *הדיוט*, so too *עצים* and *אש* must come from something not used by a *הדיוט*. The *gimara* asks *מאי בינייהו* and answers *חדתא*, and *אחרונים* explain the framing as meaning both agree to *משל ציבור* and the dispute is whether there is an added requirement of being *חדתא*. The *Lechem Mishneh* uses this to explain the Rambam, who rules in *Hilchos Issurei Mizbe’ach* that the wood must be *משל ציבור* and also must be new, because the second view includes both requirements.
- A challenge is raised from the verse where Aravna tells David, “המוריגים וכלי הבקר לעצים,” implying used tools could serve as wood. The *גמרא* answers that the case can still be *בחדתי*, meaning the items may have been newly made and not yet used. The term *מוריגים* is explained as *matah shel tarbal*, and Rav Yehuda defines it as *iza d’korkosa d’dayishu bah adashtai*, with Rav Yosef bringing the verse “הנה שמתיך למורג חרוץ חדש בעל פיפיות תדוש הרים” to associate *מורג* with threshing.
- The *Rosh miShantz* says the rule about the *מזבח* being unsuitable from something used by a *הדיוט* is learned from David HaMelech collecting money from all the tribes for the *מזבח* rather than using used materials. The *She’eilas David* connects it to “ואת המזבח תעשה,” implying *עשייה לשמה* that excludes prefabricated used items. The Tur asks how Yaakov used the stone “אשר שם מראשותיו” to make a *מצבה*, and answers by distinguishing between a *מזבח* and a *במה*, permitting a *במה* from something *שנשתמש בו הדיוט*. The *Minchas Chinuch* challenges the Tur from *Zevachim* קיט ע״ב and instead answers from *Yalkut Shimoni* that the stones were already sanctified from earlier sacrificial use, so later personal use did not disqualify them from becoming sacred again.
- The *Mahari”l* quotes the *Agudah* that one should not make a *מעיל* or *gartel* for a *Sefer Torah* from something previously used for mundane purposes. The *Magen Avraham* limits this by saying that if the item undergoes a physical change before reuse, it is permitted, and he proves from offerings that a regular *קרבן* animal need not be unused because *shechitah* changes it. The *Taz* adds that the prohibition of prior mundane use applies to *tashmishei kedushah* but not to *tashmish d’tashmish*.
- The *משנה* teaches that if one person’s *קומץ* becomes mixed with another’s, or with *מנחת כהנים*, *מנחת כהן משיח*, or *מנחת נסכים*, the offerings are *כשרין*. Rabbi Yehuda says the mixture with *מנחת כהן משיח* and with *מנחת נסכים* is *פסולה* because one has *בלילתה עבה* and the other has *בלילתה רכה*, so they absorb into each other and the proper oil-flour balance is destroyed. Rashi and Tosafos say both become disqualified, with the *קומץ* having too much oil and the *מנחת נסכים* losing oil, while the *Shitah Mekubetzes* brings views that only one side becomes *פסול* depending on how the absorption and *ביטול* are understood, and the Bartenura presents the view that the *קומץ* becomes *פסול* due to becoming effectively lacking.
- A *משנה* is cited that if sacred blood mixes with water, it is valid for *זריקה* if it still has *מראית דם*. If it mixes with wine or with other blood, it is evaluated “כאילו הוא מים” to measure whether the appearance of blood would remain. Rabbi Yehuda says in the case of blood mixed with blood, *אין דם מבטל דם*, expressing his rule of *מין במינו אינו בטל*.
- A major *אחרונים* debate is presented about whether *מראית* (visibility) affects *ביטול* on a *דאורייתא* or *דרבנן* level for *איסורי אכילה*, with views that appearance functions like *טעם*, views that it is only a rabbinic concern if *טעם* is rabbinic, and views that *חזותא* is not treated as a general factor in *כשרות*. The *Taharat HaKodesh* distinguishes *דם* by saying its eating prohibition is tied to its capacity for *כפרה*, and since *זריקה* depends on *מראית דם*, the appearance of blood is also what sustains the prohibition of eating blood.
- Rabbi Yochanan says both the sages and Rabbi Yehuda derive their principles from “ולקח מדם הפר ומדם השעיר,” since the bull’s blood is far more than the goat’s yet both are taken together. The sages infer from here that *עולין* do not nullify each other, while Rabbi Yehuda infers from here that *מין במינו אינו בטל*. The *גמרא* challenges each side by suggesting the verse might be explained by the other principle, and then suggests it may require both *מין במינו* and *עולין*, ending with *קשיא* on both the sages’ inference and Rabbi Yehuda’s inference.
- Tosafos cites views that even Rabbi Yehuda’s *מין במינו אינו בטל* applies specifically to *לח בלח*, where the mixture is evenly distributed, and limits apparent dry cases like *חיטים בחיטים* in *Beitzah* by explaining it as flour which is treated as *לח בלח*. Other *Baalei Tosafos* hold Rabbi Yehuda applies the rule even to *יבש ביבש*. Tosafos also asks why a special rule of *עולין* not nullifying is needed when there is already a principle that *מצוות אינן מבטלות זו את זו*, illustrated by Hillel’s *korech* of *Pesach matzah u’maror*. The *Sefas Emes* explains the distinction as that *מצוות אינן מבטלות* is during the act of the mitzvah, while the blood-mixture case involves potential nullification before the mitzvah is performed.
- The Ran in *Nedarim* is cited that *מין במינו אינו בטל* because nullification is an overwhelming of one entity by another, while like kinds do not overwhelm but rather enhance each other, forming the conceptual basis for the rule.
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