Menachos Daf 16 - Mefaglin B'chatzi Matir
Summary
- Today's *daf* is Menachot 16, and the *shiur* presents the core dispute over whether a korban becomes *pigul* when the *machshavat pigul* occurs in only half of the *matir*, with רבי מאיר holding that *pigul* can take effect through a partial *matir* and the חכמים requiring *pigul* in the entire *matir* to incur *karet*. The narrative follows the משנה’s cases in *mincha*, the *Shtei HaLechem*, and *Lechem HaPanim*, then develops the גמרא’s analysis through Rav and Shmuel’s disagreement about whether later *stam* follows an earlier intent, repeated attempted proofs and rejections, two explanations for רבי מאיר’s position in the *Avodat Yom HaKippurim*, and further disputes about *holacha* of the *kometz* and whether incremental burning and incremental intent can combine into *pigul*.
- Today's שיעור is sponsored by Dr. David Lander in honor of his wife and children and לעילוי נשמת his mother גולדה בת שמחה עליה השלום, נשמה שתהא לה עליה. It is also sponsored by Charlie and Mimi Gershbaum in memory of Hilda Gershbaum, הינדא רחל בת יעקב חנן on her fifth יארצייט, נשמה שתהא לה עליה. It is also sponsored by Isaac Galdentower לעילוי נשמת his father אברהם בן יהונתן יהודה אימר Galdentower, which was yesterday, the נשמה שתהא לה עליה.
- A person who is *maktir* the *kometz* with intent to eat the *sheyarei ha-mincha* *chutz lizmano* has a *machshavat pigul*, and the case at issue is when the *machshava* occurs during *haktara* because *haktara* is required for both *kometz* and *levona*. רבי מאיר rules that if one is מפגל בקומץ ולא בלבונה or בלבונה ולא בקומץ, it is *pigul* and one is liable to *karet*, while חכמים rule there is no *karet* until he is מפגל בכל המתיר. חכמים agree with רבי מאיר by מנחת חוטא and מנחת קנאות, which have no *levona*, that פיגל בקומץ is *pigul* and incurs *karet* because the *kometz* is the entire *matir*.
- The presentation explains that the משנה’s inclusion of מנחת חוטא and מנחת קנאות teaches that even when חכמים deny *pigul* and *karet* for half a *matir*, the *mincha* is still פסול מדרבנן due to a גזירה משום מנחת חוטא ומנחת קנאות. The same model applies to Shtei HaLechem on Shavuot, where the two *kevasim* are the two *matirim*, and to Lechem HaPanim, where the two *bezichei levona* are the two *matirim*. If one slaughters one of the *kevasim* intending to eat two loaves tomorrow, or burns one *bazich* intending to eat two *sedarim* tomorrow, רבי מאיר rules *pigul* with *karet* and חכמים require *pigul* in the full *matir* for *karet*.
- If one slaughters one of the *kevasim* intending to eat from that very lamb tomorrow, that lamb is *pigul* and the other is *kasher*. If one slaughters one lamb intending to eat from the other lamb tomorrow, both are *kasher* because neither lamb’s own *matir* was performed with a *machshavat pigul* relating to itself.
- Rav states that the תנאic dispute is when the first half is done בשתיקה and the second half is done במחשבה, but when the first half is done במחשבה and the second half is done בשתיקה, דברי הכל פיגול because כל העושה על דעת ראשונה הוא עושה. Shmuel states that it remains a dispute, and a first-half *machshava* followed by second-half *stam* is still treated as מפגל בחצי מתיר because no presumption of continuation is made.
- The issue is connected to *hilchot tefillin* where the hide for *klaf* and *retzuot* requires intent לשם תפילין during processing, and a responsum in תשובות האלף לך שלמה אורח חיים סימן ל״א presents a dispute between the Taz and the Noda B’Yehuda about whether intent at the initial soaking stage suffices when the later lime stage lacks intent. The analysis suggests this parallels whether one assumes כל העושה על דעת ראשונה הוא עושה, and the ספר אמרי כהן challenges assuming a ruling like Rav because later in the גמרא Rav faces strong difficulties. The ספר אמרי כהן adds that the presumption may differ when the initial intent is an עבירה like *pigul* versus when it is a מצוה like *lishmah* in tefillin processing.
- A ברייתא teaches that *machshavat pigul* during *kemitza*, placing in a vessel, and *hiluch* is effective because these acts apply only to the *kometz*, but during *haktara* the case of נתן את הקומץ במחשבה ואת הלבונה בשתיקה is still disputed by רבי מאיר and חכמים. The גמרא initially tries to reinterpret the ברייתא as describing a different order, but rejects that due to redundancy and due to a clearer version that uses the word אחר כך. Rav Ḥanina resolves that the case involves two different כהנים so the continuation-from-first-intent presumption does not apply across actors.
- A ברייתא distinguishes outer-altar blood, where even one application achieves כפרה and thus *pigul* can take effect from one *matana*, from inner-altar and Yom Kippur procedures where every *matana* is מעכב and רבי מאיר still calls *pigul* from a partial stage while חכמים require *pigul* in all the *matir*. The count of Yom Kippur applications is presented as ארבעים ושלוש, and the חזו״א is cited as noting the count spans two animals and must be allocated between פר and שעיר along with the mixed blood stage. The text presses that the phrase פיגול בין בראשונה בין בשנייה בין בשלישית implies a case where the first stage is with *pigul* and later stages are *stam*, challenging Rav’s presumption, and attempts to answer with cases involving additional *pigul* on later stages are rejected as not fitting the ברייתא’s wording, ending with קשיא.
- The גמרא asks how רבי מאיר can treat *pigul* in the Kodesh HaKodashim applications as *pigul* with *karet* when *karet* requires קרב המתיר כמצוותו, yet once the blood is disqualified inside, later sprinklings in the Heichal are likened to מיא בעלמא. Rashi’s question is recorded that this logic would seem to undermine *pigul* generally, and the answer given is that the “water-like” framing applies when the disqualification affects the same ongoing avodah unit, whereas other cases involve distinct avodot.
- Rava answers that the case can be constructed with ארבעה פרים וארבעה שעירים, where blood spills after each stage and new animals are brought to continue, allowing all required stages to be performed properly aside from the *pigul* thought. Rava also gives an alternative that even with one פר and one שעיר, later applications are still מרצי with respect to *pigul*, so the requirement of קרב המתיר כמצוותו is satisfied for *pigul* liability.
- A contradiction between counts of ארבעים ושלוש and ארבעים ושבע is resolved as dependent on whether they mix the blood for the corner applications, with one view holding מערבין לקרנות and another holding אין מערבין לקרנות. A further contradiction to ארבעים ושמונה is resolved as dependent on whether שפיכת שיריים is considered מעכב, with one view holding שיריים מעכבין and another holding שיריים לא מעכבין.
- A question is posed about פיגול בהולכה, whether *pigul* intent during carrying the *kometz* is treated as full *matir* or half *matir* given that there is also a carrying of the *levona*. רבי יוחנן holds הולכה כקמיצה, treating it like an act that stands as its own effective unit, while ריש לקיש holds הולכה כהקטרה, treating it as a half-*matir* parallel to *haktara* because there is also holacha of *levona*. רבי יוחנן’s rationale is framed as holding that any avodah that is not itself the permitting step is still חשובה לפגלה בפני עצמה, and Abaye challenges this from the slaughter of one Shavuot lamb, with Rava responding that שחיטת כבשים מקדשא ליה the bread and הבא לקדש כבא להתיר דמי.
- A challenge is brought from others who rule that if one first slaughters with intent for ערלים and then for מולים the Pesach is פסול, and it is stated that the dispute is in חצי מתיר. Rava answers by asserting that the blood is not sanctified in the animal’s neck but rather דם סכין מקדשא ליה, and again frames sanctifying as equivalent to permitting by stating הבא לקדש כבא להתיר דמי.
- A further attempt is made to infer from a ברייתא listing קמיצה, מתן כלי, and הילוך as cases where the *pigul* thought is effective, and the reading is adjusted to interpret the הילוך as related to מתן כלי rather than to הַקְטָרָה. The reordering and the language that later says נתן את הקומץ בשתיקה create a remaining קשיא, and the segment ends with the note that the continuation will resume the next day.
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