Menachos 17
Summary
- The שיעור on מנחות י״ז continues the sugya of *pigul* created by *machshavat pigul* in only part of a two-part *matir*, especially the *haktarah* of the *kometz* and the *haktarah* of the *levonah*, and it presents competing positions from the *Charifei d’Pumbedisa* and from Rav Chisda in the name of Rava about whether one *haktarah* can be *mefageil* another. The daf then closes the second perek with הדרן עלך הקומץ את המנחה, and opens the next perek with a Mishnah about intending to eat or burn something that is not normally eaten or burned, the dispute of רבי אליעזר and the חכמים, and רבי יוחנן’s derivation from ואם האכל יאכל, followed by a discussion whether רבי אליעזר’s פסול includes כרת and a braysa that is ultimately not accepted as proof.
- Today's דף is sponsored לעילוי נשמת מרתה מרים שרה בת יעקב משה, her נשמה should have an עליה. The learning begins on ט״ו עמוד ב׳ at the last word on the דף and frames the topic as cases of *mefageil* with a partial *matir* in the dispute between רבי מאיר, who holds that *pigul* can take effect with only one part of a two-part *matir*, and the חכמים, who hold that it cannot.
- The גמרא cites אמר מחריפי דפומבדיתא, identified as the sharp ones of Pumbedisa, עיפא and אבימי, the sons of רחבא of פומבדיתא, as known from מסכת סנהדרין. They state הקטרה מפגלת הקטרה, so a *machshavah* during the *haktarah* of the *kometz* about doing *haktarah* of the *levonah* tomorrow creates *pigul*, because the *kometz* and *levonah* are איקבעו בחד מנא and one can *mefageil* the other. They explain that even according to רבנן דאמרי אין מפגל בחצי מתיר, that limitation applies when the thought is about the שירים and the *levonah* is untouched, but here דחישב ביה בלבונה it is like thinking on the whole *matir* and is *pigul* even according to the חכמים.
- Rבא says אף אנן נמי תנינא and brings the last Mishnah of the first perek: זה הכלל, that in any of the four עבודות—collecting the *kometz*, placing it in a vessel, carrying, or burning—if one intends לאכול דבר שדרכו לאכול ולהקטיר דבר שדרכו להקטיר with חוץ למקומו it is פסול without כרת, and with חוץ לזמנו it is פיגול with כרת. He reads the phrase as implying that by *haktarah* itself, a thought either about eating or about another *haktarah* can generate *pigul*, supporting the *Charifei d’Pumbedisa* that a *machshavah* on *haktarah* can *mefageil* another *haktarah*. The גמרא rejects this proof by interpreting that only the first three עבודות work between eating and burning thoughts, while by *haktarah* specifically the thought can apply to eating but not to burning, so the Mishnah is not a ראיה.
- Rav Menash bar Gedda reports to Abaye in the name of Rav Chisda that אין הקטרה מפגלת הקטרה, and he says this applies even according to רבי מאיר who allows *pigul* with half a *matir*. He limits רבי מאיר’s rule to where the thought concerns the שירים, because the *kometz* is the *matir* of the שירים while the *levonah* does not prevent that, but the *kometz* is not the *matir* of the *levonah* so it cannot *mefageil* it. Abaye confirms that this is in the name of Rava, and the sugya records explicitly אמר רב חסדא אמר רבא, אין הקטרה מפגלת הקטרה.
- Rav Yaakov bar Idi cites Abaye that a Mishnah teaches: if one slaughters one of the כבשים of שבועות intending to eat from it tomorrow, it is *pigul* and its fellow is כשר, but if he intends to eat from the other one tomorrow then both are כשרים. He suggests this shows that when something is not the *matir* of the other it cannot *mefageil* it. The גמרא rejects that as a proof by saying that there the animals were not established in one vessel, while here by the מנחה the *kometz* and *levonah* are דאיקבעו בחד מנא and could be considered כחדא, leaving room to say the *kometz* could *mefageil* the *levonah*.
- Rav Hamnuna says that Rav Chanina taught him a teaching that is “equal to all my learning” and states: הקטיר קומץ להקטיר לבונה לאכול שירים למחר פיגול. The sugya asks what the חידוש is, since each component could have been stated more simply if it were only about *haktarah mefagelet haktarah* or only about *mefageil* with half a *matir*. Rav Ada bar Avin explains that the statement assumes אין הקטרה מפגלת הקטרה and אין מפגלין בחצי מתיר, and the case is different because באשלימו מחשבה בכולה מנחה, meaning he completes his *machshavah* over the entire מנחה so it becomes *pigul*.
- A תנא teaches in front of רבי יצחק בר אבא that if one burns the *kometz* intending to eat the שיריים, לדברי הכל פיגול. רבי יצחק בר אבא objects that רבי מאיר and the חכמים disagree, so the תנא revises it to לדברי הכל פסול, with רבי מאיר making it *pigul* and the חכמים making it merely פסול. רבי יצחק then asks why not leave the text as “it is *pigul* and it is רבי מאיר,” and the answer is that the תנא had learned it with the phrase דברי הכל and confused פיגול with פסול, but did not confuse the claim that it applies to everybody.
- The shiur concludes with הדרן עלך הקומץ את המנחה and the hope to finish the entire מסכת and all of ש״ס. The next perek opens with the Mishnah that if one performs קמיצה intending to eat something not normally eaten or burn something not normally burned, the מנחה is כשר, and it notes that the key point is the next clause ורבי אליעזר פוסל. The Mishnah adds that if the intent is to eat or burn less than a כזית חוץ לזמנו it is כשר, and if the intent is to eat a half-כזית and burn a half-כזית it is כשר because אין אכילה והקטרה מצטרפין.
- Rav Asi says in the name of רבי יוחנן that רבי אליעזר’s reasoning comes from the פסוק ואם האכל יאכל מבשר זבח שלמיו, where the doubled term indicates שתי אכילות: אכילת אדם and אכילת מזבח. The derivation teaches that מחשבין מאכילת אדם כך מחשבין מאכילת מזבח, and that מחשבין also from אכילת אדם to מזבח and from מזבח to אדם, since the תורה expresses *haktarah* in the language of אכילה. The חכמים answer that the use of אכילה for the מזבח does not change the law because whether one thinks in the language of אכילה or in the language of *haktarah* for the מזבח it is the same, or alternatively that it teaches that the שיעור for *haktarah* thoughts is a כזית like human eating while אכילה still means ordinary eating. רבי אליעזר replies that if so the פסוק should have used a single form like אם האכל יאכל or אם יאכל יאכל, and the difference between האכל and יאכל shows we learn two points.
- Rabbi Zeira challenges Rabbi Asi that if רבי אליעזר’s rule is truly derived from a פסוק then כרת should apply, but Rabbi Asi notes that he said in the name of רבי יוחנן that רבי אליעזר agrees there is no כרת. He answers that it is a תנאי dispute within רבי אליעזר’s view, with one position treating it as פסול דאורייתא and another as פסול דרבנן. A ברייתא is brought where intending to eat blood tomorrow, burn meat tomorrow, or eat אימורים tomorrow is כשר, while רבי אליעזר פוסל, and it adds a case of intending to leave blood over until tomorrow where רבי יהודה פוסל and רבי אלעזר says that even there רבי אליעזר פוסל and חכמים מכשירין.
- The sugya considers whether the difference between רבי יהודה and רבי אלעזר is about כרת, but the גמרא rejects that and says דכולי עלמא כרת ליכא. It explains a three-way structure: the תנא קמא holds the dispute is only in the first cases and that leaving blood over is כשר for all, while רבי יהודה holds that leaving blood over is פוסל for all because of גזירת מקצת דמי אטו כל דמי, since leaving all the blood over is פסול דאורייתא. רבי אלעזר then states that even in that case רבי אליעזר פוסל and the חכמים מכשירין, so the dispute there is about whether there is a rabbinic פסול rather than about כרת, and the shiur ends with continuing tomorrow to discuss רבי יהודה’s approach.
Previous Page
Next Page
Daf Images are property of Vagshal and may not be reproduced.
Suggestions