Menachos 17 - NBTD
00:00 - Good Morning
00:10 - 16B
08:48 - 17A
25:27 - 17B
29:03 - Have a Wonderful Day!
Quiz - http://Kahoot.MDYdaf.com
Summary
- The shiur learns Menachos דף ז׳ עמוד ב׳ about *pigul* in a *minchah* when the *kohen* has a disqualifying thought to eat the *sheyarei* tomorrow, and it applies the question to extreme cases like doing *pigul* on each individual sesame seed in the *kemitzah*. The Gemara presents a three-way dispute—*pigul*, *pasul*, or *kasher*—and rejects mapping it directly onto Rebbi Meir, the Chachamim, and Rebbi, instead tying it to whether this is considered the normal manner (*derech*) of eating and/or offering on the *mizbe’ach*. The shiur then brings the debate about whether one *haktarah* can render another *haktarah* *pigul*, cites Rashi’s reasoning about items fixed in one vessel, and concludes with a mishnah about thoughts to eat or offer things not normally eaten/offered, including Rebbi Eliezer’s פסול and the derashah from “ואם האכל יאכל,” plus the question whether Rebbi Eliezer’s פסול includes *karet*.
- Good morning רבותי! לעילוי נשמת שמשון בן מאיר ויוספה בת מרדכי.
- A person brings a *minchah* and while doing the *kemitzah* or placing it on the *mizbe’ach* he thinks he will eat the leftover *sheyarei* tomorrow, even though a *minchah* is *kodshei kodashim* that can only be eaten today. A *pigul* thought makes the korban *pigul*, and if it is eaten even today one gets *karet* because of the thought to eat it outside its time. The new *sugya* asks about “הקטיר שומשום לאכול שומשום,” where *shumshum* is *sumsum* and is treated as the smallest food item, and the case is that he is *maktir* one sesame seed at a time with a *pigul* thought for each seed until the entire *kometz* is finished. Rav Chisda, Rav Hamnuna, and Rav Shesh are in a three-way dispute where one says it becomes *pigul*, one says it is *pasul* without *karet*, and one says it remains *kasher*, and the shiur says the Gemara does not initially know who holds which view.
- The shiur explains that the *sheyarei* become permitted only after two *matirin* are offered: the *kometz* and the *levonah*, and without both one has only a *chatzi matir*. Rebbi Meir holds one can create *pigul* with a *chatzi matir*, while the Chachamim require the thought by both *matirin*, and the shiur suggests the sesame-seed case might hinge on that idea. The shiur then brings the case of Shavuos with two sheep and two breads, where Rebbi treats each sheep as a *matir* for the breads and says that thinking *chatzi kezayis* by one and another *chatzi kezayis* by the other yields no *pigul* and the whole remains *kasher*, because it combines problems of *chatzi matir* and *chatzi shiur*. The Gemara says “ממאי” and proposes that Rebbi Meir may only allow *chatzi matir* when the thought involves a full *shiur*, while in the sesame case each seed is not a *shiur*, and it proposes the Chachamim may call a case *pasul* only where the thought did not reach the entire *matir*, while here he eventually thought on all the sesame seeds. The Gemara similarly proposes that Rebbi’s leniency might be limited to where he did not return and complete the *avodah* from the same item, while here he did, and it concludes that none of the three outcomes is tied to a single Tanna, because each outcome can be “דברי הכל.”
- The shiur states the Gemara explains the three views as depending on whether this is the normal manner of eating and/or offering. The one who says *pigul דברי הכל* holds “דרך אכילה בכך ודרך הקטרה בכך,” so it is normal to eat and to offer in this incremental way. The one who says *pasul דברי הכל* holds “דרך אכילה בכך ואין דרך הקטרה בכך,” so it is normal eating but not normal offering, and it becomes like “כמנחה שלא הוקטרה.” The one who says *kasher דברי הכל* holds “דרך הקטרה בכך ואין דרך אכילה בכך,” so it is a valid offering mode but not an eating mode.
- The *charifei d’Pumbedisa* say “הקטרה מפגלת הקטרה,” and the shiur gives the case where one offers the *kometz* with intent to offer the *levonah* tomorrow, which would render it *pigul*. Rashi says “הקטיר קומץ על מנת להקטיר לבונה לאחר זמן פיגול,” and distinguishes it from thinking during the shechitah of one sheep about the blood of the other, because there the two are not fixed “בחד מנא,” whereas here the *kometz* and *levonah* were in one vessel. The shiur then brings Rav Manshiya bar Gadda in front of Abaye saying in the name of Rav Chisda that “אין הקטרה מפגלת הקטרה,” and even Rebbi Meir’s rule of *chatzi matir* applies only when the thought is about the *sheyarei* that the *kometz* helps permit, but the *kometz* is not a *matir* for the *levonah* so it cannot be *mefagel* it. Abaye verifies the transmission, and it is taught that Rav Chisda says in the name of Rav that “אין הקטרה מפגלת הקטרה.”
- A proof is attempted from the Shavuos sheep case that if one slaughters one sheep intending to eat that sheep tomorrow it is *pigul* for that animal while its fellow is *kasher*, but if he slaughters one intending to eat the other tomorrow then “שניהם כשרים,” which suggests one cannot be *mefagel* what is not its own *matir*. The Gemara rejects that as proof on the grounds that “התם הוא דלא איקבע בחד מנא,” while in the *minchah* case the *kometz* and *levonah* were established together in one vessel and are treated “כחד דמו.”
- Rav Hamnuna says “הא מילתא אכלי לי רבי חנינא” and calls it “כטילא ככולי תלמודא,” and the case is “הקטיר קומץ להקטיר לבונה לאכול שיריים למחר,” where he offers the *kometz* with a combined intent about offering the *levonah* late and eating the *sheyarei* late. The Gemara asks what this teaches and proposes that if it is about *haktarah mefageles haktarah* the *sheyarei* clause is unnecessary, and if it is about *chatzi matir* the *levonah* clause is unnecessary, and it then suggests that to teach two independent laws it would say “להקטיר לבונה ולאכול שיריים למחר.” The shiur notes that Rashi takes the “ו” there as meaning “or,” so the phrasing would signal two separate halachos rather than one combined clause. Rava bar Rav Huna says the case can still work while holding “אין הקטרה מפגלת הקטרה ואין מפגלין בחצי מתיר,” because “שאני הכא דפשטה ליה מחשבה בכולה מנחה,” and the combined thought spreads across the entire *minchah* and makes it *pigul*.
- A tanna teaches before Rebbi Yitzchak bar Abba that “הקטיר קומץ לאכול שיריים ולדברי הכל פיגול,” but he objects that the dispute about *chatzi matir* remains. The text is corrected to “לדברי הכל פסול,” and an alternative suggestion to attribute *pigul* specifically to Rebbi Meir is rejected because the tanna insists he remembers the phrase “לדברי הכל.” The shiur says the Gemara explains that “פיגול בפסול מחלפי ליה,” but “הרי זה בדברי הכל” is not easily confused.
- The shiur concludes “הדרן עלך הקומץ את המנחה” and moves to a mishnah about מחשבה on something “שאין דרכו לאכול” or “שאין דרכו להקטיר.” The mishnah states that thinking to eat something not normally eaten, such as parts meant for the *mizbe’ach*, or thinking to offer something not normally offered, such as *sheyarei* intended for eating, leaves the korban *kasher*, while Rebbi Eliezer says *posel*. The mishnah also states that thinking properly but for less than a *kezayis* remains *kasher*, and that a half-*kezayis* of eating and a half-*kezayis* of offering do not combine because “שאין אכילה והקטרה מצטרפין.”
- Rav Ashi says in the name of Rebbi Yochanan that Rebbi Eliezer’s reason comes from “ואם האכל יאכל,” and Rebbi Yitzchak bar Shalma says the pasuk speaks of two “eatings,” “אחד אכילת אדם ואחד אכילת מזבח.” The shiur states that Rebbi Eliezer treats מחשבה about *achilas mizbe’ach* like מחשבה about human eating, and he allows interchangeability so that מחשבה of “eating” can apply even to what is normally offered, because the Torah used a לשון of אכילה. The Chachamim answer that the לשון אכילה teaches other points, including that the *shiur* for *haktarah* is also *kezayis*, and they require “אורחא דאכילה,” so מחשבה of eating something not normally eaten is not *pigul*. Rebbi Eliezer reads the double wording as teaching two things, including the interchangeability between אדם and מזבח.
- Rebbi Zeira asks Rav Asi that if Rebbi Eliezer’s פסול is learned from a pasuk then it should also carry *karet*, yet a statement in the name of Rebbi Yochanan says “שאין ענוש כרת.” Rav Asi answers that there is a dispute “תנאי אליבא דרבי אליעזר,” with one view treating it as *pasul* on a Torah level with *karet* and another treating it as a rabbinic פסול. A beraisa is brought where shechting with intent to drink blood tomorrow, or to offer meat tomorrow, or to eat *eimurim* tomorrow is *kasher* according to the first view and *posel* according to Rebbi Eliezer, and another case of intending “להניח מדמו למחר” is *posel* according to Rebbi Yehuda. Rebbi Elazar says “אף בזו רבי אליעזר פוסל וחכמים מכשירין,” and the Gemara concludes the difference is whether *karet* applies, with one view saying only a simple פסול in the “להניח” case but *karet* in the other cases, while Rebbi Elazar’s framing yields “אידי ואידי פסול ואין בו כרת.”
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