Menachos 25 - Cycle 14
Summary
- Today’s *shiur* learns Menachos 25a from the *Mishnah* and centers on *ritsuy tsits*, the Torah mechanism by which the *tsits* of the *Kohen Gadol* can effect *retzuy* for certain *pesulim* of *tumah* in *korbanos*. The text frames *tumah* as a unique disqualification because, unlike many other *pesulim*, it can be mitigated in defined cases by *ritsuy tsits*, affecting outcomes such as the validity of *zerikas hadam*, the application of *piggul*, and the removal of *me’ilah*. It develops the scope of what the *tsits* can and cannot be *meratzeh* for, the dispute about whether the *tsits* must be worn intact, and whether reliance on *ritsuy tsits* is *lechatchilah* or only *b’dieved*. It then reads the *Mishnah* and *beraisos* to determine which *avon* the *pasuk* assigns to the *tsits*, rejects proposals like *yotzei*, *smol*, and *mum*, and reconciles conflicting *beraisos* about whether *retzuy* applies in *mezid* through multiple *Amoraic* approaches.
- A Torah-level disqualification of a *korban* is *tumah*, and it applies whether the *korban* becomes *tamei*, the blood becomes *tamei*, the meat becomes *tamei*, the *eimurim* become *tamei*, or the *kohen* doing the *avodah* becomes *tamei*. A *kohen* who becomes *tamei* is disqualified from performing any procedure of the *korban*. A distinct concept of *ritsuy tsits* applies when the *korban*, the blood, the *kometz*, or the *levonah* becomes *tamei*. A case of blood that became *tamei* becomes eligible for *zerikas hadam* through *ritsuy tsits*, and there is a *machlokes* whether the *tsits* is effective for *eimurim* that became *tamei*.
- Everyone agrees that *ritsuy tsits* is not effective to permit eating the *korban*. When *ritsuy tsits* operates, it is treated as if all steps of the *korban* were followed. A valid completion of the process means the *korban* becomes *piggul* if there was a *machshavas piggul* together with the other required conditions. A *korban* that had been subject to *me’ilah* until that point is no longer subject to *me’ilah* once the process is treated as properly completed.
- The Gemara in Yoma 7b presents a *machlokes* when there is *ritsuy tsits*: *R’ Shimon* holds the *tsits* is able to be *meratzeh* whether or not the *Kohen Gadol* is wearing it, while *R’ Yehudah* holds it is effective only when the *Kohen Gadol* is wearing it, and if he is not wearing it it has no effect. If the *tsits* is broken, even *R’ Shimon* agrees it is not effective. The *Noda B’Yehudah* asks that if the *halachah* follows the view that the *tsits* is *meratzeh* only when worn, the *Kohen Gadol* should always wear it in case a problem arises, and he answers that on Yom Kippur the *Kohen Gadol* cannot wear the *tsits* when he enters the *Kodesh HaKodashim*.
- One explanation is *ein kategor na’aseh saneigor*, so when the *Kohen Gadol* enters the *Kodesh HaKodashim* he cannot wear gold. Another explanation is that the *Kohen Gadol* either wears four garments or eight garments, and there is no option of wearing five, meaning the four *bigdei lavan* plus the *tsits*. These constraints explain why the *tsits* is not simply worn constantly to ensure *ritsuy*.
- A *machlokes rishonim* addresses when the *tsits* is *meratzeh* if the *Kohen Gadol* must be wearing it: the *retzuy* may be tied to the moment the *tumah* occurred or to the moment the *korban* is being brought while *tamei*. The *rishonim* also debate whether *ritsuy tsits* is relied upon *lechatchilah* or only *b’dieved*. Rashi and Tosafos hold that *tsits meratzeh* is *mid’oraysa* in cases of *tumah* where the *tsits* is effective. The Yerushalmi implies that reliance on *ritsuy tsits* is not *lechatchilah*.
- The Yerushalmi states that the *tsits* is *meratzeh* only after the blood is in a *kli shares*. If the blood is not yet in a *kli shares*, the *tsits* does not yet have the ability to be *meratzeh*. This frames an internal boundary to when *retzuy* begins.
- The *Mishnah* rules that if the *kometz* of a *korban minchah* became *tamei* and it was brought on the *mizbe’ach*, the *tsits* is *meratzeh*, and this applies to any type of *tumah*. If the *kometz* went out *chutz la’azarah* and was then brought back and offered, *ein hatsits meratzeh*. The reason given is that the *tsits* is *meratzeh* only for *tamei* and is not *meratzeh* for *yotzei*.
- A *beraisa* derives from the *pasuk* “והיה על מצח אהרן ונשא אהרן את עון הקדשים” that the Torah uses singular *lashon* “עון,” and therefore one must identify which specific *aveirah* the *tsits* addresses. The Gemara rejects *avon piggul* because the Torah says “המקריב אותו לא יחשב לו פגול יהיה,” teaching that *piggul* cannot be forgiven. The Gemara rejects *avon nosar* by citing “ואם האכל יאכל ביום השלישי פגול הוא לא ירצה,” and it clarifies, as the *rishonim* note, that “עון נותר” here means a *machshavah* of *chutz lizmano* rather than leftover meat, because leftover meat after proper offering cannot retroactively disqualify the *korban*. The conclusion is “הא אינו נושא אלא עון טומאה,” and it ties this to the idea that *tumah* is *hutrah michlal* because *tumah hutrah b’tzibbur*.
- The Gemara uses *tumah hutrah b’tzibbur* to show *tumah* is more lenient and therefore suited to be the *avon* carried by the *tsits*. A further question asks whether *hutrah* means *lechatchilah* permission or whether *tumah* is merely *dechuyah*. Yoma treats the statement as a proof of *hutrah*, while the *Noda B’Yehudah* says it is not necessarily compelling and even if it is *dechuyah* it still shows *tumah* is not so significant and thus the *tsits* is *meratzeh*. The *Shu”t Minchas Baruch* says the Gemara does not require these two *halachos* to travel together and uses *hutrah b’tzibbur* only to characterize *tumah* as an area where the Torah is lenient.
- Rav Zevid proposes that the *tsits* might carry the *avon* of *yotzei* because *yotzei* is *hutrah michlalo* through *bamah* at historical periods when *bamos* were permitted, including times such as Gilgal, and the later periods of Nov and Givon. Abaye rejects this from “לרצון לכם לפני ה’,” limiting *ritsuy* to an *avon* that occurs *lifnei Hashem*. An *avon* of *yotzei* occurs outside and therefore is not *lifnei Hashem*.
- Rav Ila proposes that the *tsits* might be *meratzeh* an *avon* of doing *avodah* with the left hand, since left-hand use is *hutrah michlalo* on Yom Kippur when the *ketores* service requires holding the pan in the right hand and the *ketores* in the left. The *Meshech Chochmah* explains that the right hand represents *ruchniyus* and the left hand represents *gashmiyus*, and on Yom Kippur there is no *gashmiyus* and the *gashmiyus* present is itself *ruchniyus*, so left-hand *avodah* becomes fitting. Abaye answers that on Yom Kippur it is not an *avon* at all, because the Torah specifically wants that *avodah* with the left hand in that context, so *ritsuy tsits* cannot be defined as correcting wrongdoing there.
- Rav Chaim Brisker cites the Gemara in Tamid describing *ketores* as “filled *chofnav*” all year, and he explains that although the scooping might involve the left hand, carrying the *ketores* in the left hand on Yom Kippur is part of the *avodah* itself, unlike the year-round scooping. Rav Ashi adds that “ונשא אהרן את עון הקדשים” indicates the *tsits* addresses something referring to the *korban*, while left-hand performance refers to the people performing the service. The *rishonim* question this because the Rambam holds the *tsits* is *meratzeh* even if the *kohen* is *tamei*, and they explain that the *tsits* addresses the *korban*’s standing even though the personal *aveirah* of serving while *tamei* is not erased.
- Rav Simi bar Ada asks Rav Ashi whether the *tsits* might cover the *avon* of *mum* because the Torah is lenient with birds, as stated by “תמות וזכרות בבהמה ואין תמות וזכרות בעופות.” Abaye rejects this by citing the Torah’s explicit verses that a blemished animal is not accepted “לנדר לא ירצה” and “כי לא לרצון יהיה לכם,” and the *tsits* cannot overturn that explicit rejection.
- A *beraisa* teaches that if blood became *tamei* and was sprinkled, if done *b’shogeg* it is accepted and if done *b’meizid* it is not accepted. The *beraisa* limits this distinction to a *korban yachid* and states that for a *korban tzibbur* it is accepted whether *b’shogeg* or *b’meizid*, and it explains this with reasons presented in Pesachim including *tumah hutrah b’tzibbur* and the reduced assignability of blame to the public. For *ovdei kochavim*, even if brought *b’shogeg*, *b’meizid*, *b’ones*, or *b’ratzon*, it is not accepted. The *rishonim* note that *meizid* and *ratzon* are synonymous and appear together only for stylistic parallel to *shogeg* and *ones*.
- The Brisker Rav explains that *tsits meratzeh* is a *chidush* stated only for the *korban* of Yisrael and excludes the *korban* of an *akum*. He also explains that *ritsuy tsits* is tied to *kaparah*, while a *nochri*’s *korban* is not fundamentally for *kaparah*, so *ritsuy* does not apply.
- A second *beraisa* states that the *tsits* is *meratzeh* for blood, meat, and fat that became *tamei* “בין בשוגג בין במזיד בין באונס בין ברצון בין ביחיד בין בציבור.” Rav Yosef answers that the *beraisa* treating *meizid* like *shogeg* follows *R’ Yosi*, while the *beraisa* distinguishing *shogeg* and *meizid* follows the *Rabbanan*. The Gemara supports the attribution by comparing it to the *machlokes* in *terumah* where taking *terumah* “מן הטמא על הטהור” is valid *b’shogeg* but invalid *b’meizid* according to the *Rabbanan*, while *R’ Yosi* holds it is valid in both cases, and *R’ Yosi* derives effectiveness from “ולא תשאו עליו חטא בהרימכם את חלבו ממנו” because liability for sin implies the act has effect.
- The Gemara challenges whether *R’ Yosi*’s view in *terumah* implies anything about *tsits* being *meratzeh* for eating, and it cites a *beraisa* where *R’ Eliezer* says “הציץ מרצה על אכילות” and *R’ Yosi* says “אין הציץ מרצה על אכילות.” The Gemara attempts to resolve by reversing the names, making *R’ Yosi* the lenient one on *achilos*. Rav Sheshes objects that the reversal is untenable in light of a *beraisa* about liability for eating *kodshim* in *tumah* that treats meat that became *tamei* before *zerikah* as generating liability after *zerikah* because “ציץ מרצה,” while excluding *piggul* as lacking *sha’as kosher*.
- The *beraisa* distinguishes items that had *sha’as kosher* such as *linah* and *yotzei* after a valid moment, and excludes *piggul* because it never had *sha’as kosher*. It explains that meat which became *tamei* before *zerikah* still yields liability after *zerikah* because *tsits meratzeh* makes the *zerikah* effective for the *korban* even though it does not permit eating. The Gemara ties this to the *machlokes* of *zerikah mo’eles l’yotzei* in Me’ilah 6b, identifies *R’ Akiva* as holding *zerikah* is effective for *yotzei* regarding removal of *me’ilah*, and identifies *R’ Elazar* as holding *ein zerikah mo’eles l’yotzei* so it remains under *me’ilah*. The Gemara uses this to show the *beraisa* aligns with *R’ Elazar*, who is stringent about *yotzei* yet can hold *tsits meratzeh al achilos*, making the attempted reversal of *R’ Eliezer* and *R’ Yosi* unsustainable.
- Rav Chisda resolves the contradiction by attributing the *beraisa* that accepts both *shogeg* and *meizid* to *R’ Elazar*, and attributing the *beraisa* distinguishing them to the *Rabbanan*. The Gemara challenges whether *R’ Elazar*’s leniency about not penalizing *meizid* is known only from *terumah*, which is lighter than *kodshim*, and it answers that the attribution is accepted because otherwise there is no resolution to the contradiction. The Gemara then cites a *beraisa* that *R’ Elazar* holds in *terumah* “בין בשוגג בין במזיד תרומתו תרומה,” supporting the claim that he does not impose a *knas* for *meizid*.
- Ravina answers that when the blood or meat became *tamei*, there is no distinction between *shogeg* and *meizid* regarding *retzuy*. Ravina limits the distinction to the *zerikah* itself: if *zerikah* was done *b’shogeg* it is accepted, and if *zerikah* was done *b’meizid* it is not accepted. This reconciles *beraisos* by assigning the *shogeg/meizid* split to the act of sprinkling rather than to the formation of *tumah*.
- Rav Shila reverses the axis and holds that *zerikah* performed in *tumah* is accepted whether *b’shogeg* or *b’meizid*, while if the blood or meat became *tamei* then *shogeg* leads to acceptance and *meizid* leads to non-acceptance. Tosafos explains that by *zerikah* one can claim the performer was preoccupied and did not realize, while by the meat becoming *tamei* such an assumption is not made. When challenged by a *beraisa* stating “אם נטמא בין בשוגג בין במזיד הורצה,” the Gemara explains according to Rav Shila that the *netma* is only *b’shogeg* and the *zarko* can be either *b’shogeg* or *b’meizid*.
- When confronted with the explicit text “דם שנטמא וזרקו בשוגג הורצה במזיד לא הורצה,” the Gemara explains Rav Shila must read it as distinguishing not the *zerikah* but how the blood became *tamei*. The re-reading makes the rule that if the blood became *tamei* *b’shogeg* then *retzuy* operates, but if it became *tamei* *b’meizid* then it is not accepted, even though the subsequent *zerikah* itself does not create the distinction. The concluding line states that if the *tumah* on the meat or blood was *b’meizid*, “לא הורצה,” and the *korban* cannot be.
Previous Page
Next Page
Daf Images are property of Vagshal and may not be reproduced.
Suggestions