Menachos 41
Summary
- Today’s *daf* is Menachot 41, continuing on 42 at “אמר רבי זירא,” and it centers on the minimum *shiur* for a *tallit katan* to be *chayav* in *tzitzit*, the status of a folded garment and where its corners are defined, and the broader question of whether *tzitzit* is a *chovat gavra* or a *chovat mana*. The *Gemara* treats attempts to avoid the mitzvah by wearing garments not obligated in *tzitzit*, addresses whether garments made for a *met* require *tzitzit*, and then moves to cases of a garment made entirely of *techelet* and what qualifies as *lavan*. The *daf* includes three disputes between Rav and Shmuel—*matirin mibeged lebeged*, lighting one Chanukah lamp from another, and ruling like Rabbi Shimon on *gerirah*—and states that in these three, the *halacha* follows Shmuel.
- Today’s *shiur* is sponsored by Henry Orlinsky, *lezcher nishmat* Milton Kramer, יחיאל מיכל בן חיים שניאור זלמן הלוי זכרונו לברכה, for an ongoing *aliyah* from the *zechut* of learning. Today's *daf* is Menachot 41, and the learning continues on 42 at “אמר רבי זירא,” five lines from the end of the page, last word on the line “אמר רבי זירא.”
- A Rabbi Zeira reports in the name of Rav Matna and Shmuel that *techelet* in *tzitzit* does not create a problem of *kilayim*, and this explains why placing *techelet* on a linen garment is acceptable on a *de’oraita* level through *aseh docheh lo ta’aseh*. A Rabbi Zeira further reports that this remains true “ואפילו בטלית פטורה,” and the *Gemara* probes what “טלית פטורה” means in this context.
- A *beraita* defines the *shiur* of a garment obligated in *tzitzit* as one that covers the head and most of the body of a child and that an adult would wear *derech arai*, and it exempts a garment that does not cover the head and most of the body of a child even if an adult would wear it *derech arai*. The text states “וכן לעניין כלאים,” and Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak explains that it refers to the case of *sadin b’tzitzit*, where the *aseh docheh lo ta’aseh* framework applies only when the garment has the proper *shiur*. The *Gemara* rejects reading “טלית פטורה” as a garment smaller than the *shiur* because that would reintroduce the *sha’atnez* problem, and it instead interprets “טלית פטורה” as *hatil lemutelet*, adding *tzitzit* onto a garment that already has *tzitzit*, which still does not create *kilayim*.
- The *Gemara* asks why Rabbi Zeira needs to state this, since earlier it was already taught that *hatil lemutelet* is *kesheirah*, even avoiding *ta’aseh velo min he’asui* if the first set is cut. Rashi explains that once the second set is deemed *tzitzit* and *kasher* for the mitzvah, it follows that it does not create an independent *kilayim* concern because “כולה ציצית מקרו.” The *Gemara* concludes that one statement is said by implication of the other, and they function together.
- The narration states that the *Gemara* shows clearly that there is a *shiur* for a *tallit katan* and that many garments can be too small to be obligated in *tzitzit*. Rav Moshe Feinstein in Orach Chaim chelek 5 siman 20 is cited as saying it is plainly incorrect for yeshiva students not to recite a *beracha* on their *tzitzit* when the garment meets the required *shiur*, described as *gimel riv’ei amah* on each side excluding the neck opening. Rav Moshe adds that if the garment is undersized it explains the lack of a *beracha*, but he expresses astonishment that *bnei Torah* would wear a *tallit katan* not obligated in *tzitzit*.
- The Teshuvot Eretz Tzvi (chelek 1 siman 1) is cited as attempting to justify the custom of wearing a *tallit katan* less than the *shiur*, noting that many *gedolim* protested this, including concern about carrying on Shabbat if the strings are not performing a mitzvah function. A chiddush is attributed to the Rema in Teshuvat Rema siman 110, which states it is better to wear a *tallit katan* less than the *shiur* than not to wear one at all, and the Rema in Darkei Moshe siman 8 explains the different *beracha* text—*al mitzvat tzitzit* rather than *lehitatef b’tzitzit*—because *tallitot ketanim* are often undersized. The narration presents the Koshiglover’s question, cited with the Taz, about how a *beracha* can be said if there is no full mitzvah fulfillment, and it presents the suggestion that there may be a partial *kiyyum* even with a garment less than the *shiur*, while also presenting the alternative reading that the modified *beracha* is a practical safeguard where the garment’s size is uncertain.
- The Mahari Abuhav, cited in the Beit Yosef, is presented as holding that the only true *shiur* is whether the garment is fit to cover the head and most of the body of a child, aligning with the Rambam who omits the adult *arai* formulation. The Mahari ben Chaviv is presented as explaining that the *beraita* addresses an adult wearing such a garment in an *arai* manner rather than establishing an additional independent *shiur*. A second approach is presented in which some *poskim* treat the text as requiring two conditions—coverage for a child and that an adult would go out in it *derech arai*—and the Chazon Ish is cited as explaining that such a criterion varies by place and time. The Magen Avraham is cited as reading the Rema’s addition “שהגדול יוצא בו דרך עראי” as adding a second condition beyond the Shulchan Aruch’s child-based *shiur*, while the Taz is cited as disputing that reading and aligning the Rema with the one-*shiur* view.
- A *beraita* teaches that a folded garment (*טלית כפולה*) is obligated in *tzitzit*, while Rabbi Shimon exempts it, and all agree that if it is folded and stitched it is obligated. The *Gemara* clarifies that the case is not normal sewing but fastening with pins (*דנקטה בסיכי*). Rav Huna sees Rava bar Rav Nachman wearing a folded garment with strings placed at the fold-created “corners,” and when it unfolds the strings end up near the head area, leading Rav Huna to say this is not the “כנף” the Torah requires and to put on a different garment.
- Rava bar Rav Nachman responds that *tzitzit* is a *chovat tallit* and not merely a *chovat gavra*, and he instructs placing the *tzitzit* properly on the garment rather than thinking removal solves the issue. The *Gemara* considers proof from the practice of the *chasidim harishonim* who placed *techelet* before the garment was fully complete, but it rejects the proof by saying they were exceptionally stringent on themselves. The *Gemara* brings the story of an *angel* who finds Rav Ketina wearing garments that avoid *tzitzit* obligation and challenges him about *techelet tzitzit*, and Rav Ketina responds by questioning punishment for an *aseh*. The angel answers that in times of divine anger there is punishment, and the *Gemara* concludes that even if *tzitzit* is fundamentally a *chovat tallit*, punishment applies for not placing oneself in a position to make a *tallit* obligated in *tzitzit*.
- Tosafot is cited as saying that one can be punished for failure to fulfill *mitzvot aseh*, but Rav Ketina’s question refers specifically to an *aseh* of this type where one is not obligated to acquire an obligated garment if one does not have it. Tosafot contrasts this with an absolute *aseh*, where even a *beit din shel matah* can coerce fulfillment, “כופין על העשה,” even with beating “עד שתצא נפשו.” The narration ties this to broader cases of seeking opportunities to fulfill mitzvot, including Tosafot in Pesachim describing one who does not try to obtain a *tallit* as “מנודה לשמיא,” and the *Gemara* in Sotah about Moshe Rabbeinu desiring entry to Eretz Yisrael to fulfill *mitzvot hateluyot ba’aretz*.
- A Teshuvat Maharsha (chelek 1 siman 269) is cited about someone who avoids bread and similar foods on Chol HaMoed Sukkot and thereby avoids *sukkah* obligation, and the Taz is cited as ruling that one fasting on Sukkot recites *leishev basukkah* upon entering because the baseline obligation is to bless upon entry, with meals serving as the usual anchor for the *beracha*. The narration presents the conclusion that one should not plan to avoid *sukkah* obligations through technical exemptions, and it cites a letter of Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein criticizing educationally the practice of arranging trips on Sukkot that avoid building a *sukkah*, contrasting it with the common effort to find a *sukkah* even when exemptions might exist.
- Shmuel is cited as ruling that *klei kupsa* are obligated in *tzitzit*, meaning even a garment kept away is obligated. Shmuel agrees that a garment made for an elderly person as *tachrichim* for after death is exempt because the Torah says “אשר תכסה בה,” and this is not made for covering in life. The narration states that at burial *tzitzit* are placed because of “לועג לרש חרף עשהו,” and Rabbi Yitzchak is cited that once a person dies he becomes free from mitzvot, alongside the related practice of tucking in one’s *tzitzit* in a cemetery due to *l’oneg larash*.
- Rav Yehuda teaches that if a *tallit* tears more than three fingerbreadths from the edge one may sew it, but within three one should not sew due to concern that loose threads might later be used as *tzitzit* and create *ta’aseh velo min he’asui*. A *beraita* parallels this and records a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Chachamim about sewing within three. All agree one may not bring even an *amah al amah* patch from elsewhere that already has *techelet* attached and then hang it, while all agree one may bring *techelet* strings from elsewhere and attach them provided they are not cut, “ובלבד שלא תהא מופסקת.”
- The *Gemara* infers “שמע מינה מתירין מבגד לבגד,” but it rejects the proof by saying the source garment may have been worn out (*דאיבליי*), which would be a different case. The topic reappears later as part of a direct dispute between Rav and Shmuel about whether *tzitzit* may be transferred from one usable garment to another.
- A *beraita* states that if a garment is entirely *techelet*, any colored material can serve for the non-*techelet* component except *kela ilan*. A second *beraita* states that a *tallit* is not exempted except by its own kind, and that for an all-*techelet* garment one brings *techelet* and “דבר אחר,” and it says *kela ilan* should not be brought but if brought it is *kasher*. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak reconciles the sources by distinguishing between a garment configured with four strings and one with eight, explaining a concern that with eight one might remove some and mistakenly reuse *kela ilan* as if it were *techelet*.
- The *Gemara* records three disputes: Rav says one may not transfer *tzitzit* from garment to garment while Shmuel permits it, Rav says one may not light one Chanukah lamp from another while Shmuel permits it, and Rav says the law does not follow Rabbi Shimon regarding *gerirah* while Shmuel rules like Rabbi Shimon. Abaye states that generally practice follows Rav, except for these three where practice follows Shmuel: *matirin mibeged lebeged*, *madlikin miner lener*, and *halacha k’Rabbi Shimon b’gerirah*. A *beraita* is cited with Rabbi Shimon allowing dragging a bed, chair, or bench provided one does not intend to make a furrow, with the later framing that Rabbi Shimon agrees in *pesik reisha*.
- The narration cites Rav Asher Weiss as explaining the boundary between *davar she’eino mitkaven* and *safek pesik reisha* in terms of what a normal person can assess by looking at the situation rather than theoretical calculations of weight and ground conditions. The text frames the permissibility as dependent on ordinary uncertainty rather than hidden determinism.
- Rav Yehuda sends his *tzitzit* garment to a launderer without concern they will replace *techelet* with *kela ilan*. Rav Chanina and Ravina employ methods to protect the strings during washing, with one braiding them into a stronger unit and the other sewing a small corner pocket to hold the *tzitzit*. The narration ends with continuing tomorrow at “תנו רבנן.”
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