Summary
  • He begins *Masekhet Menakhot* 31 and resumes from the bottom line of 30b, repeating that Rabban bar Ḥanina says in the name of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina that the *halakha* follows Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, and that wherever Rabbi Shimon Shezuri teaches, the *halakha* is like him. He explains the Gemara’s renewed attempt to identify which ruling this refers to, presenting two candidates—*shida* and wine—and then develops extended *halakhic* detail in *tumah* for large wooden chests and in *tumah* rules for liquids. He brings a *baraita* about *tevel* mixed with *ḥullin* and Rabbi Tarfon’s advice, tying it to the dispute over whether a non-Jew’s ownership in Eretz Yisrael exempts produce from *ma‘aser* and to major practical ramifications for *shemita* and the divergent practices of Yerushalayim and Bnei Brak. He then moves to laws of repairing a torn *Sefer Torah* and to the formatting and line-structure rules of a *mezuzah*, including how to place the final words *al ha’aretz* and the interpretive meanings offered for different placements.
  • He states that the Gemara previously failed to identify the referent of the rule that wherever Rabbi Shimon Shezuri teaches the *halakha* follows him, and that the Gemara now tries again. He reports Rav Papa’s claim that it refers to the ruling of *shida*, and Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s claim that it refers to the ruling of wine.
  • He explains that the *Mishnah* in *Masekhet Kelim* 18:1 addresses a wooden chest, with most *Rishonim* understanding *shida* as a storage chest while Rashi understands it as a wooden wagon-carriage with walls that people sit in. He reports Tosafot’s objection that if it is a sitting carriage it would be *mekabel tumah* as *midras* regardless of size, so Tosafot explains it as a storage chest. He states the principle derived from “מכל כלי עץ או בגד או עור או שק,” that just as a *sak* is carried full and empty, so too an item must be transportable full and empty to be *mekabel tumah*, and he says that a very large chest is not transportable when full and therefore is not *mekabel tumah*. He gives the threshold that if it is one *amah* by one *amah* by three *amot* high it is no longer *mekabel tumah*, and he presents Beit Shammai measuring from the inside and Beit Hillel measuring from the outside, with the *Tiferet Yisrael* explaining Beit Hillel in terms of weight and transportability. He reports the Ḥazon Ish’s approach that *shi‘urim* are *halakha leMoshe miSinai*, so the measurement framework is treated accordingly.
  • He describes the measurement method cited by the *Shita Mekubetzet* of immersing the box in a large body of water and measuring displacement, with forty *se’ah* of displaced liquid indicating the chest is too large. He states that the *Mishnah* says Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that the thickness of the legs and the thickness of the border (*lezabzan*) are not included, while Rabbi Yose says they agree those are included. He presents the *Shita Mekubetzet*’s question how Rabbi Yose can claim Beit Shammai agrees to include legs when Beit Shammai measures only the inside, and he answers with Rabbi Yose’s view that Beit Shammai actually measures the outside and then additionally includes the legs and border. He states Rabbi Yose’s further ruling that the space between the legs is not measured, and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri’s distinction that if the legs are a *tefaḥ* high the space between them is not measured, but if they are less than a *tefaḥ* the space between them is measured. He concludes that Rav Ḥanina’s statement that the *halakha* follows Rabbi Shimon Shezuri applies to this ruling about when the space between the legs is included.
  • He states Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s view that the referent is the *halakha* of wine in *tumah* and *taharah*. He lays out levels of *tumah* from *av hatumah* down to *rishon*, *sheni*, *shelishi* for *terumah* and *revi‘i* for *kodashim*, and he says that a *sheretz* can be *metamei* people, vessels, foods, and liquids, while a *rishon* cannot be *metamei* people and vessels but can be *metamei* foods and liquids. He states the special rule for liquids that whether a liquid contacts an *av*, *rishon*, or *sheni*, the liquid becomes a *rishon*, and that a liquid that is a *rishon* makes other liquids *rishon* as well.
  • He quotes the *Mishnah* in *Masekhet Taharot* 3:2 that Rabbi Meir says oil is always *tḥila* (a *rishon*), the Sages add honey, and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri adds wine, with Rashi reading this as classifying these as liquids. He brings Rabbeinu Tam’s reading that the case is congealed oil and congealed wine, with Rabbi Meir teaching congealed oil remains liquid for *tumah*, the Sages adding congealed honey, and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri adding congealed wine. He presents the Rambam’s twist that even through cycles of congealing and liquefying it retains the status of liquid. He cites Tosafot’s framing and applies it to *Ḥanukkah* practice, reporting a responsum of Rav Wosner zt”l in *She’elot uTeshuvot Shevet HaLevi* that congealed olive oil in pre-filled cups is close enough to olive oil for the preference of lighting like the *Beit HaMikdash*, and that Tosafot’s understanding supports that congealed *shemen zayit* has the full *halakha* of *shemen zayit* so it may certainly be used.
  • He states the Gemara’s question that Rabbi Shimon Shezuri’s “even wine” implies the first view excludes wine, which is difficult because wine is certainly a liquid, and he reports the Gemara’s answer that Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says “wine” and holds oil and honey are not liquids. He brings the *baraita* where Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says *tevel* once became mixed with *ḥullin* and he asked Rabbi Tarfon what to do. He explains the underlying principles that *min haTorah* *rov* nullifies, but the Rabbis say even a *mashehu* can prohibit, and he adds Tosafot’s reason connected to *davar sheyesh lo matirin* not becoming nullified. He frames the problem of separating *ma‘aserot* without taking *min ha-patur al ha-ḥiyyuv*.
  • He reports that Rabbi Tarfon tells him to buy produce from the *shuk* and tithe from it onto the mixture, explaining it as *demai* and relying on the claims that *min haTorah* the *tevel* is nullified in the majority and that most *amei ha’aretz* tithe, leaving only a rabbinic concern of *demai* and making it *min ha-patur al ha-patur*. He then gives the Gemara’s question why Rabbi Tarfon did not tell him to buy from *ovdei kokhavim*, and he answers with Rabbi Tarfon’s view that *ein kinyan le-oved kokhavim be’Eretz Yisrael le-hafki‘a midei ma‘aser*, grounding it in verses such as “והארץ לא תמכר לצמיתות כי לי הארץ” and explanations that Eretz Yisrael retains its *kedusha* and that a non-Jew’s purchase is not fully permanent. He adds the analogy from “והתנחלתם אותם לבניכם אחריכם לרשת אחוזה” comparing land to Canaanite slaves to argue non-Jews lack full ownership capacity in Eretz Yisrael, so produce bought from a non-Jew remains obligated *de’oraita* and would create *min ha-ḥiyyuv al ha-patur*.
  • He reports an alternate version where Rabbi Tarfon did tell him to buy from non-Jews because he holds *yesh kinyan le-ovdei kokhavim be’Eretz Yisrael le-hafki‘a midei ma‘aser*, and he states the inverse question there of why not buy from the *shuk*, answered by the view that *ein rov amei ha’aretz me‘asrin* so *demai* would be *de’oraita* and would become *min ha-ḥiyyuv al ha-patur*. He cites Tosafot asking the basis for the view of *yesh kinyan*, bringing the teaching “דגנך ולא דגן עובד כוכבים” from “ראשית דגנך תירושך ויצהרך תתן לו,” and a Yerushalmi reading of “לצמיתות” as implying a full sale. He adds Tosafot’s question that even if a non-Jew cannot exempt land ownership, *miruaḥ* done by a non-Jew could exempt, and he presents the *Turei Even*’s answer that even if *miruaḥ* by a non-Jew lowers the level of obligation, it is still not identical to complete exemption, so differing levels block taking from that produce onto the mixture.
  • He states that this dispute about *yesh kinyan* versus *ein kinyan* has major ramifications for *shemita* and whether produce grown on land truly owned by non-Jews is subject to *shemita* restrictions. He attributes to the Beit Yosef the view that truly non-Jew-owned land does not have *din shemita*, and to the Mabit the view that *ein kinyan* means it does not escape *shemita*. He states that Yerushalayim follows the Beit Yosef’s approach while Bnei Brak follows the Ḥazon Ish’s practice aligning with the Mabit.
  • He reports Rav Yeimar bar Shelamya’s question to Rav Papa whether the rule that the *halakha* follows Rabbi Shimon Shezuri everywhere includes the *baraita* case of *tevel* mixed with *ḥullin* or is limited to a *Mishnah*. He states Rav Papa’s answer that it does apply, and Rav Ashi’s support via Mar Zutra that Rabbi Ḥanina said “כל מקום ששנה,” not “משנתנו,” so it includes a *baraita* as well.
  • He states Rav Safra says in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan in the name of Rav that a tear spanning two lines may be sewn, while a tear spanning three lines may not be sewn, and he specifies that this refers to a tear between letters, since a tear through a letter invalidates the scroll. He brings the Rosh’s report that he asked Maharam miRotenburg whether one may patch or glue, and Maharam forbids it because multiple readers tug the scroll and because only certain sewing materials are permitted. He reports the Rosh’s disagreement that the Gemara’s concern is mainly aesthetics of excessive sewing, while patching or gluing can look perfect and therefore is permitted.
  • He reports Rava Zutra telling Rav Ashi in the name of Rabbi Yirmeya miDifte in the name of Rava that the “three lines do not sew” rule applies only to an old scroll, while on a new scroll one may be lenient. He ties the old-scroll restriction to “זה אלי ואנוהו” and the principle of beautifying mitzvot, and he adds Rashi’s explanation that darker old parchment makes sewing more noticeable, while whiter parchment conceals it, alongside Rabbeinu Yehonatan’s explanation that old parchment is brittle and prone to further tearing. He then states the Gemara’s refinement that “old” and “new” mean parchment treated with *afatsin* versus not treated, and he reports Rashi’s reading that *afatsin* makes it darker and thus “old,” while Rabbeinu Yehonatan reads *afatsin* as strengthening and thus permitting sewing, with the Ḥazon Ish challenging how to align the *afatsin* reading with the earlier “not literally old/new” formulation. He states the limitation that sewing is done only with *gidin* from a kosher animal and not with other material.
  • He reports the question of Bar Yehuda bar Abba about a tear between pages or between lines and states the Gemara leaves it as *teiku*.
  • He reports Rav Zevid says in the name of Rav Ḥananel in the name of Rav that a *mezuzah* written two words per line is kosher, since the width requirement of writing *le-mishpeḥoteikhem* three times applies to a *Sefer Torah* and not to a *mezuzah*. He presents the question about a *mezuzah* written in a pattern of two words, then three, then one, and he reports Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s ruling that it is certainly kosher because it resembles the style of *shira*. He then cites the objection that writing a *Sefer Torah* like a *shira* or a *shira* improperly is invalid, and he answers that this invalidation is specifically by *Sefer Torah* and not by *mezuzah*. He adds the confirmation reported from Rabbi Yoḥanan that a *mezuzah* written as “שתים ושלש ואחת” is kosher, with the condition that it not be written like *kuba* or like *zanav*.
  • He states Rav Ḥisda’s ruling that *al ha’aretz* should be the only two words on the last line of the *mezuzah*, and he reports two views on whether it should be placed at the end of the line under *kiymei hashamayim* or at the beginning under *latet lahem*. He explains the rationale that aligning it under *kiymei hashamayim* reflects that the heavens are above the earth, while placing it at the beginning maximizes the distance between *shamayim* and *aretz*. He cites *Sefer Taharat HaKodesh* quoting the Maharsha that the placement reflects whether one emphasizes the *mezuzah*’s promise of *arikhut yamim* or its protective role against transgression, linking long life to *kiymei shamayim al ha’aretz* and separation from sin to “כרחוק מזרח ממערב, הרחיק ממנו פשעינו.”
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