Menachos Daf 40 - Shatnez in Tzitzis
Summary
- Today's שיעור on מנחות דף מ continues from דף לט עמוד ב and moves from the definition of *beged* in Torah contexts into the core sugya of *sha’atnez* in *tzitzit*, explaining why Chazal restricted putting *tekhelet* on a linen garment despite *aseh docheh lo ta’aseh*. The narrative presents competing דרשות within תנא דבי רבי ישמעאל about whether *beged* means specifically wool and linen or includes other materials, then lays out the מחלוקת בית שמאי ובית הלל about a linen *sadin* and the practical ירושלים practice not to cast *tekhelet* on it. The Gemara offers five distinct rationales for that restriction, and then transitions to determining whether the חיוב of *tzitzit* follows the body of a garment or its corners, and to multiple applications of the rule תעשה ולא מן העשוי in *tzitzit* construction.
- Today's דף is מנחות דף מ, continuing from דף לט עמוד ב at אמר אביי תרי שירא. The learning is sponsored by Dr. David Lander and his wife and children לעילוי נשמת his mother גולדה בת שמחה עליה השלום, הנשמה שתהא עליה, by אבישי Newman לעילוי נשמת his father חיים נפתלי בן יעקב שלמה whose eighth יארצייט was this week, הנשמה שתהא עליה, by Eric Cohn in honor of his mother's seventh יארצייט שרה פרידה בת אברהם אריה and in honor of the birth of סנדר יחיאל to one of Mrs. Cohn's favorite Leibowitzes, and by Judy and Danny Israeli in memory of Danny's father יעקב ישראלי's seventh יארצייט. The sponsors are thanked, with repeated נוסח הנשמה שתהא עליה.
- Rab Nachman holds that only a garment of צמר ופשתים is חייב in ציצית מן התורה, and he aligns with a תנא דבי רבי ישמעאל that learns from the Torah’s unspecified uses of בגדים that since one מקום specifies בבגד צמר או בבגד פשתים by נגעים, all instances of *beged* mean צמר ופשתים. Abaye challenges this by citing another תנא דבי רבי ישמעאל that expands *tum’at nega’im* on garments to include צמר גמלים וצמר ארנבים ונוצה של עזים והכלך והסריקין והשיראין from the inclusive reading of “או בגד.” The שיעור reports that in שבת דף כז, Rava resolves the apparent contradiction by distinguishing between small garments of שלש על שלש אצבעות, which are limited to צמר ופשתים, and larger garments of שלשה על שלשה טפחים, which include other materials. Tosafot argues that the cited “או בגד” does not match the nega’im verses and therefore understands the derashah as referring instead to a pasuk in טומאת שרצים, leaving Abaye’s contradiction as one between two uses of *beged* across contexts.
- A ברייתא teaches that סדין בציצית is subject to a מחלוקת, with בית שמאי פוטרין and בית הלל מחייבין, and the הלכה follows בית הלל because of the סמיכות between לא תלבש שעטנז and גדילים תעשה לך, which yields that the עשה of ציצית overrides the לא תעשה of כלאים. The shiur presents that Rashi reads בית שמאי’s פטור as applying to *tekhelet* specifically, since *tekhelet* is wool and creates *sha’atnez*, while לבן could be non-wool and therefore still required, whereas other ראשונים read בית שמאי as exempting the linen garment entirely from both *tekhelet* and לבן. Rabbeinu Tam explains that full exemption as a גזירה that allowing לבן leads to adding *tekhelet*; Tosafot suggests בית שמאי holds like רבי that תכלת מעכב את הלבן; and the Ramban suggests that a garment intrinsically excluded from *tekhelet* has no *tzitzit* obligation at all. Tosafot raises that בית שמאי cannot reject *aseh docheh lo ta’aseh* altogether and must have both a source for the כלל and a reason not to apply it here, while Rashi explains the wording פוטרין instead of אוסרין by portraying ציצית as חובת הבגד that applies even when not worn, while the איסור כלאים applies only upon wearing.
- Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Tzadok states that anyone who casts *tekhelet* in ירושלים is “אינו אלא מן המתמיהין,” reflecting a Jerusalem practice against placing *tekhelet* on linen despite בית הלל’s היתר. Rabbi first attributes the restriction to שאינן בקיאין, fearing that observers will generalize and permit *sha’atnez* in ordinary garments, but the Gemara rejects the remedy of public demonstration in the market and then rejects the possibility that teaching it publicly in a דרשה would solve the concern, forcing a different rationale. The second reason is a גזירה משום קלא אילן, fearing indigo substitution so the wool strings lack the halachic status of *tekhelet* and become mere wool, making *sha’atnez* a violation without *aseh docheh lo ta’aseh*, and the shiur notes the interpretation that שאינן בקיאין here means inability to distinguish *tekhelet* from קלא אילן. The Gemara challenges that even קלא אילן should count as לבן, but it answers with the rule that when one can fulfill both obligations, *aseh docheh lo ta’aseh* does not apply, as stated by Reish Lakish: כל מקום שאתה מוצא עשה ולא תעשה אם אתה יכול לקיים את שניהם מוטב ואם לאו יבוא עשה וידחה לא תעשה. The Gemara then rejects the idea of פשוט בדיקה as a full solution and gives a third reason: גזירה משום טעימה, fearing dyeing שלא לשמה for “testing,” which cannot be detected, and it rejects reliance on warning letters to sellers, until Rava argues that if letters are relied upon for חמץ בפסח and יום הכפורים דכרת then they should be relied upon here, with the shiur noting the later question that the concern is avoiding a לאו of *sha’atnez* rather than merely enabling an עשה and citing the חזון איש’s alternative girsa of “הכא דלאו בעלמא.” Rava then gives a fourth reason, said as well in מערבא משמיה דרבי זירא, that one might tear the linen garment within three fingerbreadths and sew it with linen thread, then later use those threads as part of the *tzitzit* and add *tekhelet*, creating פסול by תעשה ולא מן העשוי, and רבי זירא responds by untying his own *tzitzit* from a linen garment. רבי זירא provides a fifth reason: גזירה משום כסות לילה, since כסות לילה is פטור from ציצית לפי רבי שמעון based on וראיתם אותו, and wearing *sha’atnez* *tzitzit* at night would violate *sha’atnez* without a mitzvah.
- Rava cites, and attributes similarly to רבי זירא in מערבא, that if the main body is cloth and the corners are leather, the garment is חייבת, while if the body is leather and the corners are cloth it is פטורה, because עיקר בגד בעינן and the חיוב follows the main body. Rav Achai disagrees and follows the corners, holding that the material at the כנף determines obligation. The shiur adds that leather is פטור because it is not a woven fabric, and it notes a later halachic discussion attributed to Rav Moshe in אגרות משה about woven strips of leather still remaining פטור and the implications for synthetic materials that are produced as a weave.
- Rava בשם רב סחורה בשם רב הונא rules that one who places *tzitzit* on a three-cornered garment and later completes it to four corners has פסולה *tzitzit* משום תעשה ולא מן העשוי, because the earlier act occurred when the garment was not yet obligated. A ברייתא about חסידים הראשונים initially seems to contradict this by describing placing *tekhelet* as soon as three were woven, but the Gemara reinterprets it to mean they placed *tzitzit* when the weaving reached the final margin of within three אצבעות from the edge, at which point the garment was already a obligated-sized garment. רבי זירא’s case of הטיל למוטלת, adding an additional set of *tzitzit* onto a garment already containing *tzitzit* and then removing the original, is ruled כשרה, and the Gemara challenges why this is not תעשה ולא מן העשוי. Rava answers that when adding a second set while the first set remains, the act is under בל תוסף and therefore מעשה לא הוי, so the later removal functions as the enabling act, but Rav Pappa challenges that the intent may have been לביטולי rather than להוסיף, weakening the בל תוסף framing and restoring the difficulty against Rav Huna’s פסול of the three-corner case. The shiur ends by setting up continuation from אמר רבי זירא toward the bottom of the page.
Previous Page
Next Page
Daf Images are property of Vagshal and may not be reproduced.
Suggestions