Menachos 45 - Cycle 14
Summary
- A shiur on Maseches Menachos Daf מ״ה begins on Daf מ״ד Amud ב׳ at the Mishnah about ציבור offerings of פרים, אילים, and כבשים and the rule אין מעכבין זה את זה, meaning that lacking one component does not prevent bringing the others. The sugya identifies which specific korbanos the Mishnah refers to, clarifies when numbers and categories are indispensable, and develops a major focus on נסכים and what to do when animals are available but נסכים are not. The text weaves in the Rambam’s framing of רבי שמעון versus the רבנן on delaying נסכים, brings proofs from pesukim in יחזקאל about bringing partial numbers when full amounts are unavailable, and applies the “do what you can” idea to צדקה and to a dispute about Chanukah candles. It then addresses difficult pesukim in יחזקאל that seem to contradict the Torah, the role of אליהו עתיד לדרשה versus Rav Ashi’s approach of מלואים in the days of Ezra, and concludes with the Shavuos שתי הלחם offerings and the dispute whether the לחם or the כבשים are מעכב each other, including the hermeneutics of *gezeirah shavah* and readings of קדש יהיו לה׳ לכהן.
- An opening Mishnah teaches that the ציבור offerings of הפרים ואילים והכבשים are not מעכב one another, so inability to bring one does not block bringing the others. Rabbi Shimon addresses a case of having many פרים available but lacking נסכים, and the question becomes whether to bring all the פרים without נסכים or to bring fewer animals together with נסכים. Another reading frames the case as available funds and whether to purchase animals in a way that prevents purchasing נסכים, or to ensure פרים ונסכים even if not all animals can be brought. The simplest pshat presented is that the תנא קמא prefers bringing a פר with נסכים rather than bringing all without נסכים, and it is treated as a question whether a korban is acceptable without נסכים.
- The Chafetz Chaim in ליקוטי הלכות asks for the halacha when the full number of פרים is unavailable anyway, since the Mishnah’s case assumes the full number exists and the issue is only the נסכים. Acharonim ask why one cannot bring the פרים today and bring the נסכים later, since prior learning established that נסכים need not be brought the same day. The Rambam is cited as explaining that רבי שמעון holds לכתחילה one may not delay bringing the נסכים, while the רבנן treat delay as permissible only בדיעבד, and this explains why רבי שמעון prefers bringing whatever can be brought with נסכים rather than delaying them.
- The Gemara asks הני פרים וכבשים דהיכא and rejects the suggestion that they are the Sukkos מוספים, because the pesukim there include language like משפט משפטם כציווהו indicating exactness. The Gemara instead identifies them as the פרים וכבשים of the מוסף of ראש חודש and of עצרת as written in חומש הפקודים in פרשת פנחס, where the presentation here is that the pesukim do not indicate the same absolute requirement of exactness. The resulting principle is that if one cannot bring all prescribed animals in those contexts, one brings what one can, consistent with אין מעכבין.
- The Gemara asks אילים דהיכא and notes that ראש חודש and the שבועות מוסף in פנחס each have only one איל, so “אילים” cannot mean multiple within one unit. The Gemara turns to עצרת דתורת כהנים in פרשת אמור for the שתי הלחם, where the Torah requires ואילים שנים, and then challenges this with הוייה כתיבא בהו, suggesting a requirement of exactness. The Chafetz Chaim in ליקוטי הלכות is presented as understanding the Gemara’s focus as requiring bringing from every type of animal, while the מנחת חינוך is presented as extending הוייה to require the entire set and not to bring the unit at all if it is incomplete.
- The Gemara explains the Mishnah as stating multiple distinct rules rather than one uniform rule, expressed as תנא מילי מילי קתני. It establishes that the איל of חומש הפקודים for the שבועות מוסף does not מעכב the אילים of תורת כהנים brought with the שתי הלחם, and vice versa, because they are separate obligations. It highlights the resulting contrast that פרים may be non-essential even within their own set, while אילים are “not מעכב” only across different contexts, and the Gemara accepts this by treating the Mishnah as listing separate halachos.
- A פסוק in יחזקאל states וביום החודש פר בן בקר תמים וששת כבשים ואיל תמימים, and the Gemara asks why יחזקאל says פר when the Torah in פנחס requires two פרים on ראש חודש. The Gemara answers that יחזקאל teaches that if one does not find two, one brings one. It similarly reads ששה כבשים as teaching that if one does not find seven, one brings six, and it continues the chain down to even one animal by citing ולכבשים כאשר תשיג ידו, establishing that one brings what one can.
- The Gemara asks why the special mention of ששה כבשים is needed if the general rule is simply to bring what one can, and it answers that before this דרשה one would not know the rule. The Gemara also introduces that when the animals are available one must bring the full prescribed number, deriving this from wording such as יהיו. The halacha is framed as a dispensation for shortage rather than permission to reduce offerings when resources exist.
- The שואל ומשיב addresses whether someone who recites the wrong number of Sukkos korbanos in Musaf is יוצא, given that each day has a unique count. One side suggests one is יוצא, particularly if one says *k’mo shekasuv b’sorasecha*, because the Gemara teaches that if the right amount was not brought one can still be יוצא. The שואל ומשיב is presented as ruling that one must repeat because each day’s Musaf is uniquely defined by its number, while the opposing view is grounded in the Gemara’s principle of bringing what one can and still being יוצא.
- A practical question is raised about the third night of Chanukah when a מהדרין has only two candles available, whether to light two or to revert to the baseline נר איש וביתו of one. The Beis HaLevi says one should light two to avoid violating מעלין בקודש ואין מורידין, even though two does not represent the third-night count. Rav Shach in אבי עזרי is presented as agreeing that doing what one can is preferable to doing nothing, and Rav Menashe Klein in משנה הלכות brings a proof from this Gemara’s “bring what you can” teaching. The חיי אדם, quoted by the משנה ברורה, and the שער הציון quoting the כתב סופר, are presented as ruling to light only one in that situation.
- The Gemara cites יחזקאל saying on the first of the month one brings a פר and “וחטאת את המקדש,” and it asks how the פר can be a חטאת when it is an עולה. Rabbi Yochanan says אליהו עתיד לדרשה, leaving the pshat to be resolved in the future. The Rashba asks why Eliyahu is needed if Yechezkel himself will return, and one answer given is that Eliyahu comes before Mashiach whereas Yechezkel returns only at תחיית המתים.
- The Brisker Rav is presented as explaining that prophetic statements rely on a מסורה given at the time, and once the prophet leaves this world that standing is no longer operative in the same way. The approach suggests that those who return at תחיית המתים are not treated as identical in halachic standing to their prior existence, so the Gemara still directs interpretation to Eliyahu. Eliyahu is distinguished as never having died, which makes him uniquely positioned as the authoritative interpreter in this framing.
- Rav Ashi explains that the פסוק is not about ראש חודש but about מלואים offered in the days of Ezra when the Second Beis HaMikdash was built, and Rashi is cited as explaining it this way. Some Rishonim are presented as explaining instead that the פסוקים point to מלואים of the Third Beis HaMikdash. A difficulty is raised that Moshe’s מילואים used an עגל while Yechezkel speaks of a פר, and Rabbeinu Nesanel is cited (via שיטה מקובצת) that an עגל בן בקר may be a two-year-old animal that can also be called a פר.
- A baraisa states that Rabbi Yehuda says פרשה זו אליהו עתיד לדורשה, expressing inability to resolve the passage. Rabbi Yosef responds that it refers to מילואים in the days of Ezra modeled on the days of Moshe. Rabbi Yehuda replies with תנוח דעתך שהנחת דעתי, accepting the resolution and crediting Rabbi Yosef with settling his mind.
- An additional explanation is attributed to the חוזה that Eliyahu will bring תחיית המתים and the טל של תחייה will carry tremendous כח התורה. That כח is presented as the reason Eliyahu can reveal correct pshat in difficult halachic passages. This frames Eliyahu’s interpretive role as tied to unique spiritual capacity rather than merely chronological arrival.
- The ספר חשוקי חמד is cited as extending the Gemara’s rule of bringing what one can to a case of a person who pledged צדקה and later cannot fulfill the full pledge. The conclusion presented is that the halacha directs the person to give what he can rather than abandon the obligation entirely. This application is explicitly linked to the Gemara’s דרשה of progressive reduction when the full amount cannot be met.
- A פסוק in יחזקאל says וכל נבלה וטרפה מן העוף ומן הבהמה לא יאכלו הכהנים, and the Gemara asks why it singles out כהנים, since ישראל also may not eat טרפה. Rabbi Yochanan again says פרשה זו אליהו עתיד לדורשה. Ravina explains that “kohanim” is needed because one might think that since מליקה is permitted for kohanim in the Mikdash and would otherwise render the bird a נבלה, kohanim would be permitted to eat נבלה more generally, and the פסוק teaches they are not.
- Rabbi Yosef Engel is presented as explaining that the Torah teaches that the bird killed by מליקה is not a נבלה because it is the Torah-mandated procedure, rather than being a nבלה that is merely permitted in that context. This is then connected to a broader conceptual issue in a dispute between the Rambam and Ramban about מאכלות אסורות מטמטם לבו של אדם. The line of reasoning suggested is that when the Torah permits something under necessity, it may be treated as not “issur food” in that moment rather than as “issur food with a היתר.”
- The Gemara cites a פסוק in יחזקאל וכן תעשה בשבע בחודש מאיש שוגה ומפתי וכפרתם את הבית and Rabbi Yochanan interprets “שבע” as teaching that שבע שבטים can obligate a פר העלם דבר של ציבור even if they are not the numerical majority of כלל ישראל. The word “חודש” is read as referring to a renewed ruling, exemplified by declaring חלב permissible. The phrase מאיש שוגה ומפתי is read as teaching that liability requires both erroneous הוראה and שגגת מעשה, meaning the mistaken ruling must be acted upon.
- Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav says זכור איש לטוב וחנינא בן חזקיה שמו, because without him Sefer Yechezkel would have been hidden due to apparent contradictions with Torah law. The Gemara says he brought up three hundred barrels of oil and sat in an attic to interpret the passages. Ben Yehoyada is cited as explaining that his willingness to do whatever it took brought סייעתא דשמיא, and that attic is also linked to the well-known event of the י״ח דבר in Maseches Shabbos.
- A baraisa expounds a פסוק in יחזקאל about measures for מנחה and oil, and Rabbi Shimon asks how one measure can apply to both a פר and an איל when their נסכים normally differ. The baraisa concludes that if there are many פרים but insufficient נסכים, one brings a single פר with its נסכים rather than all the animals without נסכים. The same rule is applied to multiple אילים lacking sufficient איפות, preferring one איל with its proper accompaniment over many without.
- The Mishnah teaches that the פר, two אילים, seven כבשים, and the שעיר of חטאת associated with the שתי הלחם do not prevent bringing the לחם, and the לחם does not prevent bringing them, stated as אין מעכבים את הלחם ולא הלחם מעכבם. It then states that the לחם is מעכב the two כבשים of שלמים according to רבי עקיבא, while the כבשים do not prevent the לחם. Shimon ben Nanas reverses it, ruling that the כבשים are מעכב the לחם while the לחם does not prevent the כבשים, and he supports this by saying that in the מדבר they brought כבשים without לחם.
- A question is raised whether כלל ישראל grew wheat in the מדבר, because if they did not, it impacts how Shimon ben Nanas explains bringing כבשים without לחם and also raises a problem about why זריעה and חרישה are among the ל״ט מלאכות derived from the Mishkan. The Minchas Chinuch answers that such acts could have occurred before entering the מדבר, or that materials could have been purchased from passersby. This is presented as sufficient to anchor the מלאכות even if ongoing agriculture was not part of the במדבר economy.
- A statement is brought that one accepts Shimon ben Nanas’s conclusion but not his reason, because everything in חומש פקודים was offered in the מדבר while what is in תורת כהנים was not. The reasoning given is that the כבשים “מתירים את עצמם,” meaning their slaughter permits their consumption, while the לחם has no permitter without the two כבשים, since only afterward can the kohanim eat the שתי הלחם. This frames the dependency as an issue of what enables permissibility rather than historical precedent alone.
- A baraisa derives from והקרבתם על הלחם that there is an obligation linking the offerings to the לחם. It then derives from the wording that one may bring the כבשים even without the לחם, and it resolves the tension by teaching that the community was not obligated in the כבשים before it was obligated in the לחם. This view is attributed to Rabbi Tarfon as presented in the text.
- Rabbi Akiva proposes that one might think the seven כבשים in תורת כהנים are the same as the seven כבשים in חומש פקודים. The baraisa rejects identity by comparing פרים and אילים, since Pinchas requires two פרים and one איל while Emor requires one פר and two אילים, and it concludes that these are separate sets: one set comes independently as מוסף and the other comes בגלל הלחם. The Gemara also rejects the idea that the Torah is offering a choice between configurations and infers from the changed order of listing that they must be distinct offerings.
- The Gemara asks the reason for Rabbi Akiva and derives it from והניף הכהן אותם על לחם הבכורים… על שני כבשים… קדש יהיו לה׳ לכהן, reading יהיו through linkage to תהיינה by the לחם. Ben Nanas derives instead through a *gezeirah shavah* of יהיו from the passage where the word refers to the עולה animals, preferring יהיו מיהיו over יהיו מתהיינה. The Gemara explains the preference by citing a principle from the school of Rabbi Yishmael that an inexact match is used only when no closer match exists.
- The Gemara offers that they may be arguing the plain reading of קדש יהיו לה׳ לכהן. Rabbi Akiva reads it as referring to something entirely for the kohen and identifies that as the שתי הלחם, while Ben Nanas reads it as something partly for Hashem and partly for the kohen and identifies that as the כבשי שלמים. Rabbi Akiva defends his reading by noting the absence of a “ו” and aligns it with Rav Huna’s reading of האשם המושב לה׳ לכהן by גזל הגר, where the property is acquired by Hashem and given to the kohen, supporting a unified construct reading.
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