Menachos 64
Summary
- A speaker continues Menachos 64 from 63b, presenting רבי ישמעאל’s view that the *omer* harvest on Shabbos uses three *se’ah* rather than five to minimize *melachah*, and then follows the Gemara’s attempts to align that principle with other Tannaim and its repeated rejections. The narrative moves into halachos of unnecessary Shabbos desecration in communal offerings and in *pikuach nefesh* scenarios, including cases where intent conflicts with outcome, and then to the Mishnah and Beraisa about bringing the *omer* from the closest place to Yerushalayim and the historical episode of the Hasmonean civil war that led to sourcing the *omer* and *shtei halechem* from distant locations.
- A speaker states that רבי ישמעאל holds the *omer* on Shabbos uses three *se’ah* and on a weekday uses five *se’ah* because extra *melachah* should be avoided on Shabbos when possible, and extra sifting can produce sufficiently fine flour from the smaller amount. Rava initially connects רבי ישמעאל with רבי ישמעאל בנו של רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה, who limits skinning the *Korban Pesach* on Shabbos to *ad hachazeh* because only what is necessary is permitted, while the Chachamim allow skinning the entire animal. The Gemara rejects the identification by suggesting רבי ישמעאל may allow more there to avoid *bizayon kodashim*, and alternatively that רבי ישמעאל בנו של רבי יוחנן בן ברוקה may still require greater Shabbos labor for the *omer* because it improves the offering itself.
- A second attempt connects רבי ישמעאל with רבי חנינא סגן הכהנים, who requires fewer people and tools for the Shabbos harvest than for weekday harvest, while the Chachamim require the same procedure on both days. The Gemara again rejects the identification by proposing רבי ישמעאל might prioritize *pirsumei milsa* in the public harvest process even if it increases Shabbos labor, and alternatively that רבי חנינא’s leniency applies only where the offering outcome is unchanged, unlike the quality difference created by harvesting more grain.
- A third attempt connects רבי ישמעאל with רבי יוסי’s position in *kiddush hachodesh* testimony, where רבי יוסי says that if the new moon is clearly visible then witnesses do not desecrate Shabbos, unlike the Tanna Kamma who allows it regardless. The Gemara rejects this as well by suggesting רבי ישמעאל’s *omer* case lacks the concern of *nimtzeisa atah machshilan le’asid lavo*, while testimony restrictions could deter future witnesses, and alternatively by suggesting רבי יוסי’s leniency applies only where there is no *tzorech gavoha* and Shabbos is not “given to be overridden,” unlike the *omer*.
- A speaker explains that the Chachamim’s permission to skin the entire *Korban Pesach* on Shabbos is explained in Shabbos 116b as either preventing spoilage of the meat or avoiding leaving *kodshei Shamayim* lying like a *neveilah*, with practical differences such as placing it on a gold table or having a cooling north wind. The speaker notes a *girsa* difference there, and attributes to the Chasam Sofer that the wording *ad sheyafshit es kulo* implies one delays removing the *eimurim* until the skinning is completed, because finishing the skinning after removing the *eimurim* may no longer be *docheh Shabbos*. The Chasam Sofer links this to the dispute over returning for *tzitzin she’einan me’akvin es hamilah* on Shabbos after one already stopped, and he frames the impulse to remove *eimurim* earlier as driven by *zerizin makdimin lemitzvos*.
- A speaker attributes to Tosafos that the example is not uniquely Pesach and could apply to any communal offering on Shabbos, yet Pesach is chosen either because its abundance makes it look more like being left as *neveilah* or to teach a novelty in the Chachamim that they permit full skinning even for something treated as *tzorech yachid*. Tosafos also gives the possibility that the Chachamim’s allowance is specific to Pesach because its primary mitzvah is eating, so they are especially concerned about spoilage. The speaker adds that later authorities clarify Tosafos does not mean an *olah* like *tamid* or *musaf*, since an *olah* requires full skinning by Torah law, and the intended cases are communal offerings that are eaten.
- A statement is presented בשם Rava (or רבי אמי) that one who slaughters two communal *chataos* on Shabbos when only one is needed is liable for the second slaughter and exempt for the first, even if atonement is ultimately achieved with the second, and even if the first is found *kehushah*. The speaker brings Rashi that the *kehushah* is discovered before slaughtering the second, and the Gemara rejects the idea that *hakriveihu na lefachasecha* would justify slaughtering the second as permitted. The speaker lists applications of *hakriveihu na* as brought by Rashi and the Rambam, and then attributes to the Mikdash David and the Biur Halachah that these teachings are not *le’ikuva* but *lechatchilah*, because a thin animal is not invalid *bediavad*.
- The Gemara challenges whether Rava really holds liability in the *kehushah* case by citing Rava’s other ruling that if one has a fat and thin *chatas*, slaughtering the thin first and then the fat is exempt, and one is even instructed to bring the fat *lechatchilah* to slaughter, which the speaker attributes to the Chacham Tzvi as highlighting the weight of *mitzvah min hamuvchar*. The Gemara answers either by removing the *kehushah* clause from the earlier statement or by attributing that earlier statement to רבי אמי instead of Rava.
- Ravina asks Rav Ashi about a case where the first offering is discovered *kehushah bivnei me’ayim*, with the speaker noting Rashi understands this as appearing fat externally but found thin internally, while the Rambam understands it as being discovered *treifah*. The Gemara links this to the dispute of Rabbah and Rava about one who spreads a net on Shabbos intending to catch fish but ends up raising a baby together with fish, where Rava rules liable and Rabbah rules exempt, and one version explains Rabbah’s exemption only where the person heard the drowning and is assumed to have some intent for the baby. Another version presents it as the core dispute whether one follows *machshavah* or *ma’aseh*.
- A speaker raises the difficulty that Torah punishment does not generally follow forbidden intent when the act is ultimately permitted, contrasts that with the concept of needing *kaparah u’selichah* for attempted wrongdoing, and reports approaches from later commentaries. The speaker attributes to Shitah Mekubetzes that the liability framework hinges on the second act being only for *mitzvah min hamuvchar*, which has no place when one is acting as an *aveirah* attempt, and attributes to the Rashash and the Chazon Ish a distinction between an act that is *heter gamur* and an act that is inherently *melachah* but overridden. The speaker also attributes to the Birkei Yosef and the Sefas Emes that the dispute may be only when the forbidden objective is also accomplished alongside the permitted outcome.
- Rabbah states that if ten people each bring a fig-sized portion for a sick person when only one was needed, they are all exempt whether they arrive simultaneously or sequentially, even if the first already healed him, because each believed his action was necessary. Rava asks whether if a sick person needs two figs and one can either cut two stems each with one fig or one stem with three figs, which should be done. The Gemara concludes that bringing three is obvious because it reduces cutting, and it distinguishes this from רבי ישמעאל’s case, where reducing consumption also reduces harvesting, while here reducing food would increase cutting.
- The Mishnah states that the mitzvah of the *omer* is to bring it from the closest area, but if the closest to Yerushalayim did not ripen then it is brought from elsewhere, and it records that once the *omer* came from גגות צריפין and the *shtei halechem* from בקעת עין סוכר. The Gemara gives reasons as either the requirement of *karmel* understood as *rach u’malei* so travel winds do not harden it, or *ein ma’avirin al hamitzvos*.
- A Beraisa recounts that when Hasmonean kings fought, with הורקנוס outside and אריסטובולוס inside, money was lowered daily and animals for the *tamid* were raised, until an elder knowledgeable in חכמת יוונית signaled that as long as the *avodah* continues they will not be delivered into the enemy’s hands. The next day a חזיר was sent up, it dug its hooves into the wall halfway, and Eretz Yisrael shook four hundred *parsah* by four hundred *parsah*, leading to the decree “ארור שיגדל חזיר וארור שילמד בנו חכמת יוונית.” The Gemara ties this period to the sourcing of the *omer* and *shtei halechem* from distant places, describing a חרש who signaled “roof” and “hut” for גגות צריפין and later signaled “eye” and “socket” for עין סוכר, and a figure called מרדכי interpreted these signs. Rashi identifies him as Mordechai of Achashverosh’s time, while Tosafos objects and says officials in that role were called “Mordechai” in honor of the original.
- A speaker brings a teaching in Sotah בשם רבי יוחנן about an almana who bypasses her local synagogue to pray in רבי יוחנן’s בית המדרש for *schar pesios*, and he cites the Magen Avraham’s ruling to prefer the farther synagogue for that reward. The speaker frames this as a difficulty against the principle of bringing the *omer* from the closer place due to *ein ma’avirin al hamitzvos*, and he presents one answer בשם Teshuvos Zichron Yehudah that *ein ma’avirin* applies where choosing the closer option enables performing the mitzvah earlier, while *schar pesios* applies where the mitzvah time is unchanged and only extra effort is added.
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