Menachos 55
Summary
- A sponsorship is stated לעילוי נשמת מרת מרים בת יעקב משה, and the learning begins in מנחות דף נה from תנו רבנן. A ברייתא sets rules for separating תרומה between תאנים and גרוגרות and is reconciled by distinguishing cases where a כהן is present or not, with Rav Pappa deriving a preference to interpret one source with two circumstances rather than as a תנאים dispute. The sugya then moves to מנחות becoming חמץ, establishing liability for חמוץ in the שיירים and for multiple distinct acts like לישה, עריכה, אפייה, and קיטוף, using דרשות from לא תאפה חמץ חלקם. רבי אבהו rejects treating distant פסוקים as כלל ופרט here, a challenge is raised from a ברייתא about שחיטת חטאת בצפון, and רב אשי reframes the issue as stemming from the limiting word אותו rather than from כלל ופרט.
- A ברייתא states that one separates תרומה from תאנים onto גרוגרות only במקום שרגיל לעשות תאנים גרוגרות, but one does not separate from גרוגרות onto תאנים even where turning תאנים into גרוגרות is common. A deduction is made that the היתר of תאנים on גרוגרות applies only where it is רגיל, and the case is analyzed by asking whether a כהן is available to receive the תרומה immediately. A משנה is applied that מקום שיש כהן requires תורם מן היפה, and this pushes the explanation that the ברייתא’s opening case is where there is no כהן, so the separated תאנים would spoil unless the locale normally dries them into גרוגרות. A further משנה is applied that מקום שאין כהן requires תורם מן המתקיים, and this leads to reading the ברייתא’s סיפא as a case where a כהן is present, creating the conclusion that רישא דליכא כהן and סיפא דאיכא כהן, which the גמרא accepts.
- Rav Pappa concludes שמע מינה that the explanation forces the ברייתא into תרי טעמי, interpreting it as referring to two different situations, rather than establishing it as תרי תנאי. Rav Pappa frames this as the preferred approach, choosing a situational split over attributing the contradiction to a תנאים disagreement about taking מן היפה versus מן המתקיים.
- The text states that all מנחות are kneaded with warm water and must be guarded so they do not become חמץ. It states that if the שיירים become חמץ after the קמיצה, the person violates a לא תעשה from the פסוק כל המנחה אשר תקריבו לה' לא תעשה חמץ. It states that one is liable for לישתו, עריכתו, and אפייתו when these acts are performed in a state of חמץ.
- Reish Lakish derives from לא תאפה חמץ חלקם that even חלקם, the כהנים’s portion, may not be baked as חמץ, extending the איסור to the שיירים and not only to the קומץ. It is noted that this reading depends on placing the pause after חלקם rather than reading the פסוק with the standard division.
- A ברייתא uses the repetition of לא תעשה חמץ and לא תאפה חמץ to teach that one might have thought there is only one חיוב for all actions, so לא תאפה teaches that אפייה, though included in the general לא תעשה, is singled out to create a היקש. It teaches that just as אפייה is a distinct מעשה with its own liability, so too לישה and עריכה and each מעשה יחידי are each חייב בפני עצמה, and the text identifies קיטוף as an included unique act. The response to the challenge that the פסוק is needed for this דרשה is that Reish Lakish’s לימוד is from the word חלקם, not from לא תאפה.
- The sugya argues that if the פסוק were only for the lesson about the שיירים, it should have said חלקם לא תאפה חמץ, and the existing order לא תאפה חמץ חלקם indicates שמעת מינה תרתי. It then rejects limiting liability to אפייה alone by applying the rule of דבר שהיה בכלל ויצא מן הכלל ללמד that the פרט teaches about the entire כלל and yields separate חיובים for לישה, עריכה, קיטוף, and similar acts.
- A suggestion is raised to treat לא תעשה as כלל and לא תאפה as פרט and conclude אין בכלל אלא מה שבפרט, restricting the לאו to אפייה alone. Rabbi Abahu answers that this does not apply because the כלל and פרט are המרוחקים זה מזה, appearing four פרקים apart in two different פרשיות, and such a case is not judged as כלל ופרט.
- A challenge is brought from a ברייתא about the שעיר הנשיא being שחט בצפון, where a פסוק seems redundant and is explained as establishing that deviation פסול, with an intermediate possibility that only that offering requires צפון until another פסוק makes it a בנין אב for all חטאות. The challenge suggests that this indicates דנין כלל ופרט even when מרוחקים, but Rav Ashi answers that the structure is not כלל ופרט but פרט וכלל, where the כלל adds to the פרט and includes all cases. The conclusion is that the תנא’s difficulty really comes from the limiting term אותו in ושחט אותו, which creates the הוה אמינא that only this case requires צפון, rather than from a כלל ופרט analysis.
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