Summary
  • Today’s *shiur* on Menachos 55a opens with the *beraisa* that sets rules for taking *terumah* between fresh figs and dried figs, and the *Gemara* resolves an internal tension by distinguishing cases where there is a *kohen* available from cases where there is not. The *Gemara* then draws a methodological point from Rav Papa about preferring to establish a single source with two different explanations rather than split it into two *tannaim*. The text moves to the *Mishnah* that all *menachos* are kneaded with lukewarm water while guarding against *chametz*, extends the prohibition of *chametz* even to the *shirayim*, and derives multiple liabilities for separate acts from the wording of the *pesukim*. The *Gemara* addresses whether distant *klal u’prat* counts as *klal u’prat*, brings a counterexample from *chataos* requiring *tzafon*, and concludes with exclusions and inclusions for the *sa’ir nasi*, *sa’ir Nachshon*, and the source for *semichah*, including a dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon.
  • A *beraisa* permits separating *te’enim* for *grogeros* in a place where it is common to make *te’enim* into *grogeros*, because the *halachah* views the *te’enim* as already destined to become *grogeros*. A *beraisa* forbids separating *grogeros* for *te’enim* even in a place where people commonly make *te’enim* into *grogeros*, because the *grogeros* are smaller than *te’enim* at present. A *Gemara* inference limits the permissibility of taking *te’enim* for *grogeros* to a place where they are usually made into *grogeros*, and it does not permit it where that is not the practice.
  • A *Gemara* asks what the case is and initially suggests that if a *kohen* is present then even in a place where people do not usually make *te’enim* into *grogeros*, one should be able to separate from the better, because “מקום שיש כהן, תורם מן היפה.” A *Gemara* then establishes the first clause as a case where there is no *kohen*, because fresh *te’enim* will spoil and are not considered “מן היפה” in practice when they cannot be eaten. A *Gemara* then challenges the second clause, because “מקום שאין כהן תורמין מן הקיים” should support using *grogeros*, but it reestablishes the second clause as a case where there is a *kohen*, so using *grogeros* would be “מן הרע על היפה.” A *Gemara* accepts that the *reisha* is “דליכא כהן” and the *seifa* is “דאיכא כהן” as the only workable reading.
  • Rashi notes that the *Gemara* assumes taking *ma’aser* from *te’enim* and *grogeros* is done by counting, such as taking ten from one hundred. The text raises that *poskim* discuss whether *ma’aser* is taken by weight, and it presents that “רע” and “יפה” may be evaluated by taste, value, or durability. The text cites the source for taking “מכל חלבו” from the *pasuk* “מכל מתנתיכם תרימו את כל תרומת ה׳ מכל חלבו.”
  • The *Gemara* cites Rav Ila deriving that one who separates “מן הרע על היפה” still has valid *terumah*, from “ולא תשאו עליו חטא בהרימכם את חלבו ממנו.” A *Gemara* argues that if the act were not effective there would be no reason for “נשיאת חטא,” and it concludes “מכאן לתורם מן הרע על היפה שתרומתו תרומה.”
  • The Brisker Rav frames “מן היפה על הרע” as either a דין in *kiyum hamitzvah* and the *ma’aseh hafrashah* or a דין in the *nesinah* to the *kohen*. The Brisker Rav gives a *nafka minah* where a *kohen* separates *terumah* from his own produce and keeps it, and he argues that if the requirement is דין נתינה it may not apply the same way when the *kohen* is the one who will receive it regardless. The Brisker Rav connects this to a *machlokes tannaim* in Terumos 2:4 where the *tanna kama* prefers taking “מן המתקיים” and Rabbi Yehudah prefers taking “מן היפה,” and he explains the *tanna kama* as focusing on giving to the *kohen* while Rabbi Yehudah focuses on the act of separation itself. The text states that the Rambam rules like the *tanna kama* to prefer “מן המתקיים,” while the Shulchan Aruch in Yoreh De’ah 331:52 rules “אין תורמין אלא מן היפה” but adds that “ונראה דהשתא דליכא כהן… אין להקפיד בכך,” while for *ma’aser* given to the Levi and the poor “יש להקפיד” to give “מן היפה.”
  • Rav Papa derives “שמע מינה” that one establishes a *Mishnah* “בתרי טעמי” rather than say it reflects “תרי תנאי,” preferring to interpret internal differences as different cases rather than as a *tannaitic* dispute.
  • A *Mishnah* states “כל המנחות נילושות בפושרין” and “משמרן שלא יחמיצו,” using lukewarm water despite increased risk of *chametz*. The text gives two *Rishonim* explanations that lukewarm water produces the best product under a דין of *le-mashchah*, and that it parallels *matzah* where there is a possibility of *chametz* but there is *shimur* to prevent it. The Brisker Rav asks whether “משמרן שלא יחמיצו” means merely avoiding *chametz* or a requirement that it be *matzah* with *shimur l’shem matzah*, and the Chazon Ish holds it must be done with intent and guarding for *matzah*. The Mikdash David is cited that they first put it in oil and only afterward used lukewarm water.
  • A *Mishnah* states that if the *minchah* becomes *chametz* one violates a *lo ta’aseh*, and if the *shirayim* become *chametz* one also violates a *lo ta’aseh*, based on “כל מנחה אשר תקריבו להשם לא תעשה חמץ.” The *Mishnah* applies the prohibition to kneading, arranging, and baking, “על לישתה, על עריכתה, ועל אפייתה.” The text cites the Keren Orah that the case concerns a *minchas solet* that is not baked and must be prevented from becoming *chametz*.
  • The Ohr Sameach says that the *achilah* of a *minchah* differs from other *korbanos*, and the *shirayim* eaten by the *kohanim* are part of the *achilah* of *kodshim*. Rav Shmuel Deutsch ztz”l in Berkas Kohen notes that the Torah speaks about *korbanos* in Vayikra and their eating in Tzav, and that the *minchah* appears only in Vayikra and not in Tzav, implying the *shirayim* of *minchah* function differently than the two-part model of other *korbanos*.
  • The text frames that *halachah* sometimes directs doing something that could lead to wrongdoing, and it contrasts that with cases where unnecessary stringency makes one a *hedyot*. The Chashukei Chemed is cited as weighing likelihood and risk, avoiding steps likely to cause *chametz* while still pursuing the best performance when proper guarding is feasible.
  • Reish Lakish derives from “לא תאפה חמץ חלקם נתתי אותה מאשי” that even “חלקם,” the *kohanim’s* portion, may not be made *chametz*. A *Gemara* challenges that the phrase “לא תאפה חמץ” is needed to teach separate liability for distinct acts, since one might have thought only one *lav* applies to all actions, and the *beraisa* teaches that baking was singled out to teach that each distinct act incurs its own liability, including “קיטוף.” The Minchas Chinuch answers why this is not “לאו שבכללות,” distinguishing multiple applications of one *lav* from deriving many different laws from one *pasuk*. A *Gemara* resolves that the *shirayim* rule is learned from “חלקם,” allowing “לא תאפה חמץ” to teach separate liabilities, and it infers “שמע מינה תרתי” from the word order “לא תאפה חמץ חלקם.”
  • A *Gemara* proposes reading “לא תעשה חמץ” and “לא תאפה חמץ” as *klal u’prat* to limit liability only to baking, and the Rashba is cited that without the *klal u’prat* framing one would extend beyond baking via *mah matzinu*. Rav Papa in the name of Abaye states “כלל ופרט המרוחקים זה מזה” are not judged as *klal u’prat* because the general and particular statements are in different *parshiyos*, and the Sefas Emes explains this with “אין מוקדם ומאוחר בתורה” creating uncertainty in the *klal-prat* structure.
  • A *beraisa* about the *sa’ir* of the *nasi* derives *tzafon* from its linkage to the *olah*, and it explains that the extra wording teaches that if it is not slaughtered in the north it is *pasul*. A *Gemara* suggests one would otherwise treat the earlier general rule “במקום אשר תשחט העולה תשחט החטאת” and the later specific *nasi* verse as *klal u’prat* even though they are distant, but Rav Ashi says it is *prat u’klal* because of the order across Vayikra and Tzav. A *Gemara* then explains that the *tanna* is bothered by “ושחט אותו,” and once all *chata’os* are known to require *tzafon* from “ושחט את החטאת במקום העולה,” the word “אותו” comes “למעוטי” that it is “אותו בצפון ואין שעיר נחשון בצפון.”
  • A *Gemara* says one might have thought the *sa’ir Nachshon* requires *tzafon* because it is included regarding *semichah*, and it teaches “קא משמע לן” that it does not require *tzafon*. A *beraisa* derives *semichah* from “וסמך ידו על ראש השעיר” to include *sa’ir Nachshon* for *semichah*, and the *Rishonim* explain that since it is a *korban l’sha’ah* one might have thought it lacks *semichah* without a *ribuy*. Rabbi Yehudah uses the verse to include *sa’ir Nachshon* for *semichah*, while Rabbi Shimon uses it “לרבות שעירי עבודת כוכבים,” where the *kohengadol* brings the offering with *semichah* after an erroneous ruling of *Beis Din*.
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