Summary
  • Today’s שיעור learns מסכת מנחות דף נו עמוד א from מתקיף לה רבינא and moves from the special חטאת of the נשיאים in the שמונת ימי המלואים to the rules of צפון in שחיטה and קבלת הדם, and then returns to the איסור of making a מנחה חמץ with multiple חיובים for different stages like לישה, עריכה, and אפייה. The sugya then parallels “one act after another” liabilities by comparing מחמץ אחר מחמץ and מסירוס אחר מסירוס to the laws of making a מום in a בכור, including bloodletting in a way that risks creating a מום. The text attributes specific frameworks to תוספות, רבינו גרשום, the חזון יחזקאל, the קרן אורה, the מנחת חינוך, the שפת אמת, and positions attributed to the רמב"ם, and it closes with an analogy to מחיקת השם and to מששרש אחר מששרש by עבודה זרה.
  • Today's learning states that the פסוק ושחט אתו teaches that the שעיר חטאת of נחשון and the נשיאים during the שמונת ימי המלואים does not require שחיטה בצפון because it is not brought for an עבירה. Rabina challenges that this need for a פסוק fits רבי יהודה, since he holds the שעיר requires סמיכה and that could have implied ordinary חטאת rules like צפון, but it is hard to justify according to רבי שמעון who lacks a source for סמיכה there. Zutra challenges the premise and says that even for רבי יהודה, “מה דאירבי אירבי” could limit obligations to what the תורה explicitly includes, and the sugya answers that “שעה מדורות לא ילפינן,” so one cannot derive the one-time inauguration offering from standard חטאות, and therefore separate פסוקים are needed for details like סמיכה and צפון.
  • The sugya reads ושחט אותו to teach that the animal must be in צפון while the שוחט need not be in צפון. Tosafos asks from זבחים דף ל"ב עמוד ב' where the שוחט need not even be in the עזרה because “לפני ה'” applies to the animal and not the slaughterer, and Tosafos answers that the relevant view there is distinct because ר' שמעון התמוני holds the שוחט must be in the עזרה, and he is the תנא of the sugya here. The text reviews the earlier discussion in זבחים דף כ' עמוד א' about the geographic definition of צפון, citing ר' יוסי בר' יהודה, ר' אלעזר בר' שמעון, and רבי on how far the northern designation extends around and beyond the מזבח.
  • Tosafos explains that the שוחט does not need to stand in צפון because שחיטה כשירה בזר shows that שחיטה is not an עבודה, while קבלת הדם is an עבודה and therefore requires both the act and the כהן’s stance to be בצפון. The ראשונים debate whether the סכין must be in צפון, with רבינו גרשום requiring the knife to be in צפון and Tosafos in זבחים holding that both the שוחט and the knife may be outside צפון as long as the animal is in צפון. The sugya brings the derivation attributed to רב אחייא from ושחט אותו על ירך המזבח צפונה and the linkage of שחיטה and קבלה from the juxtaposition to ולקח הכהן, and it resolves that רב אחייא’s teaching is framed as distinguishing that the שוחט is not in צפון but the מקבל is in צפון.
  • The sugya entertains that “אותו בצפון” might exclude מליקה of a בן עוף from צפון, and later reframes the exclusion to other cases, while the אחרונים ask why צפון is relevant for a bird since מליקה is on the מזבח and the משנה in זבחים דף נח עמוד א states the מזבח is like צפון. The חזון יחזקאל answers that the special דין of צפון requiring the animal’s placement applies to בהמה offerings like חטאת and עולה, while by birds that placement requirement does not apply, and performing מליקה on the top of the מזבח suffices without a צפון requirement. The sugya gives a rejected קל וחומר from בן צאן to בן עוף based on כהן requirements and then rejects it because בן צאן requires a כלי whereas מליקה is done with the כהן’s fingernail.
  • The sugya proposes that “אותו בצפון” could teach that פסח does not require צפון, and it notes that this דין is elsewhere sourced from רבי אליעזר בן יעקב who tests a logical argument that פסח should require צפון because it has a fixed זמן. The sugya rejects learning פסח from עולה because עולה is כליל, rejects learning from חטאת because חטאת is מכפרת על חייבי כריתות, and rejects learning from אשם because אשם is קדשי קדשים, and it questions why any such derivation would start since the candidate sources are all קדשי קדשים unlike פסח. The conclusion returns to the original reading that “אותו” teaches the animal must be בצפון and the שוחט need not be, while clarifying that רב אחייא is used to establish that קבלה requires the מקבל to be in צפון, and it notes an alternate derivation “מלוקח ולוקח” that relies on the vav of ולוקח, which “דההוא ו לא משמע ליה” for the dissenting view.
  • The sugya returns to the rule “לחייב על לישתו ועל עריכתו ועל אפייתו” that one who makes a קרבן מנחה חמץ is liable for each discrete act in the process. Rav Pappa states that one who bakes the חמץ מנחה receives שתי מלקיות, אחת על עריכתו and אחת על אפייתו, and this is presented with רש"י’s understanding that אפייה also finalizes the forming process associated with עריכה. The sugya challenges this from the earlier ברייתא that treats אפייה as a unique single act with its own liability and answers with a case distinction between when he performed the earlier stage himself versus when עריכה was done by someone else and he only baked.
  • A new discussion brings a ברייתא about a בכור שאחזו דם where bloodletting is performed, with רבי מאיר allowing הקזת דם only in a place that does not create a מום and the חכמים allowing it even where it creates a מום provided one does not slaughter based on that מום and must wait for another מום. The text presents a מחלוקת ראשונים on whether this is a דין in what counts as a מום or a גזירה to prevent people from intentionally making מומין, and it explains רבי שמעון as allowing even slaughtering on that מום. The text raises the tension with רבי שמעון’s usual rule of דבר שאינו מתכוין and the problem of פסיק רישא, and it reports an אחרונים explanation that the issue is framed as permission to slaughter rather than the status of the מום because the act aimed at healing lacked intention to create a usable מום. Tosafos rejects grounding the היתר in דבר שאינו מתכוין and instead treats the whole concern as מדרבנן, with the תנא קמא maintaining a גזירה and רבי שמעון not accepting it, while רבי יהודה prohibits bloodletting even if the animal will die to avoid opening the door to abuse.
  • The sugya states “הכא מודים מחמץ אחר מחמץ” that even a second person is liable for further חימוץ once the מנחה is already חמץ, grounding it in the double phrasing לא תעשה חמץ and לא תאפה חמץ and in the earlier point that singling out אפייה teaches liability for any act that produces חמץ. The קרן אורה analyzes whether the liability is for any act of חימוץ even when the object is already חמץ, or because each act intensifies the חמץ status, and it raises a practical question about putting שאור into dough as either an act of חימוץ or a גרמא. The sugya adds “במסירוס אחר מסירוס” that even a subsequent act after initial sterilization carries liability, and it derives from the סדר of “ומהוך וכתות ונתוק וכרות” that liability can attach in a sequence of partial and completed actions, concluding “הוי נותק אחר כורת שחייב.”
  • The sugya locates the core מחלוקת in “במתממי במום” when an already blemished animal receives an added מום, with רבי מאיר reading “כל מום לא יהיה בו” to prohibit adding a מום even to an animal already a בעל מום, and the רבנן reading “תמים יהיה לרצון” as limiting the prohibition to animals that are still fit as a קרבן. The gemara challenges רבי מאיר from תמים יהיה לרצון and answers that the phrase excludes a case of בעל מום מעיקרא, then rejects that framing as unnecessary by calling it “דקלא בעלמא,” and instead uses the phrase to exclude “פסולי המוקדשים לאחר פדיונם,” where despite ongoing restrictions like גיזה ועבודה, making a מום is not included among those restrictions. The sugya then challenges the רבנן from “כל מום לא יהיה בו” and answers that “כל מום” teaches a ban on indirect causation, such as placing בצק or דבילה on the animal’s ear so a dog will bite it and create a מום, with the word “כל” extending the prohibition to *grama*.
  • The text states that רבי יוחנן holds even when the מנחה is already חמץ, further acts of חימוץ remain prohibited and create liability, and it reports רש"י’s reading that multiple participants in distinct stages like kneading, shaping, and baking are each liable even if the first already caused חמץ. The מנחת חינוך limits this to different stages and says a second addition of שאור onto a מנחה that already had שאור does not qualify as מחמץ אחר מחמץ for liability, while the שפת אמת cites the רמב"ם as holding liability even for repeated additions of שאור and the חפץ חיים is presented as framing whether this is truly a מחלוקת or whether all agree about liability even for repetitive acts. The מנחת חינוך then raises a case of erasing Hashem’s name where one person erased one letter and a second erased another, citing the חבות יאיר that once one letter is gone it is no longer an act of מחיקת השם, and it brings אחרונים who disagree by analogy to the obligation to eradicate עבודה זרה, citing “מששרש אחר מששרש” as implying an ongoing duty to act on what remains and applying that model to protecting what remains of שם השם by treating each additional erasure as independently severe.
Previous Page
Next Page