Menachos 67 - Cycle 14
Summary
- Today’s *shiur* in Menachos moves from Rava’s certainty that produce whose *miruach* is done under *hekdesh* control is exempt from *terumos u’maasros*, into the Tannaitic dispute over *miruach* done by or under ownership of an *oved kochavim*, and then into the parallel question of *gilgul* for *challah* when a non-Jew forms the dough before it comes to Jewish ownership. The *Gemara* anchors the comparison between *maaser* and *challah* in the Torah’s repeated phrases *diganecha* and *arisoseichem*, tests Rava’s linkage between the two disputes with *beraisos*, and resolves the tension by attributing some *terumah* liability to a Rabbinic decree for *baalei kisin* rather than to the core rule itself. The *shiur* also brings interpretive notes from the Rambam, Rashi, Rashba, Rabbeinu Gershom, Shaagas Aryeh, and later Acharonim, and it transitions to the *Mishnah*’s description of the *Minchas HaOmer* procedure and the post-Omer Jerusalem markets, while raising broader questions about relying on dreams for *psak*, informing a non-Jew who separated *challah*, and when *ha’arama* is legitimate, including applications to *mechiras chametz*.
- Rava states that if the *miruach* of produce is done while the produce is owned by *hekdesh*, it is exempt from *maasros*. Rava says that even Rabbi Akiva, who holds that the portion of the cut Omer not used for the *korban haOmer* is obligated in *maasros* though the *miruach* occurred before redemption, only obligated there because the money from *hekdesh* is paid solely for what is needed for the Omer and the remainder was never needed and therefore never became *hekdesh*. Rava says Rabbi Akiva agrees that ordinary *miruach hekdesh* exempts from *terumos u’maasros*.
- The *Gemara* turns to *miruach oved kochavim* and presents approaches to what it means, including ownership by a non-Jew at the time of *miruach* and performance of the *miruach* act by a non-Jew regardless of ownership. The Rambam holds both readings are correct, while Rashi and others, and seemingly the Rashba, understand the *Gemara* as speaking only when both conditions apply, that it belongs to the non-Jew and the non-Jew performs the *miruach*. The *Gemara* states that the status of *miruach oved kochavim* is a *machlokes Tannaim* whether it is obligated or exempt from *maasros*.
- A *beraisa* teaches that one separates *terumos u’maasros* from Jewish produce for Jewish produce, from *oved kochavim* produce for *oved kochavim* produce, and from Kuti produce for Kuti produce, and it also allows separating “from any on any,” which is attributed to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda reason that *miruach oved kochavim* or Kuti does not exempt from *maaser*, and their view aligns with the position that there is no *kinyan* for an *oved kochavim* in *Eretz Yisrael* to remove produce from *maaser* obligation. Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Shimon limit separations to like-for-like and from Kutim on *oved kochavim*, and they prohibit separating between Jewish produce and that of *oved kochavim* or Kutim because of the risk of separating *min hachiyuv al haptur* and *min haptur al hachiyuv* under their view that *miruach oved kochavim* exempts.
- The *Gemara* applies an analogous principle to *challah* by stating that if *gilgul* is done while the dough belongs to *hekdesh*, it is exempt, even if later redeemed to Jewish ownership. A *Mishnah* in *Maseches Challah* teaches that if one is *makdish* the dough before it is rolled into dough and then redeems it, it is obligated, and if one is *makdish* before *gilgul*, the *gizbar* performs *gilgul*, and then it is redeemed, it is exempt because at the moment of obligation it was exempt.
- Rava asks what the law is when a non-Jew performs *gilgul* and afterwards the dough becomes Jewish-owned, noting that the rules of *miruach* and *challah* do not necessarily move together because *challah* rests on a distinct concept. The *Gemara* cites a *Mishnah* that a convert who had dough made before conversion is exempt and after conversion is obligated, and a doubt is treated stringently because *safek d’Oraisa l’chumra* for *challah* in *Eretz Yisrael*. The *Gemara* probes whether that *Mishnah* fits all views, contrasting the derivations from *diganecha* for *maaser* with the two occurrences of *arisoseichem* for *challah*.
- The *Gemara* explains that by *maaser* the Torah’s extra *diganecha* yields exclusions, including *diganecha* and not *degan hekdesh* and *diganecha* and not *degan ovdei kochavim*, and the structure becomes a *miut achar miut* that yields inclusion, producing liability even for *miruach ovdei kochavim* in that framework. The *Gemara* contrasts this with *challah* where *arisoseichem* appears twice, one usage defining the required dough measure and the other excluding *oved kochavim* and *hekdesh*. The *shiur* records that the *Sefer Divrei Yisrael* in *Klaley HaTorah* offers multiple *pshatim* on אין מיעוט אחר מיעוט אלא לרבות, and it records the Shaagas Aryeh’s comparison to *bal yera’eh u’bal yimatzei* and his point that *challah* cannot be derived from ownership rules because one can be obligated in *challah* even when the dough does not belong to him.
- The *Gemara* entertains that Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Shimon would make *gilgul oved kochavim* exempt consistent with their view on *miruach*, while Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda might obligate *challah* by learning *reishis reishis* from *reishis diganecha* and *reishis arisoseichem*. Rava says יהא רעוא דאיחזי בחלמא, expressing a wish to be shown the answer in a dream. The *shiur* brings the *Gemara* in Sanhedrin about money identified in a dream as *maaser sheini* and the principle דברי חלומות לא מעלין ולא מורידין, and the *Shibolei HaLeket* that rules *lo min hashamayim hi* for dream-based rulings, while distinguishing limits of relying on dreams, especially in *dinei mamonos*.
- Rava concludes that the view that *miruach ovdei kochavim* exempts also holds *gilgul ovdei kochavim* exempts, and the view that *miruach ovdei kochavim* does not exempt also holds *gilgul ovdei kochavim* does not exempt. Rav Papa challenges this with a *beraisa* that a non-Jew who separates *petter chamor* or *challah* is told he is exempt, his *challah* may be eaten by non-*kohanim*, and the donkey may be shorn and worked, while his *terumah* is prohibited, implying a Tanna who treats *terumah* as binding but *challah* as exempt. Rav Papa brings another *beraisa* that the non-Jew’s *challah* in *Eretz Yisrael* and his *terumah* in *chutz la’aretz* are treated as exempt, while *terumah* in *Eretz Yisrael* is prohibited and *medama’as*, again implying that *terumah* can be treated stringently even where *challah* is not.
- The *Gemara* answers that the *terumah* liability attributed to *miruach oved kochavim* in those sources is rooted in a Rabbinic decree, a גזירה משום בעלי כיסין, to prevent wealthy people from evading *maaser* by transferring produce or having a non-Jew perform *miruach*. Rashi explains the evasion as giving ownership to a non-Jew, while other Rishonim explain it as giving the produce to a non-Jew to do *miruach*, and Rabbeinu Gershom explains it as wealthy buyers claiming their Jewish-bought produce was bought from non-Jews. The *Gemara* rejects extending the decree to *challah* because one can avoid *challah* by simply making a smaller dough, described as אפשר דעביד ליה פחות מחמשה רבעים כאחת. The *Gemara* asks why similar avoidance options do not undercut the decree for *terumah*, cites Rabbi Oshaya’s allowance to be מערים אדם על תבואתו by bringing produce in partially processed or via roofs and courtyards, and the *shiur* records the Rishonim’s limitation that this permits only *achilas arai* or animal feeding unless one later eats in a normal manner.
- The *shiur* returns to the *beraisa* that one must inform a non-Jew who separated *challah* that he is exempt, and it cites the Tzafnas Paneach who explains that accepting it as though only *kohanim* may eat it is *geneivas da’as* because in truth even Jews may eat it. The *shiur* cites the Shach that the concern is that seeing a Jew eat it may lead the non-Jew to think Jews do not treat *challah* properly, and it cites the Bach that the case may involve a non-Jew about to convert and confusion would result if he thought his earlier “*challah*” was valid.
- The *shiur* recalls the earlier *Mishnah* about how the barley is processed to arrive at the *isaron* used for the *korban haOmer*, and it states that the date is ט״ז סיון as the day the Omer is brought. The *Mishnah* describes that the *kohen* places oil and *levonah* on the *isaron*, performs *yetzikah* and *belilah*, does *tenufah*, brings it near the *mizbe’ach*, performs *kemitzah*, burns the *kometz* and the *levonah*, and the remainder is eaten by the *kohanim*. The *Mishnah* states that after the Omer is offered, one finds Jerusalem’s markets filled with new flour and roasted grain, and Rabbi Meir says this is שלא ברצון חכמים while Rabbi Yehuda says it is ברצון חכמים היה נעשה, with the *Tosafos Yom Tov* explaining the non-prohibition through מוטב שיהיו שוגגין ואל יהיו מזידין.
- Tosafos asks why the *Mishnah* omits salting the offering despite the verse על כל קרבנך תקריב מלח, and the Rishonim answer that salt applies universally to all *korbanos* and therefore is not singled out for the *Minchah*. The *shiur* raises the question whether avoiding *challah* through making a smaller dough is *ha’arama* and whether *ha’arama* to avoid obligation is permitted. The *Bechor Shor* is cited as holding that one should not use *ha’arama* to evade a *d’Oraisa* obligation but may do so for a Rabbinic obligation, and this is applied to the practice of *mechiras chametz* by preferring not to sell full *chametz gamur* when viewing the sale as *ha’arama* and being more lenient where the prohibition is only Rabbinic.
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