Summary
  • Today's *shiur* on מסכת מנחות דף ס״ט begins on דף ס״ח עמוד ב׳ and frames the עומר and שתי הלחם as two staged permissions: the קרבן עומר on the second day of פסח permits eating חדש, and the שתי הלחם on שבועות permits bringing מנחות and קרבנות from the new crop. The narrative tests what happens when growth or permissibility proceeds “שלא כסידרן,” brings multiple proofs that the עומר is מן השעורים and the שתי הלחם is מן החטים, and then moves through a chain of unresolved questions where planting, replanting, digestion, cloud-born grain, and post-relocation growth each challenge how halachah defines “rooting,” “attachment to land,” and whether rulings follow the עיקר or later תוספת, often concluding with תיקו.
  • Today's presentation states that the עומר permits eating חדש from פסח onward and the שתי הלחם permits bringing קרבנות from the new grain from שבועות onward. The גמרא’s case plants wheat for the שתי הלחם בין עומר לשתי הלחם so it is חדש and cannot be eaten, and then asks whether passage of שבועות before פסח in the grain’s lifecycle affects permissibility, meaning מאי כסידרן שרו and whether שלא כסידרן לא שרו or שלא כסידרן נמי משרין. The question is expressed as a ספק about whether the required order is intrinsic to the permission or whether the permission can apply even when the calendar markers occur “out of order” relative to the grain’s rooting and readiness.
  • Rabba answers with a ברייתא on the פסוק ואם תקריב מנחת ביכורים and identifies it as referring to מנחת עומר. רבי אלעזר derives that the עומר comes מן השעורים through the shared word אביב, linking the אביב of מצרים, where the פסוק ties אביב to שעורה, to the אביב used לדורות for the עומר. רבי עקיבא argues from a structural pattern of offerings that יחיד brings חובתו מן החיטים in a קרבן עולה ויורד and חובתו מן השעורים in the מנחת סוטה, while ציבור brings חובתו מן החטים via שתי הלחם, so ציבור must also have a חובה מן השעורים, identified as the עומר. A further argument says that if the עומר were from חטים then אין שתי הלחם בכורים because the first wheat-offering would already have occurred, so the text frames the consistent arrangement as עומר מן השעורים and שתי הלחם מן החטים.
  • The גמרא challenges whether the “אין שתי הלחם בכורים” argument depends on assuming that two different cycles of new wheat could allow both offerings to be wheat if two permissions apply שלא כסדרן. The response says מי סברת בכורי כל פרי קאמרינן and reframes the issue as למזבח קאמרינן, meaning the concern is that the מזבח not “eat” from produce that precedes the proper שתי הלחם boundary. The text attributes the non-implementation of the proposed workaround to משום לקויי סדרים and states that this reasoning does not decide the earlier question about whether two-permission mechanics can operate “out of order.”
  • Rami bar Ḥama asks whether the שתי הלחם permits produce at the stage of הנצה or only at חנטה, and the גמרא clarifies that the terms cannot mean fruit-blossom versus fruit-set because the עומר’s standard of השרשה is earlier and would make later stages obviously eligible. The גמרא therefore defines the question as הנצה דעלה וחנטה דעלה and asks whether leafing is equivalent to השרשה for the purpose of permission via שתי הלחם. The sugya ends this inquiry with תיקו.
  • Rami bar Ḥama asks whether the עומר permits wheat that is planted in the ground when the omer passes, and the גמרא rejects the simple cases because the משנה already rules that אם השרישו קודם לעומר עומר מתירן and אם לאו אסורים עד שיבא עומר הבא. The needed case is דקצדנהו וזרעינהו קודם לעומר, where grain that previously took root is cut and replanted before the current עומר, and the current עומר passes while it has not re-rooted. Rashi is quoted as limiting the question to the original kernels, not the later growth, and the ספק is framed as whether they remain כמאן דשדי בכדא and are permitted by the עומר, or whether they are בטלו להו גבי ארעא and take on the status of their אסור growth. The sugya leaves the permissibility unresolved in the presentation’s framing of competing considerations.
  • The text brings the רש״ש in מסכת שבת to argue that planting on שבת is only actionable if the seed eventually takes root, and that removing it before rooting prevents חיוב, analogizing to removing dough from an oven before baking. The מנחת חינוך and דגל טל are cited as disagreeing and holding that liability for זורע can apply even if the seeds are removed before rooting. The ספר דברי אברהם is cited as distinguishing planting from baking because planting often fails due to external factors, so the act is defined at placement, and the resolution offered for aligning these views with the מנחות sugya is that the sugya’s “before rooting” category concerns whether something is considered part of the קרקע, while שבת concerns whether a מלאכה was performed.
  • The narrative shifts to commercial and litigation categories, asking whether seeds placed into the ground are treated as קרקע, which has אין אונאה לקרקעות, or as מטלטלין, which can have אונאה. The גמרא excludes the case where an explicit quantity was agreed and violated, invoking רבא’s rule כל דבר שבמדה ושבמשקל ושבמנין אפילו פחות מכדי אונאה חוזר, and instead frames the case as a directive of שדי בה כדבעי לה with witnesses claiming it was not done. The text parallels this to שבועות, asking נשבעין עליהם או אין נשבעין עליהם, since אין נשבעין על קרקעות, and again presents the central ספק as כמאן דשדי בכדא versus בטלו לגבי ארעא. The sugya ends both אונאה and שבועה questions with תיקו.
  • Rava bar Ḥana asks about wheat found in cattle manure and barley found in animal manure, and the גמרא first routes it to טומאת אוכלים, citing a ברייתא that even if one thinks to eat them they do not receive טומאת אוכלים, but if one gathers them for eating they do. The narrative then pivots to using such grain for מנחות and says פשיטא דלא, grounding the rejection in הקריבהו נא לפחתך הירצך או הישא פניך. The case is narrowed to דנקיטינהו וזרעינהו so they are replanted and grow, and the unresolved question becomes whether the disqualification is משום דמאיסה היא and replanting removes the מאיסות, or whether it is משום כחישותא היא so they remain inferior even after regrowth. The sugya ends with תיקו, and the מרדכי is cited to infer that manure presence does not automatically render grain חמץ because חמץ is not raised as the disqualifying factor in the question.
  • Rami bar Ḥama asks about an elephant that swallowed a basket and expelled it דרך בית הרעי, and the גמרא dismisses the question as one of removing existing טומאה because כל הכלים יורדין לידי טומאתן במחשבה ואין מיטהרין מטומאתן אלא בשינוי מעשה. The actual case is that the elephant swallowed raw material דבלע הוצן and later one made them into a כפיפה מצרית, and the ספק is whether digestion makes it like כלי גללים/כלי אדמה/כלי אבנים that אינן מקבלים טומאה. The גמרא brings עולא בשם רבי שמעון בן יהוצדק about wolves that swallowed children בעבר הירדן where חכמים טיהרו את הבשר but טימאו את העצמות, and rejects a direct analogy by distinguishing softness of flesh and hardness of bones while treating reeds as intermediate. The sugya remains unresolved on whether such material is treated as digested for טומאה purposes.
  • The text connects the digestion theme to later halachic debate about בהמה שנתפטמה באיסור. The רמ״א in יורה דעה סימן פ סעיף א is quoted as permitting an animal fattened on forbidden foods but forbidding one whose entire life diet is only forbidden foods, while the ש״ך סעיף קטן ה is cited as permitting even in the latter case because digested input loses its original status. The presentation adds that the ש״ך concedes a problem when the feed is אסור בהנאה, with בשר בחלב given as an example. The אגרות משה in אורח חיים חלק א סימן קמז is cited as requiring that digestion be complete, and the מהרש״ם is cited for a distinction based on whether the consumed איסור matches the animal’s category, asserting that an animal fed exclusively on non-כשר meat would be forbidden because “meat is what this animal is all about.”
  • The shiur presents ר׳ זירא asking about חטים שירדו בעבים, with Rashi explaining evaporation and return and Tosafot explaining a נס where wheat falls with rain. The question is framed not for מנחות but for שתי הלחם, because the תורה says ממושבותיכם and the sugya asks whether that excludes only חוץ לארץ but allows cloud-derived grain, or whether it requires strict “from your settlements,” making cloud grain invalid. The גמרא supports plausibility with the story of עדי טייעא who saw רום זרתא חיטי בתלתא פרסי, and the presentation notes the נודע ביהודה’s question about חמוץ and his answer that cloud-fall grain is not treated as standard חמץ-making contact with water.
  • Rav Shimon Pazi asks about stalks that reached a third before the עומר, were uprooted, replanted after the עומר, and then increased, and whether the status follows the original עיקר permitted by the עומר or the later תוספת requiring next year’s עומר. The גמרא tests resolution from רב אבהו אמר רב יוחנן about ילדה שסבכה בזקנה where fruit remains אסור even if הוסיף מאתים, and from רבי שמואל בר נחמני אמר רבי יונתן about בצל ששתלו בכרם that remains אסור even after the כרם is removed, both suggesting הולכים אחר העיקר. The sugya then challenges whether the rule of following the עיקר is accepted both לקולא and לחומרא or only invoked לחומרא, and it leaves the attempted use of the principle for חדש as a קולא unresolved with תיקו. The narrative closes by tying this to the broader issue raised in the רמב״ם about עציץ שאינו נקוב and whether status follows the vessel or the plant through the lens of עיקר.
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