Menachos Daf 84 - Omer and Shtei Halechem Come First
Summary
- The text presents the daf’s main flow in Menachos 84, framing the omer and shtei halechem as korbanos with special rules, then challenging those rules through opposing tannaitic and amoraic positions. It advances from whether these offerings must come from Eretz Yisrael and from *chadash* to the permissibility of using shemittah grain for the omer, and then pivots into the laws of bikkurim, including quality requirements and whether produce from atypical growing locations has bikkurim status with *k’dushah* and *k’riah*. It records multiple explanations and disputes, including the Ramban, Keren Orah, Shfas Emes, Ulla, Rabbi Yochanan, Reish Lakish, and others, and ends by setting up a coming contradiction about whether one is *meivi v’korei* for bikkurim from places like a roof, ruin, or pot on a ship.
- A distinction emerges between the machlokes about *chadash* versus *yashan* and the lack of machlokes about location, because both the Mishnah and the earlier baraisa require that the omer and shtei halechem come from Eretz Yisrael and not from Chutz La’aretz. A separate baraisa records that Rabbi Yosi b’Rabbi Yehuda holds that the omer may come from Chutz La’aretz, and he interprets “כי תבואו אל הארץ” as establishing the time when the obligation begins rather than restricting the source of the grain. A Rishonim question arises about whether this position extends to shtei halechem, with the Ramban limiting the expansion to the omer because *chadash* applies “בכל מושבותיכם” even in Chutz La’aretz, while “ממושבותיכם” by shtei halechem does not include “כל מושבותיכם.” A Keren Orah approach treats shtei halechem as a *kal vachomer* extension because the omer is stricter as a matir of *chadash* beyond the Mikdash, yet it can come from Chutz La’aretz. A supporting rationale is stated that since the issur of eating *chadash* before the omer applies in Chutz La’aretz on a *d’oraisa* level, the omer’s framework is operative there and its grain may be brought from there as well.
- A Mishnah in Shekalim states that the guards of *sefichin* in shevi’is are paid from *terumas halishkah* to ensure available grain for the omer. A question is raised from “קצירכם” that excludes *k’tzir nochri* and seems to invite excluding *hefker* as well, and a Turei Even answer limits the exclusion to non-Jewish ownership rather than to *hefker* ownership. An alternative approach treats shevi’is produce as not fully *hefker* to everyone because it is not *hefker* to non-Jews and thus remains tied to *klal Yisrael*. A contradiction is posed from “לאכלה” implying not for burning, since the omer includes burning on the mizbe’ach, and the tension is sharpened by the observation that burning on the mizbe’ach is called *achilah* while “לכם לאכלה” implies human use. A further difficulty is noted that an *aseh* should override even a prohibition derived from an *aseh*, and an *aseh d’rabim* should override an *aseh d’yachid*, making it hard to see why burning shevi’is produce for the omer would be problematic in the first place. A response rejects canceling the omer in shemittah on the basis of “לדורותיכם,” and the attempted alternative of bringing last year’s grain is rejected because the omer requires *karmel* at the time of offering, which last year’s grain cannot satisfy.
- A dispute is recorded about the source for requiring this year’s grain, with Rabbi Yochanan deriving it from “כרמל תקריב” as a requirement of moist, fresh grain at the time of hakravah, and Rabbi Elazar deriving it from “ראשית קצירכם” as a requirement that it be the beginning of the harvest and not the end. A baraisa about “מנחת ביכורים” identifies the omer as coming from barley and presents Rabbi Eliezer’s gezeirah shavah of “אביב” from Mitzrayim to later generations to establish barley. Rabbi Akiva argues that the public must have both a wheat and a barley obligation paralleling individual obligations, and the Shfas Emes reframes this as a bikkurim-based structure in which omer and shtei halechem function as a form of bikkurim for barley and wheat. An additional line asserts that if the omer were from wheat, shtei halechem would not be bikkurim, because shtei halechem must be the first wheat offering, and therefore the omer must be barley. A challenge concludes that the “bikkurim/ראשית” theme supports Rabbi Elazar’s rationale and yields a *tiyuvta* against Rabbi Yochanan’s stated source.
- A Mishnah in Bikkurim limits bikkurim to the seven species and excludes dates from the mountains and fruits from the valleys as lower-quality produce. Ulla rules that if one brings such produce, it does not become sanctified as bikkurim. A baraisa about shtei halechem being “קרבן ראשית” derives that shtei halechem precedes all menachos, that “מנחה חדשה” makes it the first wheat offering, that a second “חדשה” establishes the omer as the first barley offering, and that shtei halechem precedes bikkurim and other new items such as *nesachim* and *peiros ilan*. The same baraisa includes sources that extend the precedence to growths from a field and even to growths from unusual places like a roof, a ruin, a pot, and a ship, creating pressure against Ulla’s claim that inferior mountain or valley produce lacks bikkurim sanctity. A resolution narrows that clause to menachos rather than bikkurim, preserving the claim that such items may be relevant for menachos without granting bikkurim sanctity.
- A challenge argues that if the verse is about menachos, “כל טהור בביתך יאכל אותו” improperly implies household-wide consumption, while menachos are for *zichrei kehuna* only. A response by Rav Mesharshiya uses two phrases within the verse to split the referents, reading “לך יהיה” as menachos for male kohanim and “כל טהור בביתך יאכל אותו” as bikkurim for the kohen’s household. Rav Ashi reads the entire passage as menachos and assigns “כל טהור בביתך יאכלנו” to the loaves of todah given to kohanim, which may be eaten by the kohen’s household.
- A broader framing sets Ulla’s position within an amoraic dispute, with Rabbi Yochanan holding “אם הביא לא קידש” and Reish Lakish holding “אם הביא קידש” and treating it analogously to *hekdesh* taking effect even on inferior items. Rabbi Yochanan’s reasoning is attributed to Rav Elazar citing a dream-based introduction and then a derashah from “מראשית” as “מראשית ולא כל ראשית” and from “מארצך” as “מארצך ולא כל ארצך,” requiring the best-quality produce and excluding inferior mountain and valley growth. Reish Lakish uses “מארצך” differently, via a baraisa of Rabban Gamliel b’Rabbi linking “ארץ” in bikkurim to “ארץ” in the praise of the land to define bikkurim as the land’s praised produce. Rabbi Yochanan answers that “ארץ” alone could have taught the praise connection and the extra “מ” in “מארצך” supports selecting the finest produce, while Reish Lakish rejects deriving an additional derashah from that extra letter.
- A closing note sets the next step as addressing contradictory baraisos about whether one is *meivi v’korei* for bikkurim when the first fruit does not grow in a standard field and instead comes from places like a גג, חורבה, עציץ שבספינה, or similar cases. The text ends by deferring the resolution to the next day’s continuation with “תני חדא.”
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