Bava Basra 146
Summary
- A statement of Rav through Rabbi Zeira explains *kol yemei ani ra’im* as the hard life of a *ba’al gemara* and *tov lev mishteh tamid* as the ease of a *ba’al mishna*, while Rava reverses it and frames the difficulty of *ba’al mishna* as the lack of practical halachic clarity and the satisfaction of *ba’al gemara* as reaching a complete conclusion. The Maharal and Rashbam split on whether the pain of *mishna* is the lack of *halacha lema’aseh* or the lack of *geshmak*, and later responsa use this to argue about whether a *siyum mishnayos* creates a *se’udas mitzvah* that can exempt a *bechor* from fasting, alongside additional approaches about what the core joy of *siyum* is. The Gemara then applies *kol yemei ani ra’im* and *tov lev mishteh tamid* to various personality types and life situations, resolves how an *ani* can still have *Shabbasos* and *yamim tovim*, and brings Ben Sira’s description of an *ani* whose nights are also bad. The Mishnah and Gemara move to the laws of *sivlonos* sent to a father-in-law’s house, define when gifts are collectible after a broken match, probe details like eating, drinking, location, wear-and-tear items, partial waiver, and appreciation, and bring several stories used to derive law or convey *chashivus* of Eretz Yisrael. The sugya ends with rulings about returning food and drink depending on who backed out, and then begins a new Mishnah about a *shechiv mera* gift and the broader question of following *umdana*, anchored in disputes attributed to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya and Rabbi Shimon Shizuri and the distinction between *umdana d’muchach* and weaker inference.
- A teaching of Rav via Rabbi Zeira interprets *kol yemei ani ra’im* as *zeh ba’al gemara* and *tov lev mishteh tamid* as *zeh ba’al mishna*, and Rashbam explains that the *ba’al gemara* “kills himself” to align *halachos* and answer difficulties, while *mishna* learning flows with less strain. Rava says *ipcha* and brings Rav Mesharshiya in his name to read *masi’a avanim yei’atzav bahem* as *ba’alei mishna* and *boke’a etzim yisaken bam* as *ba’alei gemara*, with Rashbam explaining that the *ba’al mishna* cannot resolve disputes or rule *halacha lema’aseh* while the *ba’al gemara* reaches a settled conclusion. The Maharal explains that Rabbi Zeira locates the “bad” in the toil and pressure of answering *kushyos*, while Rava locates the “bad” in the lack of *hana’ah* and *geshmak* in *mishna* compared to the pleasure of *Talmud* as *chochmah*.
- A practical question emerges about whether a *siyum* on *mishnayos* counts as a *se’udas mitzvah* to exempt a *bechor* from fasting on *Erev Pesach*, and the framing depends on whether *siyum* centers on completion of a “*davar shalem*” or on *simchah*. A responsum in *Afraksata D’Anya* חלק א' סימן קנ"ד אות ג' challenges a claim that one who only learns *mishnayos* and does not know *tzurta d’shema’ata* cannot make a *se’udas siyum*, and it rules that understanding what one learns is certainly *mitzvah rabbah* of *talmud Torah* and fulfills *pikudei Hashem yesharim mesamchei lev*. Afraksata D’Anya cites *tov lev mishteh tamid elu ba’alei mishna* and limits Rava’s downside of *mishna* by invoking Rashbam’s point about lack of *psak*, arguing that with פירוש המשניות לרמב"ם, ברטנורא, קהתי, and similar aids, one can reach the practical bottom line and the full *simchah* of completion. A view attributed to *Binyan Shlomo* reads *mishteh tamid* as the ability to finish even a *masechta mishnayos* quickly, while others require at least a *seder* or even *shishah sidrei mishnah*, and *שו"ת בדרוש וחקרתי* raises whether a *katan* making a *siyum* can exempt a *bechor* depending on whether the *chiyuv* stems from being *metzuvah v’oseh* or from the inherent joy of *talmud Torah*. A further approach brought from Rav Soloveitchik in *Harei Kedem* בשם Rav Chaim ties the main joy of *siyum* to what the learner is now prepared to accomplish, preferring *Chasan Bereishis* over *Chasan Torah*, and frames completion as laying groundwork for deeper understanding on the next cycle.
- Rabbi Chanina defines *kol yemei ani ra’im* as one who has an *ishah ra’ah* and *tov lev mishteh tamid* as one who has an *ishah tovah*. Rabbi Yannai defines the “bad” as an *istenis* and the “good” as one whose *da’ato yafeh* and is easygoing. Rabbi Yochanan defines the “bad” as a *rachaman* and *tov lev* as an *achzari*, and Rashbam explains that the *rachaman* constantly sees tragedies and *libo bocheh tadir* over them. Rabbi Shimon ben Levi defines the “bad” as one whose *da’ato ketzarah* and the “good” as one whose *da’ato rechavah*, and Maharsha reads *da’ato ketzarah* as short temper and aligns these last three with פסחים דף קי"ג עמוד ב' about *shloshah chayyeihem einan chayim*: *rachmanim*, *ratzchanim*, and *aninei hada’as*. Maharsha ties *rachaman* to Shaul’s misplaced mercy on Agag that leads to later misplaced cruelty at Nov Ir HaKohanim, and it frames anger as adding foolishness and allowing “*kol minei gehinnom*” to rule over a person.
- Rabbi Shimon ben Levi challenges how *kol yemei ani ra’im* can be literal when there are *Shabbasos* and *yamim tovim*, and the Gemara answers like Shmuel that *shinui veset techilas choli* because changing habitual eating can cause illness. Shulchan Aruch states that one who fasts every day and then eats on Shabbos experiences *tza’ar*, and *yesh omrim* report that some *chasidim v’anshei ma’aseh* fasted on Shabbos, with Rabbi Yehudah HeChasid doing so to avoid sickness from *shinui veset*. Rav Reuven Margolios in *Nefesh Chayah* explains the *minhag* to taste Shabbos food before Shabbos as acclimating the body to avoid illness, while Beis Yosef אורח חיים סימן רפ"ו בשם שבולי הלקט and Mishnah Berurah frame tasting as a *mitzvah* to check and fix the food before Shabbos. A *nafka minah* is drawn between tasting to acclimate even when one cannot fix the food and tasting only to evaluate quality when repair is possible, and the *Chiddushei HaRim* reads *ani* as *ani hada’as* and interprets *shinui veset* on Shabbos as a drush about *ga’avah* overpowering expanded *da’as*.
- A citation from *Sefer Ben Sira* adds *af leilos* to *kol yemei ani ra’im* and portrays the *ani* as living under the lowest roof where others’ rain drains onto him and farming a vineyard on the highest mountains where windblown dirt harms it. The narrative contrasts a notion that night provides rest with Ben Sira’s claim that even nights bring dripping roofs and unrest. The *Hafla’ah* questions why *kol yemei* would not automatically include nights like Ben Zoma’s *kol yemei chayecha l’rabbos af leilos*, and it answers that the Gemara’s framing works even according to *Chachamim* who disagree with Ben Zoma and do not derive nights from *kol yemei*, so Ben Sira supplies the inclusion of night for that view.
- The Mishnah rules that one who sends *sivlonos* to his father-in-law and then eats a *se’udas chasan* there cannot collect them back even if he ate only a *dinar*’s worth, while if he did not eat the *se’udah* he can collect. The Mishnah distinguishes *sivlonos merubin* intended to return with her to the husband’s home as collectible, and it explains that this is typical practice and the principle applies even to *mu’atin* if explicitly sent for return, while *mu’atin* intended for her use in her father’s house are not collectible. Rava rules *davka dinar* and the Gemara explains that this rejects an assumption that *dinar* is merely *orchah d’milsa* and establishes a precise threshold. The Gemara asks whether drinking counts, whether a *shaliach* eating counts, and whether being served at the door counts, and it brings Shmuel’s story of a man who sent massive gifts, stood at the doorway, drank a cup of hot liquid, and died, after which the court in Usha ruled that *sivlonos ha’asuyin libalos* are not collectible while those not made to wear out are collectible. The Gemara infers that drinking functions like eating, rejects proof about “less than a dinar” with Rav Ashi’s suggestion of an extremely valuable additive, and rejects proof about “sent to him” by suggesting the doorway is like the house itself.
- A question is raised *mah’u sheyishalesh* and Tosafos explains it as whether eating less than a *dinar* enables proportional collection of *sivlonos* according to what was eaten rather than an all-or-nothing rule. The Gemara asks *shevach sivlonos mah’u* and frames it as whether appreciation belongs to him because the items ultimately return to him, or to her because loss or theft liability lies with her, and it leaves the matter as *teiku*. Rava asks about *sivlonos ha’asuyin libalos* that in fact did not wear out, attempts to prove from the Usha ruling that intent controls regardless of actual wear, and rejects the proof by limiting it to cases where they did wear out. The Gemara tries again from the Mishnah’s *sivlonos mu’atin* that she uses at her father’s house, and Rava answers by narrowing it to *bimei u’besivchasa* where small inexpensive items are fully waived, unlike valuable items where actual wear may matter.
- A story reports a man sending *yayin chadash*, *shemen chadash*, and new linen utensils *ba’Atzeres*, and the Gemara asks what it teaches. One explanation is *chashivus d’Eretz Yisrael* because produce ripens early enough for such gifts by Shavuos. Another explanation is that such a claim is a valid *ta’anah* and cannot be dismissed as impossible, because in Eretz Yisrael it can occur.
- A story describes a man told that his wife is *totranis* and he follows her into a ruin to test her, says “*rei’ach tzanon ani marei’ach b’Galil*,” and she replies *man yehiv lan m’kosavos d’neri’ach v’ne’echol bahen*, after which the ruin collapses and she dies, and the sages rule that since he entered only to test her, if she dies he does not inherit her. Tosafos בשם רבינו יעקב explains that the case is an *arusah* and the entry is not *lishmah nissu’in*, so no inheritance right exists absent *nissu’in*. Rashbam explains that they already had *nissu’in* and derives *nasan einav l’garshah v’shuv eino yorshah*, extending it even to a wife who dies amid serious conflict where he truly intends divorce. The *Chavos Yair* cites this sugya in a responsum about breaking a match due to a claimed *mum* of an overly long nose, narrows what counts as a *mum*, and uses loss of smell as the paradigmatic defect from this Gemara, tying smell to cooking and taste and treating it as a greater issue for a woman than for a man in that context.
- Rav Papa the elder teaches before Rav Papa that whether she dies, he dies, or he backs out, the *sivlonos* return but food and drink do not, while if she backs out then even *kisha d’yarka* is returned. Rav Huna brei d’Rav Yehoshua rules that repayment is appraised as *d’mei basar b’zol*, and Rashbam explains that the valuation deducts up to a third because the food was originally eaten without expectation of reimbursement and would have been consumed more modestly had return been anticipated.
- A new Mishnah states that a *shechiv mera* who writes all his property to others but leaves over *karka kol shehu* makes a valid gift, while if he leaves nothing then the gift is not valid if he recovers, because total divestment indicates it was given only under assumption of imminent death. The Gemara asks who follows *umdana* and Rav Nachman attributes it to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya, citing a case where a man who heard his son died wrote his property away and then the son returned, with Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya invalidating the gift because *ilmalei hayah yode’a shebno kayam lo hayah kotvan*. Rav Sheshet attributes the principle to Rabbi Shimon Shizuri, citing a development in which one *yotzei b’kolar* who says “*kitvu get l’ishti*” is treated as intending “write and give,” later extended to one leaving in a caravan, and Rabbi Shimon Shizuri extends it even to *ha’mesukan*. Rav Nachman declines that proof because *da’amar kitvu* shows limited intent, while Rav Sheshet declines Rav Nachman’s proof by distinguishing *umdana d’muchach* from less conclusive inference, leaving each amora grounding *azlinan basar umdana* in a different tanna.
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