Summary
  • A שיעור on מנחות פ״ד begins with an announcement that שמואל בן פנחס Sydney Marcus was נפטר, and the לימוד is dedicated לעילוי נשמתו with the hope that after the קבורה the family should have נחמה and המקום ינחם אותם. A central thread runs through disputes about the sources and requirements for the עומר and שתי הלחם, including whether they must come from חדש and from ארץ ישראל, how the רמב״ם rules in הלכות תמידין, and how the גמרא frames disagreements among תנאים. The שיעור then turns to practical-הלכתי fallout about חדש בחוץ לארץ, presenting the שולחן ערוך’s clear formulation and multiple proposed היתרים in later authorities, and continues into sugya material about שומרי ספיחין בשביעית and the tension between using שביעית produce for the עומר and the rule of לאכלה ולא לשרפה. The later portion analyzes דרשות for why the עומר must be fresh and first, explores a large מחלוקת ראשונים about משומר produce and *mimashkeh Yisrael*, and then moves into ביכורים and “inferior” produce, with a debate between רבי יוחנן and ריש לקיש about whether such offerings become sanctified, ending with a plan to address “פסקן from dreams” and *divrei ḥalomot lo ma’alin ve-lo moridin*, and closing with wishes for a גוטן יום ירושלים and gratitude to הקדוש ברוך הוא.
  • A listener’s father, שמואל בן פנחס Sydney Marcus, is reported נפטר yesterday, and the לימוד is designated לעילוי נשמתו because his נשמה is still here. A hope is expressed that after the קבורה the family should have נחמה and המקום ינחם אותם. A location is set for the sugya: מנחות פ״ד, beginning from פ״ג עמוד ב׳.
  • A מחלוקת is presented between the משנה and a ברייתא about whether עומר and שתי הלחם must come specifically from חדש and from ארץ ישראל. A statement is given that the משנה requires ארץ ישראל and חדש, while the ברייתא allows ישן as כשר but says it is חיסר מצוה because the לכתחילה מצוה is to bring from חדש. A difficulty is raised from the רמב״ם in הלכות תמידין פרק ח׳ הלכה ב׳, where he writes that שתי הלחם come only מן הארץ ומן החדש from *mimoshvoteichem tavi’u leḥem tenufah*, yet also rules לא מצאו חדש יביאו מן העלייה, leading the כסף משנה and מהר״י קורקוס to suggest that the רמב״ם reads the dispute as לכתחילה versus בדיעבד even though תוספות notes that the לשון of אינם באין does not sound merely לכתחילה.
  • A clarification follows that the dispute between the משנה and ברייתא is about חדש versus ישן, but regarding ארץ ישראל both agree that עומר ושתי הלחם are from ארץ ישראל and not from חוץ לארץ. A new תנא is then introduced: רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה, who says עומר בא מחוץ לארץ and reads *וכי תבאו אל הארץ* as a timing marker rather than a geographical limitation, since the obligation begins once entering the land. A rationale is stated that he holds חדש בחוץ לארץ דאורייתא from *mimoshvoteichem* meaning any dwelling place, and therefore once the prohibition applies everywhere on a דאורייתא level, bringing for the מצוה applies everywhere as well.
  • A question is raised about whether earlier תנאים must therefore hold חדש בחוץ לארץ דרבנן, or whether they could hold the איסור דאורייתא while still limiting the מצוה to ארץ ישראל, with the point that the גמרא assumes רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה makes the “jump” from איסור to מצוה. A further analysis from קרן אורה is presented about whether רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה’s stance extends beyond עומר to שתי הלחם, with a suggestion that the ברייתא’s wording implies he argues only by עומר, yet a *kal va-ḥomer* is offered that if עומר can come from חוץ לארץ then surely שתי הלחם can too, while also noting there are ראשונים who say by שתי הלחם everyone agrees מן הארץ דוקא, and concluding that פשטא דשמעתתא does not support making שתי הלחם more חמור than עומר.
  • A practical discussion is framed around the famous רמ״א in יורה דעה סימן רצ״ג and how people rely on leniencies regarding חדש בזמן הזה, especially in חוץ לארץ. A statement is emphasized that the שולחן ערוך rules explicitly that איסור החדש applies both בארץ and בחוץ לארץ, for Jewish and non-Jewish grain, and that any תבואה not taking root before ט״ז בניסן is אסורה until the next עומר.
  • A principal היתר of the רמ״א is quoted: after פסח, סתם תבואה is permitted due to a ספק ספיקא, maybe it is last year’s crop, and even if it is this year’s crop maybe it rooted before the עומר. Two strong objections are given from אחרונים: modern traceability often removes the ספק, and the supposed ספק ספיקא may collapse into one question about whether it rooted before or after the relevant עומר, leaving the רמ״א’s formulation as difficult and often left בצריך עיון, alongside a preference stated by many אחרונים to be מחמיר.
  • A second line of היתר is attributed to the ב״ח, who holds that grain of עכו״ם is not דאורייתא, making it a ספיקא דרבנן for which one can be lenient. A third approach is brought from the ערוך השולחן, who quotes an אור זרוע that many ראשונים hold חדש בחוץ לארץ is only דרבנן and that in שעת הדחק one may rely on those views, calling this a clear explanation of earlier leniencies given the difficulty of the איסור in “our country.” A further step is described that for many מצוות התלויות בארץ, rabbinic decrees on חוץ לארץ were limited to lands סמוך to ארץ ישראל, and it is suggested that distant lands were not included, with an added point that חדש is “kail tfei” than תרומות ומעשרות, while noting that the משנה ברורה in הלכות ספירת העומר advises not to rely on the heterim.
  • A משנה in שקלים is introduced that שומרי ספיחין בשביעית take their wages from תרומת הלשכה, with the explanation that guards are arranged so that enough grain remains available for the עומר and שתי הלחם during שמיטה when produce is הפקר, and רש״י in כתב יד is cited that the goal is that the poor not collect it all. A question from רמי בר חמא to רב חסדא challenges using שביעית produce for the עומר because of *le’okhlah ve-lo li’sreifah*, since burning the קומץ appears to destroy קדושת שביעית. A response is framed that the Torah commands עומר לדורותיכם and therefore the מצוה cannot be canceled every seventh year, while רמי בר חמא clarifies he suggests bringing from last year.
  • A rejection is then given that the offering requires כרמל, and the דרשה *karmel takriv* is used to require כרמל at the time of הקרבה, making last year’s produce invalid because it is not fresh then. A suggested reconciliation is attributed to קרן אורה that the requirement of חדש applies when possible and in שביעית one would fulfill לדורותיכם using ישן, while the בריסקער רב proposes a case where grain is “last year’s” regarding שביעית status yet still “חדש” for עומר because it took root after the previous year’s עומר and grew before the שביעית year took effect, allowing burning without קדושת שביעית while still counting as not yet permitted by the prior עומר. A further question is raised about why one does not invoke עשה דוחה לא תעשה, with remarks about the nature of the prohibition as an איסור עשה and the principle that דחייה is said when אי אפשר לקיים שניהם, tying it back to the requirement of כרמל.
  • A later אמוראי dispute is presented about the source of the “fresh/first” requirement: רבי יוחנן derives it from כרמל, while רבי אלעזר derives it from *reishit ketzirkha* as “ראשית קצירך ולא סוף קצירך.” A further ברייתא is brought to show עומר comes from שעורים, with one view learning *aviv* by comparing מצרים and לדורות from *ki ha-se’orah aviv*, and רבי עקיבא arguing by structural comparison that since a יחיד can bring from חיטין or שעורים (including מנחת סוטה), the ציבור must also have both, requiring the עומר to be barley so that ציבור has a barley option, and adding that if עומר were wheat then שתי הלחם would not be ביכורים. A תיובתא is recorded against רבי יוחנן from this emphasis on ביכורים and ראשית.
  • A “huge מחלוקת ראשונים” is laid out regarding whether guarding a שמיטה field makes the produce אסור באכילה, with a report that some ראשונים including ספר החינוך and the רמב״ם hold it remains permitted to eat despite the prohibition of guarding, while רש״י, רבינו תם, and others are presented as holding that משומר becomes אסור באכילה. A תוספות question is quoted: if משומר is אסור, how can the עומר be brought from guarded ספיחין given the requirement of *mimashkeh Yisrael*.
  • Three תוספות answers are then presented. A first answer says that מדאורייתא the prohibition is on בצירה, not on אכילה, because the verse in תורת כהנים addresses harvesting rather than eating, so the item can still qualify as *mimashkeh Yisrael*. A second answer says the guards did not forcibly prevent others from taking; they merely informed people it was intended for the עומר and people withdrew on their own, so it is not truly משומר. A third answer says the Torah prohibits “קצירך ונזירך,” meaning yours and not הקדש, so produce guarded for הקדש is excluded from the איסור.
  • A משנה in ביכורים is cited that ביכורים come only from the שבעת המינים and not from תמרים שבהרים or פירות שבעמקים, and עולא adds that if one brought such produce it does not become sanctified. A challenge is posed from a ברייתא that applies “ראשית” language to שתי הלחם and derives that it precedes other offerings, including items from גג, חורבה, עציץ, and ספינה, which sounds like inferior sources are included. A resolution is given that the end of that teaching refers to מנחות rather than ביכורים.
  • A further challenge is raised from the verse *kol tahor beveitekha yokhlenu*, since if the passage is about מנחות only זכרי כהונה can eat most מנחות as קדשי קדשים. A resolution by רב משרשיא distinguishes two verses, applying one to ביכורים and one to מנחות, while רב אשי offers that all can be read as מנחות with the verse about general eating applying to לחמי תודה as קדשי קלים. The question of עולא’s statement is then framed as a dispute: רבי יוחנן says הביא לא קידש and ריש לקיש says הביא קידש, comparing it to bringing a כחוש animal in קדשים.
  • A reasoning for רבי יוחנן is attributed to רבי אלעזר with the phrase חזאי בחלום מלתא מעליא אמינא, with two readings recorded from רש״י traditions about whether it means רבי יוחנן conveyed the answer in a dream or that seeing him was a good omen for a good explanation. A דרשה is given: *me-reishit ve-lo kol reishit, me-artzekha ve-lo kol artzekha*, and ריש לקיש is shown using *artzekha* for a different דרשה via רבן גמליאל ברבי that just as “ארץ” elsewhere indicates שבח ארץ, so too here it requires the best of the land, while the other side contests whether “ארץ מארץ” is a viable derivation.
  • A practical question is raised about whether one can bring ביכורים on שבועות itself after the שתי הלחם, and a שיטה מקובצת in בכורות כו עמוד ב is cited as saying not to bring on שבועות, understood as beginning from the day after שבועות. A possible explanation is attributed to מהרי״ט אלגאזי that this may be only לכתחילה because the רמב״ם requires bringing a קרבן with ביכורים and that is not feasible on שבועות, so bringing on that day would forfeit the accompanying קרבן.
  • A continuation from the משנה in ביכורים is cited that אין מביאין ביכורים קודם לעצרת and that אנשי הר צבועים brought early and were refused, while a ruling is reported in the רמב״ם (ביכורים ב, טו) that if one brought early, בדיעבד they are accepted and left until עצרת to be read over. A dispute between the רמב״ם and ראב״ד is then stated about not bringing ביכורים after חנוכה, where the רמב״ם says fruit that ripens after חנוכה is considered next year’s and must be left until after עצרת, while the ראב״ד objects that חנוכה is before שבט and argues that such fruit is merely inferior “פסולת הפירות” and is excluded because the Torah says מראשית, likening it to תאנים פטורות ומנוקבות, and it is noted that later מפרשים such as תורה זרעים discuss this.
  • A plan is stated to begin the next day with the issue of relying on dreams in halacha, referencing a גמרא in סנהדרין about finding money based on a dream claim that it is מעשר שני or belongs to someone else, and the ruling that *divrei ḥalomot lo ma’alin ve-lo moridin*. A closing wish is given for a גוטן יום ירושלים and gratitude to הקדוש ברוך הוא for forty years, alongside a תפילה for the future ירושלים.
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