Menachos 12
Summary
- Today's *daf* is Menachos 12, beginning at the Mishnah near the bottom of 11b, and it is learned as a *zechus refuah sheleimah* for יצחק בן שפרה מרים, חוה מרים בת פלקא פריידא, and שלמה בן חיה לאה, and as a *zechus* for שרה בת סילביא to find a זיווג הגון בקרוב. The *daf* presents the Mishnah’s parallel to Zevachim’s major *sugya* of *pigul*, defining how invalid intent of *chutz limkomo* and *chutz lizmano* applies to *menachos* across the four essential *avodos*, when the offering becomes *pigul* with *kares*, and when it remains merely *pasul* without *kares* because it is not *karav hamatir k’mitzvaso*. The Gemara then frames a key question about a deficient *minchah* where *shirayim* were lost between *kemitzah* and *haktarah* according to רבי יוחנן, and debates whether the *haktaras hakometz* in that case can still establish *pigul* and remove *me’ilah*, with a dispute between Rav Huna and Rava, Rava’s attempted proof from a *beraisa* of רבי חייא, and Abaye’s counter-reading attributing the omission of *kezayis* language to רבי אלעזר’s view about *hakravas chutz*.
- Today's *daf* is learned as a *zechus refuah sheleimah* for יצחק בן שפרה מרים, חוה מרים בת פלקא פריידא, and שלמה בן חיה לאה. Today's *daf* is also learned as a *zechus* for שרה בת סילביא that she find a זיווג הגון בקרוב. The learning continues through the first *perek* of Menachos with *sugyos* in *kodshim* that have close equivalents in Zevachim, and today’s material is presented as one of Zevachim’s larger *sugyos* appearing here in Menachos.
- Pigul in Zevachim arises when a *kohen* performs one of the critical *avodos*—*shechitah*, *kabbalah*, *holachah*, or *zerikah*—with intent regarding eating, burning, or related actions *chutz lizmano* or *chutz limkomo*. Both *chutz lizmano* and *chutz limkomo* render the offering *pasul* as *machshavah haposeles*, but only *chutz lizmano* creates *pigul* such that one who eats a *kezayis* is *chayav kares*, while *chutz limkomo* does not generate that *kares* consequence. The principle that *pigul* with *kares* requires that aside from the *machshavas pigul* everything else be valid is framed as *karav hamatir k’mitzvaso*, and if another *psul* exists then the offering remains *pasul* but does not become *pigul* for *kares*.
- The Mishnah applies the same structure to *menachos*, where *kemitzah* parallels *shechitah* and the four critical *avodos* are *kemitzah*, placing the *kometz* into a *kli shareis*, *holachah*, and *haktarah*. If a *kohen* performs *kemitzah* with intent to eat the *shirayim* *chutz limkomo*, or to burn the *kometz* *chutz limkomo*, whether the whole amount or a *kezayis*, or to burn its *levonah* *chutz limkomo*, the *minchah* is *pasul* and there is no *kares*. If he has the same intent *lemachar*—*chutz lizmano*—the offering is *pigul* and one is *chayav kares* for eating from it. The Mishnah’s *zeh haklal* states that this applies not only at *kemitzah* but also if the invalid intent occurs during placing into the vessel, *holachah*, or *haktarah*, provided the offering is *karav hamatir k’mitzvaso*.
- The Mishnah defines *karav hamatir k’mitzvaso* through examples where the avodos are otherwise done properly and the only defect is *machshavas chutz lizmano*, even if that intent appears in one avodah or multiple avodos, as long as all are *chutz lizmano*. The Mishnah defines *lo karav hamatir k’mitzvaso* when *machshavas chutz limkomo* is mixed with *machshavas chutz lizmano* across the avodos, making the offering *pasul* without creating *pigul* for *kares*. It also defines *lo karav hamatir k’mitzvaso* for מנחת חוטא and מנחת קנאות when one avodah is done *shelo lishmah* and another includes *chutz lizmano*, because the additional *psul* prevents *pigul* with *kares* even though the offering is *pasul*.
- The Mishnah rules that if one intends a *kezayis* *chutz limkomo* and a *kezayis* *lemachar*, or reverses the order, the offering is *pasul* and there is no *kares*. It also rules that if one intends half a *kezayis* *chutz limkomo* and half a *kezayis* *lemachar*, in either order, the offering is *pasul* and there is no *kares*. The presentation explains that combining *chutz lizmano* with another invalid intent undermines *pigul*, and that half-measures do not reach the *shiur* needed for *machshavas chutz lizmano* to generate *pigul*.
- Rabbi Yehuda states that if *machshavas hazman* precedes *machshavas hamakom*, the offering is *pigul* and one is *chayav kares*, but if *machshavas hamakom* precedes *machshavas hazman*, it is *pasul* without *kares*. The Chachamim rule that in both orders it is *pasul* without *kares*. Rabbi Yehuda’s position is explained as treating the later invalid intent as not preventing *pigul* once the *machshavas chutz lizmano* is already effective, while the Chachamim treat any mixture as preventing *pigul* with *kares*.
- A prior dispute is recalled about *shirayim* that became missing between *kemitzah* and *haktarah*, where Reish Lakish holds a *minchah* cannot be deficient throughout that span and the deficiency invalidates it, while Rabbi Yochanan allows one to burn the *kometz* even if *shirayim* were lost after *kemitzah*. The conclusion cited is that even according to Rabbi Yochanan, although one may perform *haktaras hakometz*, those *shirayim* remain forbidden to eat. The *haktarah* is described as a functioning *haktarah* that is nevertheless deficient because it does not permit the *shirayim* for consumption.
- The *bnei yeshiva* ask whether, according to the view that *shirayim* missing between *kemitzah* and *haktarah* still allow *haktaras hakometz* and yet leave the *shirayim* forbidden, that *haktarah* is effective to establish *pigul* and to remove *me’ilah*. The question treats *haktaras hakometz* as wearing multiple “hats,” functioning as *meratzeh*, as *matir*, as establishing *pigul* when all is otherwise proper, and as removing *me’ilah*, and it tests whether a *haktarah* that does not permit eating can still accomplish the other effects. The framing attributes the approach of learning the question to the *Shitah Mekubetzes*, to the Brisker Rav’s reading as the *peshuto shel mikra*, and to the Rambam as aligned with that approach, while noting that Rashi reads the question differently.
- Rav Huna says that even according to Rabbi Akiva who holds *zerikah mo’eles l’yotzei*, the case of deficiency differs because *yotzei* is intact but invalid due to an external factor while deficiency is a *psul* in the offering itself, so the *haktarah* does not establish *pigul* and does not remove *me’ilah*. Rava argues that even according to Rabbi Eliezer who holds *ein zerikah mo’eles l’yotzei*, that limitation applies when the item is not inside, whereas deficiency concerns what remains inside, so *haktarah* is effective to establish *pigul* and to remove *me’ilah*. The positions are stated as extremes, with Rav Huna denying effectiveness even under Rabbi Akiva’s lenient premise and Rava affirming effectiveness even under Rabbi Eliezer’s stringent premise.
- Rava attempts to prove his view from the Mishnah’s inclusion of *kezayis* language and from a *beraisa* of Rabbi Chiya that parallels the Mishnah but omits the phrase “או כזית.” Rava reads the omission as driven by the ambiguity that “*kezayis*” can mean either thinking about a *kezayis* out of a full amount or a scenario where only a *kezayis* remains, and he treats the omission as a stylistic choice to avoid asymmetry between *kemitzah* and the later avodos. Rava infers that the Mishnah’s rule of *pigul* applies even where only a *kezayis* remains after *shirayim* were lost between *kemitzah* and *haktarah*, indicating that such *haktarah* can still establish *pigul*, and he links that to also removing *me’ilah*.
- Abaye rejects Rava’s inference and explains Rabbi Chiya’s omission as a halachic alignment with Rabbi Elazar, who holds regarding *hakravas chutz* that liability requires offering the entirety rather than merely a *kezayis*. Abaye argues that Rabbi Chiya therefore could not teach *kezayis* language for *haktarah* and, for symmetry, also omitted it for *shirayim*. The Gemara raises that if Rabbi Chiya follows Rabbi Elazar, then for a typical *minchah* with both *kometz* and *levonah* one would need to include both, and it answers that the *beraisa* can be about the *kometz* of *minchas chotei* which lacks *levonah*, with Rav Dimi reporting in the name of Rabbi Elazar that this is indeed the case and that Rabbi Chiya’s teaching follows Rabbi Elazar.
- A *beraisa* in Zevachim 28b derives *karav hamatir k’mitzvaso* from “לא ירצה,” teaching “כהרצאת כשר כן הרצאת פסול” and requiring that all *matirim* be offered for *pigul* to take effect. The same *beraisa* derives from “לא יחשב” that one may not mix other invalid thoughts, yielding the concept of מחשבות שמוציאות זו את זו, where an additional disqualifying thought prevents *pigul* with *kares*. The Brisker Rav is cited as questioning why “לא יחשב” is needed once “לא ירצה” already demands full valid *hatzah’ah* aside from the *machshavas pigul*, and two approaches are reported to distinguish the derashos, including a model where later thoughts might be deemed not operative as *machshavah haposeles* because they occur in a context no longer “ראוי לעבודה,” and a model distinguishing the role of *machshavas chutz limkomo* as a separate thought requiring “לא יחשב” to exclude it from being treated like additional *chutz lizmano*.
- The Vilna Gaon’s explanation on the Mishnah in Zevachim is presented as tying Rabbi Yehuda’s rule about which thought comes first to Rabbi Yehuda’s use of “לא יחשב” for the warning that yields *malkos* for מחשב בקדשים, based on the Gemara on 29b that attributes lashes for this *lav she’ein bo ma’aseh* to Rabbi Yehuda’s view. The Brisker framing explains Rabbi Yehuda as retaining “לא ירצה” for *karav hamatir* while not using “לא יחשב” for the *machshavos* rule because it is “taken” for the *malkos* derivation, which matches Rabbi Yehuda’s distinction between when *machshavas hazman* comes first and when another thought precedes it. The presentation concludes by relating this to earlier observations about Rashi in Menachos 2b not invoking “לא יחשב” in the context of *shelo lishmah*, while noting alternative understandings such as the Or Sameach’s reading in the Rambam and the Chasam Sofer’s approach, and suggesting that the Gaon’s model supplies an additional framework for why “לא יחשב” may not be invoked in that setting.
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