Menachos 16
Summary
- Today's *daf* is Menachos 16, starting from the *Mishnah* on the top of 16a, and it presents the core dispute between Rabbi Meir and the *Chachamim* about whether a *machshavas pigul* said during only half of a permitting process creates full *pigul* with *kares*. Rabbi Meir holds *mefaglin b’chatzi matir* and therefore a partial *pigul* intent during one component of the *matir* makes the offering *pigul* with *kares*, while the *Chachamim* hold that there is no *kares* until the *kohen* is *mefagel* in the entire *matir*, even though the *korban* becomes *pasul*. The *Gemara* brings a long parallel *sugya* from Zevachim about Rav and Shmuel’s framing of the dispute, tests it from *beraisos*, and arrives at unresolved difficulty in fitting Rav’s principle of שכל העושה על דעת ראשונה הוא עושה into the language of the sources. The *daf* then develops a further dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish about whether *holacha* in *menachos* is treated like *kemitzah* or like *haktarah*, and it introduces the conceptual rule that only actions that function as a *matir* (or as a *mekadesh* treated like a *matir*) generate the special weakness of “half a *matir*.”
- A *kohen* who has a *machshavas pigul* during *haktaras ha’kometz* but not during *haktaras ha’levonah*, or during *haktaras ha’levonah* but not during *haktaras ha’kometz*, acts with *pigul* intent in only a *chatzi matir* because the *kometz* and *levonah* together permit the *shiyarei ha’minchah*. Rabbi Meir says the *minchah* becomes *pigul* and one who eats from it is *chayav kares* because Rabbi Meir holds *mefaglin b’chatzi matir*. The *Chachamim* say there is no *kares* until the *kohen* is *mefagel* in the entire *matir*, so partial *pigul* intent creates a disqualifying effect without *kares*. The *Mishnah* adds that the *Chachamim* agree with Rabbi Meir in *minchas chotei* and *minchas k’naos*, because those *menachos* have no *levonah* and the *kometz* alone is the full *matir*, so *pigel ba’kometz* yields *pigul* with *kares*.
- A *kohen* who slaughters one of the two *kivsei atzeres* with intent to eat two loaves tomorrow, or who burns one of the two *bezichei levonah* with intent to eat two *sedarim* tomorrow, creates a classic case of *pigul* in a *chatzi matir*. Rabbi Meir rules *pigul* with *kares* even though only one component of the *matir* was done with *pigul* intent, while the *Chachamim* deny *kares* unless the entire *matir* is *mefugel*. When one of the *kivsei atzeres* is slaughtered with intent to eat its own meat tomorrow, the law is that it is *pigul* and the other lamb is *kasher* because each lamb’s own permissibility depends on its own *avodas hadam*, not on the pair as a joint *matir* for the loaves. When one is slaughtered with intent to eat from the other lamb tomorrow, both are *kesheirim* because the *pigul* thought is directed at a different *korban*.
- Rav says the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the *Chachamim* applies when the *kometz* is offered silently and the *levonah* is offered with *pigul* intent, but if the *kometz* is offered with *pigul* intent and the *levonah* is offered silently then everyone agrees it is *pigul* because שכל העושה על דעת ראשונה הוא עושה. Shmuel says the dispute applies even when the first act is done with *pigul* intent and the second is done silently, rejecting the extension of the first thought into the later act. Rav Acha bar Rav Huna challenges Rava from a *beraisa* that explicitly presents both orders, including נתן את הקומץ במחשבה ואת הלבונה בשתיקה, and still records the *Chachamim* saying there is no *kares* until one *mefagel* in the entire *matir*. The *Gemara* attempts to revise the *beraisa*, is challenged for collapsing it into a single case and for contradicting wording like הא תניא אחר כך, and Rav Chanina answers with an *ukimta* of בבי כהני where two *kohanim* performed the two offerings so Rav’s principle of “doing on the first intent” does not apply across different actors.
- A *beraisa* distinguishes outer-altar blood applications, where one essential *zerikah* suffices for *pigul*, from inner-altar sequences such as the מ״ג של יום הכיפורים, or the eleven applications of *par kohen mashiach* and *par he’elem davar shel tzibbur*. Rabbi Meir rules that *pigul* intent during the first, second, or third stage creates *pigul* with *kares*, while the *Chachamim* require *pigul* in the entire *matir* for *kares*. The *Gemara* challenges Rav from the phrase פיגול בין בראשונה, בין בשניה, ובין בשלישית because a first-stage *pigul* should, under Rav’s principle, carry forward, and the *Gemara* struggles to explain it as multiple *kohanim* since the *kohanim gedolim* scenario depends on the dispute in Yoma about whether a replacement continues or restarts. Rava proposes rereading the *beraisa* as a case where *pigul* occurs in more than one stage in a way that shows the actor is not relying on “first intent,” and Rav Ashi rejects inserting new words like שתק. Rav Ashi proposes a different trimming of the wording, the *Gemara* objects that the text still does not fit, and it concludes קשיא.
- The *Gemara* asks how Rabbi Meir can impose *kares* for *pigul* in a partial stage when *kares* is not incurred until all the *matirin* are offered, derived from ירצה and כהרצאת כשר כך הרצאת פסול, requiring completion of all permitting elements. The challenge is that once *pigul* intent occurs in the inner sanctum, the blood becomes *pasul*, and subsequent sprinklings appear to be מיא בעלמא rather than valid blood service. Rava answers that the case can be found with ארבעה פרים וארבעה שעירים so each stage uses new blood, and Rava also says even with one bull and one goat דפגולא מירצי, treating the service as valid for the goal of establishing *pigul* even though it is invalid for other purposes. The text notes that Rashi raises the broader problem that this would seemingly apply to every *pigul*, and it reports the *derech* attributed to Rav Chaim Brisker that the unique difficulty here is sprinkling in the *heichal* and *lifnei v’lifnim* where there is no “koltei mizbe’ach” dynamic, unlike applications on an altar.
- The *Gemara* reconciles 43 versus 47 by attributing the counts to the dispute about whether the bloods are mixed for the corner applications, הא כמאן דאמר מערבין בקרנות והא כמאן דאמר אין מערבין. The *Gemara* reconciles 47 versus 48 by attributing the extra count to whether שירים מעכבין, so שפיכת שירים is treated as an essential act that adds to the count, הא כמאן דאמר שירים מעכבין והא כמאן דאמר שירים לא מעכבין.
- The *Gemara* asks whether *pigul* intent during *holachas ha’kometz* has the status of *pigul*, and it frames the question primarily within the *Chachamim* who deny *kares* for *pigul* in a *chatzi matir*. Rabbi Yochanan rules הולכה כקמיצה, treating *holacha* like *kemitzah* such that it is not governed by “half a *matir*” in this context, while Reish Lakish rules הולכה כהקטרה because there is also a *holacha* of *levonah* just as there is a parallel *haktarah*, making each *holacha* a half-unit. Rava explains Rabbi Yochanan with the principle that כל עבודה שאינה מתרת עבודה חשובה היא לפגול בפני עצמה, so the limitation of “half a *matir*” applies only to an act that itself functions as a *matir*, whereas an act that is not a *matir* does not lose its standing as an *avodah* when it is only “half.” Abaye challenges from slaughtering one of the *kivsei atzeres*, which the *Mishnah* treats under the same Rabbi Meir/*Chachamim* dispute even though slaughter is not the *matir*, and Rava answers that שחיטת כבשים מקדשי ליה and והבא לקדש כבא להתיר דמי so an act of *kedushah*-creation is treated like a *matir* for this rule.
- Rav Simi bar Ashi challenges from the *beraisa* about the *korban Pesach* thought regarding *arelim* and *mulim*, where Acherim rule הקדים מולים לערלים כשר and הקדים ערלים למולים פסול, and the text states that the dispute is understood as the same “half a *matir*” dispute. The challenge is that *shechitah* there is neither a *matir* nor obviously a *mekadesh* in the earlier sense, yet the framework of half-unit disqualification still appears. The *Gemara* answers with מי סברת דם בצוואר בהמה קדוש and explains that *shechitah* is what *mekadesh* the blood, so the same rule of הבא לקדש כבא להתיר דמי applies broadly.
- The *Gemara* tries to prove Rabbi Yochanan from the *beraisa* that lists *kemitzah*, *matan kli*, and *hiluch* as settings for the dispute, reading *hiluch* as the *holacha* toward *haktarah*. The *Gemara* rejects this by reading *hiluch* as the movement associated with *matan kli*, since the *levonah* lacks a parallel second-vessel placement, and it allows rearranging the order of terms. The *Gemara* then objects that the *beraisa*’s phrasing about “coming to *haktarah*” and later “נתן את הקומץ בשתיקה” still does not align cleanly with this reading, and it concludes קשיא.
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