Menachos 19
Summary
- The text moves from the earlier *pigul* sugiyot to the Mishnah at the end of Menachos 18a that lists multiple *minchah*-related *mitzvos* whose omission still leaves the *minchah* *kesheirah*, and it focuses on clarifying why “*lo yatzak*” can be *kasher* despite *yetzikah* appearing to be *me’akev*. It sets the Mishnah against Rabbi Shimon’s view that *yetzikah* is an *avodah* requiring a *kohen*, develops the competing *derashos* from the *pesukim*, and then broadens into the classic question of why *shechitah* is *kesheirah b’zar* and whether it must be done by the *ba’alim*. It then turns to rules of *le’akev* based on “*Torah*” and “*chukah*,” the special status of *minchah* where “*chukah*” is written by *achilah*, and the dispute of Rav and Shmuel about when repetition in *parshas minchah* creates *ikkuf*. It closes with the *din* of *hagashah* and its place on the *mizbe’ach*, and adds longer *aggadic* and conceptual notes from the Chasam Sofer, Torah Temimah, and Rav Tzadok about *ani v’lo shaliach*, *shechitah lo avodah hi*, and the differing spiritual posture of the *midbar* versus *Eretz Yisrael*.
- The Mishnah states that a *minchah* remains *kesheirah* even if one did not pour oil, did not mix, did not break into pieces, did not salt, did not wave, did not perform *hagashah*, or if one broke it into too many pieces, or did not anoint it. The Gemara explains that “*lo yatzak*” cannot mean that *yetzikah* was not done at all, because the Torah repeats *yetzikah* in a way that makes it *me’akev*. The Mishnah means that a *zar* performed the *yetzikah* rather than a *kohen*, and the *minchah* is still *kasher*, like *shechitah* which is *me’akev* yet *kesheirah b’zar*. The conclusion frames this as the Mishnah holding that *yetzikah lav avodah hi* and therefore is *kesheirah b’zar* even though it is a required component.
- The Gemara says the Mishnah does not follow Rabbi Shimon because a *beraisa* attributes to Rabbi Shimon a list of fifteen *avodos* connected to a verse about a *kohen* receiving the *shok hayamin*, and the first of those fifteen is *yetzikah*, showing he treats *yetzikah* as *avodah*. The Rabbanan derive that *yetzikah* (and *belilah*) is *kesheirah b’zar* from the verse sequence that places “*bnei Aharon hakohanim*” starting at *kemitzah*, reading it as “*mi’kemitzah v’ailach mitzvas kehunah*.” Rabbi Shimon initially is presented as reading “*mikra nidrash lefanav u’le’acharav*,” extending “*bnei Aharon hakohanim*” backward to require a *kohen* already for *yetzikah*. The Gemara challenges this from a *beraisa* about *chatas* that contrasts the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Shimon on whether “*etzba*” can be applied backward to *kabbalah*, and Abaye defines Rabbi Shimon there as not accepting “*mikra nidrash lefanav u’le’acharav*.” The Gemara therefore re-grounds Rabbi Shimon’s requirement of *kohen* for *yetzikah* in the “*v*” of “*vehavi*,” treating it as “*v mosif al inyan rishon*” that links the earlier actions to the later *kohen*-requirements.
- The Gemara challenges Rabbi Shimon’s use of “*v mosif al inyan rishon*” from the verse “*veshachat… vehikrivu bnei Aharon…*,” because the standard *limud* that *shechitah kesheirah b’zar* comes from “*mi’kabbalah v’ailach mitzvas kehunah*,” and extending the “*v*” backward would make *shechitah* require a *kohen*. The Gemara answers that Rabbi Shimon does not rely on that source for *shechitah*, and instead learns *shechitah kesheirah b’zar* from “*vesamach veshachat*,” making *shechitah* analogous to *semichah* which is *kesheirah b’zar*. The Gemara then asks whether that analogy should also require *shechitah* to be done by the *ba’alim* since *semichah* is a *din ba’alim*. The Gemara rejects this with a *kal vachomer* from *zerikah* not requiring *ba’alim*, and it addresses the pushback of “*ein danin efshar mi’she’i efshar*” by citing the verse of Yom Kippur, “*veshachat es par hachatas asher lo*,” as a *giluy* that ordinary *shechitah* does not require *ba’alim*.
- The Chasam Sofer in *Yoreh De’ah* siman רצג frames his point as *divrei aggadah* that are *mechuvanim la’halachah*, and he states that although *shechitas kodashim* is *kesheirah b’zar*, most of the time the *kohanim* performed *shechitah* rather than *Yisraelim*. He asserts that *bechor behemah* was a case where the *ba’alim* themselves typically performed *shechitah*, even not through a *shaliach* and even not through a *kohen*. He ties this practice to *makas bechoros* and the verse that portrays the offering as a response to Hashem’s act, emphasizing “*ani v’lo shaliach*,” and reads “*al kein ani zove’ach*” as the owner saying, “I do it myself.” He extends the *midas keneged midah* idea to the practice that *pidyon haben* is not done through a *shaliach*.
- The text cites Bava Metzia 86b in the name of the school of Rabbi Yishmael that the reward to Avraham’s descendants reflects whether Avraham acted personally or through a *shaliach*. It states that what Avraham did *b’atzmo* is repaid by Hashem *b’atzmo*, and what Avraham did through a *shaliach* is repaid through a *shaliach*. It applies that to the Chasam Sofer’s model as a “reverse” response, where *Klal Yisrael* similarly choose to act *ani v’lo shaliach* in response to Hashem’s *ani v’lo shaliach* at *makas bechoros*. The narrative underscores that the phrase *shechitah kesheirah b’zar* is a loaded axis in *Kodshim* that keeps resurfacing across Shas.
- Rav states that wherever the Torah says “*Torah*” and “*chukah*,” it is *le’akev*. The Gemara tests this against *nazir*, *todah*, and *metzora* where “*Torah*” appears and the Mishnah teaches *me’akev* requirements, and it offers local explanations such as “*ken ya’aseh*” and “*tihyeh*” functioning like *chukah*, and *todah* being linked to *nazir* through “*shelamav*.” The Gemara then challenges from Yom Kippur where “*chukah*” appears and *me’akev* rules apply even without “*Torah*,” and it reframes the principle as “*o Torah o chukah*.” It then challenges from the general verse “*zos haTorah la’olah…*” where many details are not *me’akev* despite “*Torah*,” and it concludes that “*chukah*” is decisive for *ikkuf* while “*Torah*” alone is not, interpreting Rav’s formulation as meaning that even if “*Torah*” is written, only the presence of “*chukah*” makes it *le’akev*.
- The Gemara challenges from *minchah* where “*chukah*” is written, yet Rav elsewhere says that only what the Torah repeats in the *toras minchah* is *le’akev* and otherwise it is not. The Gemara answers that *chukah* in *minchah* is written regarding the *achilas shirayim*, which is not *me’akev*, so it cannot serve as a blanket signal of *ikkuf* for the *avodah*. The Gemara then challenges from *lechem hapanim* where “*chok olam*” is written by *achilah* yet multiple structural elements are *me’akev*, and it establishes the principle that when *achilah* is written in that context it speaks to the whole parashah. The Gemara still distinguishes *minchah* through the *giluy* of “*migirshah u’mishmanah*,” which teaches that the measures of flour and oil are *me’akev* and thereby reveals that “*chukah*” in the *minchah* parashah does not automatically render all details *me’akev*. Rav maintains that repetition in *toras minchah* makes a detail *me’akev*, while Shmuel says *girish* and *shemen* are *me’akev* and nothing else is.
- The Gemara presses Shmuel on whether repetition in the verses can ever create *ikkuf* for *minchah*, and it frames the dispute around “*melo kumtzo*” and “*b’kumtzo*,” which yield the rule that the *kohen* may not use a fixed measuring device for *kemitzah*. Rav treats this as *me’akev* because the Torah repeats the idea with “*vaymaleh kapo*,” while Shmuel rejects learning *ikkuf* from that support because it is *kedoshei sha’ah* and “*doros mi’sha’ah lo yilfinan*.” The Gemara then challenges Shmuel from his own teaching that *mizrakos* can sanctify dry substances, based on the verse about the *nesi’im* bringing a *mizrak* “*mele’im solet belulah bashamen l’minchah*,” which is also *kedoshei sha’ah*. The Gemara answers that the Torah repeats that context twelve times, creating an exceptional strength of *giluy* that allows derivation.
- Rav Kahana and Rav Asi challenge Rav from *hagashah*, which appears in two verses but is not *me’akev* as the Mishnah indicates. The Gemara answers that the repetition is not superfluous because it establishes the *kvi’us makom* for *hagashah*. A *beraisa* derives from “*lifnei Hashem*” and “*el penei hamizbe’ach*” that the placement is at the southwestern corner, “*keren dromis ma’aravis*,” “*k’neged chudah shel keren*.” Rabbi Eliezer argues for a placement that fulfills both verses by performing it on the southern side, and Rav Ashi explains that Rabbi Eliezer assumes the entire *mizbe’ach* stands in the north so the southern side still qualifies as “*lifnei Hashem*.”
- A Midrash Rabbah in Acharei Mos portrays the *midbar* practice that if people wanted meat they brought offerings, “*v’hakohen shocheit u’mekabel*,” and it states “*ein hakol holech ela achar hashocheit*” regarding whose thoughts matter. The text raises the difficulty that *shechitah* is *kesheirah b’zar*, and it cites Torah Temimah who answers using a Tosafos attribution to the Ri of Orléans that *shechitah* is not an *avodah* because it exists for *chullin* as well and is not unique to *kodshim*, unlike *kabbalah*, *holachah*, and *zerikah*. Torah Temimah then applies Rabbi Akiva’s view that in the *midbar* people ate *basar nechirah* without *shechitah*, concluding that in the *midbar* *shechitah* would have been unique to *kodshim* and therefore function as *avodah* requiring a *kohen*, whereas in the *Beis HaMikdash* era when *shechitas chullin* exists, *shechitah* becomes *lav avodah* and is *kesheirah b’zar*. The text then frames this as a shift in the Jew’s ability to participate directly in his own *korban* upon entering *Eretz Yisrael*. It connects this to Rav Tzadok HaKohen in *Tzidkas HaTzaddik* אות רמז about Moshe’s inability to “see” Hashem versus “*yera’eh kol zechurecha*” in *Eretz Yisrael*, and to the distinction between *lashon nistar* in the first *berachah* of *bentshing* and *lashon nochach* in the second, presenting *Eretz Yisrael* as enabling a more direct “*atah*” relationship that parallels the halachic opening for a *zar* to play a real role in the *hava’ah* of his *korban*.
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