Menachos 26
Summary
- A Mishnah in Menachos 26a rules that if the *sheyarei ha-minchah* become *tamei*, are burned, or are lost while the kohen is bringing the *kometz* to the *mizbe’ach*, Rabbi Eliezer validates the *minchah* and Rabbi Yehoshua invalidates it, and the Gemara aligns this with Rabbi Yehoshua’s broader view that a *matir* must also permit something. Rav explains that even within Rabbi Yehoshua, the offering remains valid when some significant remnant still exists, and a *beraisa* about *zevachim* establishes that a *kezayis* of meat or *cheilev* suffices for *zerikas ha-dam* while a mere accompanying *minchas nesachim* does not. The sugya then shifts to whether the *kometz* must be placed into a *kli shareis*, presenting competing readings of Rabbi Shimon and a sequence of *beraisos* that overturn Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak’s claim that Rabbi Shimon still requires that second sanctification. The daf continues with disputes about splitting the *haktaras ha-kometz*, when the *kometz* permits the remainder for eating, and several later analytical notes, including a Rambam contradiction and Brisker explanations about *piggul* and the structure of multiple applications.
- A Mishnah states that when the *sheyarei ha-minchah* become *tamei*, are burned, or are lost, Rabbi Eliezer deems the *minchah* valid and Rabbi Yehoshua deems it invalid. Rav says Rabbi Yehoshua invalidates only when all the *sheyarim* became *tamei*, but if only part became *tamei* the *minchah* is valid. The Gemara challenges why Rav distinguished only *tum’ah* rather than loss or burning, and answers that Rav meant the same distinction for all three cases and simply cited the Mishnah’s first case.
- A *beraisa* states in Rabbi Yehoshua’s name that for all offerings, if a *kezayis* of meat or a *kezayis* of *cheilev* remains, one performs *zerikas ha-dam*, but if only half-measures remain they do not combine, and one does not perform *zerikah*. A separate rule says that for an *olah*, even half a *kezayis* of meat and half a *kezayis* of *cheilev* suffice because it is entirely burned. The *beraisa* adds that if only a *minchah* remains, even if it is fully intact, one does not perform *zerikah*, and the Gemara explains this refers to *minchas nesachim* accompanying the sacrifice and not to an independent *minchah*. The inference is that Rabbi Yehoshua requires the *matir* to permit something of the offering itself, and a mere accompaniment does not satisfy that role.
- A teaching attributed to Rabbi Yochanan in the name of Rabbi Yishmael and brought also in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Chananyah derives from the juxtaposition of *zerikah* and “*vehiktir ha-cheilev*” that *cheilev* suffices even when no edible meat remains. The Gemara derives from “*rei’ach nicho’ach*” that anything brought for “*rei’ach nicho’ach*,” including the *yoseret* and the *shtei ha-kelayos*, also counts for Rabbi Yehoshua’s requirement. The Gemara says both verses are needed, because “*cheilev*” alone would exclude other *eimurim*, while “*rei’ach nicho’ach*” alone would wrongly include the *minchas nesachim*.
- The text presents Rabbi Yehoshua as holding that the *zerikah* of blood or the *haktaras ha-kometz* can effect atonement only when it also functions as a *matir* that permits something formerly prohibited. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the primary role is *ritzuy* and that atonement does not depend on simultaneously permitting consumption or burning. This framework is applied to *zevachim*, where *zerikah* permits meat for eating and *eimurim* for the altar, and to *minachos*, where *haktaras ha-kometz* permits the *sheyarim* for eating.
- The Rambam is stated to rule like Rabbi Yehoshua as the general halachic outcome in disputes with Rabbi Eliezer. The text cites a contradiction in the Rambam between *Hilchos Pesulei ha-Mukdashin* 1:31, where performing *zerikah* without a sufficient remnant yields “*lo hurtzah*,” and 11:20, where in a parallel *minchah* case of total loss or defilement of *sheyarim* he writes that if the kohen nevertheless burned the *kometz*, “*hurtzah*.” The explanation attributed to Rav Chaim Brisker says *haktaras ha-kometz* in a *minchah* corresponds both to *zerikas ha-dam* and to *haktaras eimurim* in a sacrifice, so the *kometz* itself ensures there is always some “flesh” equivalent present, making Rabbi Yehoshua’s requirement operate only *lechatchilah* while allowing *bedi’eved* acceptance.
- A Mishnah states that if the *kometz* is not handled in a *kli shareis* it is invalid, and Rabbi Shimon validates it. Rav Yehudah the son of Rav Chiyah explains Rabbi Shimon from “*kodesh kodashim hi ka-chatat ve-cha-asham*,” reading it to allow performing the service by hand like a *chatat* and therefore requiring the right hand. Rav Yannai the son of Rav Yannai agrees that one may proceed without the second *kli shareis* once the *kemitzah* was taken from a *kli shareis*, but he allows even left-handed performance and even unusual means. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak says everyone agrees the *kometz* requires sanctification in a second *kli shareis*, and Rabbi Shimon only permits removing it from the vessel for placement on the altar.
- A *beraisa* equates placing *kometz*, *ketores*, and *levonah* on the altar with *cheilev* and limbs, stating validity whether done by hand or vessel and with right or left, and Rav Yehudah answers that it is read *l’tzadadin* so that by hand it is right-handed while by vessel it may be either. Another *beraisa* states that if the *kometz* was not sanctified in a *kli shareis* it is invalid, yet Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon validate, and the Gemara re-reads the clause “*mimitan kli*” to mean from the stage of being placed into a vessel and onward. A further *beraisa* explicitly says the Sages require *kometz* taken, sanctified, and offered in a *kli shareis*, while Rabbi Shimon says once it was taken from a *kli shareis* it may be offered without a vessel, and the Gemara again emends the wording to include sanctification. A decisive *beraisa* about moving the *kometz* from the right hand to the left, Rabbi Elazar b’Rabbi Shimon’s view of restoring it, and the Sages’ view that it becomes like spilled blood because it requires vessel sanctification ends with “*tiyufta d’Rav Nachman tiyufta*,” and the text presents this as a conclusive refutation of Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak’s approach.
- The Mishnah validates burning the *kometz* in two separate times. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says it may be done twice but not three times, while Rabbi Yochanan permits even more divisions. Rabbi Zeira explains that the dispute depends on whether there can be a *kometz* smaller than two olives and whether an act of *haktarah* smaller than a *kezayis* counts as *haktarah*.
- A dispute asks from what moment the *kometz* permits the remaining *minchah* for eating. Rabbi Chanina says it is from when the fire first takes hold of the *kometz*, while Rabbi Yochanan says it is only when the fire consumes most of it. Rabbi Yehudah explains Rabbi Yochanan from “*kitor ha-kivshan*,” asserting an oven produces smoke only when the fire has substantially taken effect. A *beraisa* about items offered by day and their remaining on the altar all night is resolved by distinguishing between the stage of “*klitah*” on the altar and the stage of “*lehatir*,” and an additional difficulty about *ketores* that “fell off” is handled by removing *ketores* from that *beraisa*.
- The text applies the Mishnah’s allowance of two burnings to the question of whether *piggul* can be created through intent during only half of a divided *kometz*, citing a tradition that even Rabbi Meir’s “*mefaglin b’chatzi matir*” still requires intent across the full *kometz*. Tosafos is quoted as inferring that one sprinkling within an inner set resembles a “half-*kometz*,” while another Tosafos indicates that under Beis Shammai one of two required outer applications can generate *piggul* per Rabbi Meir. The Brisker Rav’s resolution distinguishes requirements that arise from the korban’s need for multiple complete acts from requirements where multiple applications jointly constitute a single complete *ma’aseh*, and he ties “*v’kach hayah moneh*” to a *din minyan* that makes the inner applications a unit. The analysis also presents a difficult passage in Zevachim about why an *ikkur* might be assumed for *matan sheva* and answers it through the same unitary structure of counted applications.
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