Menachos 38
Summary
- The text follows the Gemara in *Menachos* סביב דף ל״ח, building from the earlier Mishnah on דף כ״ח about items that are *meakev zeh es zeh*, and it applies that framework to *tzitzis* through the dispute between the תנא קמא, who treats four corner-*tzitzis* as one mitzvah that are mutually indispensable, and רבי ישמעאל, who treats each corner as an independent mitzvah. It then traces the Gemara’s practical *nafka minas* for that dispute, rules that the halacha does not follow רבי ישמעאל despite שמואל’s reported ruling, and develops related laws about altering corners and about Shabbos liability when wearing a garment lacking proper *tzitzis*, including the limit of *kavod habriyos* to a *lav* of *lo sasur* and cases involving *karmelis*. It begins פרק התכלת with the Mishnah that *techeiles* and *lavan* do not impede each other and similarly that *tefillin shel yad* and *shel rosh* do not impede each other, reconciles that Mishnah with רבי’s view that *techeiles* and *lavan* are mutually indispensable by interpreting the Mishnah as addressing order or *geradumin*, and then explores minimum remnants (*kedei le’anvo*) and related uncertainties. The text closes by linking *tzitzis*, *mezuzah*, and *tefillin* as “reminders” that protect from sin through Rambam passages, and it adds a discussion of *lo sasur* in Rambam versus Ramban, Tosafos’s *Taryag* question and the Netziv’s answer via the four *tzitzis* as four mitzvos, and a note about the source of Rambam’s statement about Rav via *asarah milei d’chasidusa*.
- A Mishnah states that ארבע ציציות מעכבין זו את זו because שארבעתן מצוה אחת, and it equates this to the way the ד׳ פרשיות of *tefillin* impede each other. Rabbi Yishmael argues that ארבעתן ארבע מצוות, so each corner is a separate mitzvah and does not impede the others.
- Rav Yosef says the practical difference is סדין בציצית when the garment is linen and the *tzitzis* strings are wool, creating a שעטנז issue that is permitted only because עשה דציצית דוחה לא תעשה of שעטנז. The case turns on whether a linen garment with only three corners fringed has enough mitzvah-force to override שעטנז, which depends on whether the mitzvah is one unit requiring all four or whether each corner is its own mitzvah. Rashi is cited that רוב טליתות של פשתן הן, making this a common real-life scenario rather than a theoretical one.
- Rava bar Achina says the difference is a garment with five corners and whether it is חייב in *tzitzis*. Rashi explains that if four corners constitute one mitzvah then a fifth resembles adding a fifth parashah to *tefillin* or a fifth species to the ארבע מינים and raises בל תוסיף, while if each corner is an independent mitzvah then adding another corner does not create בל תוסיף and may even generate another obligation.
- Ravina says the difference is Rav Huna’s rule that one who goes out on Shabbos wearing a טלית שאינה מצוייצת כהלכתה is חייב חטאת for prohibited carrying. The application depends on whether three corners with *tzitzis* constitute fulfillment of some mitzvos (and the strings are not merely “loads”) or whether lacking the fourth corner voids the mitzvah entirely and makes the strings an unlawful burden.
- Rav Shesh brei d’Rav Idi says that one who cuts a corner to split it into two, creating five corners, לא עבד ולא כלום because the garment remains obligated, and he holds a טלית בעלת חמש is חייב בציצית. Rav Mesharshia says that folding and tying a corner also לא עבד ולא כלום because it is easily undone and therefore כמאן דשרי דמי, so the corner is still treated as present and obligated. A Mishnah in *Kelim* פרק כ״ו is brought as precedent that makeshift tying does not restore כלי-status for tumah because it is easy to untie, paralleling the corner case. Rav Dimi miNeharda’a extends this to sewing over the corner, stating it is still לא עבד ולא כלום because the effort indicates the person wants the corner rather than eliminating it, so the כנף remains.
- Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the halacha follows Rabbi Yishmael, but the Gemara immediately concludes ולא סלקא כוותיה, so the halacha is not like Rabbi Yishmael and the four *tzitzis* are treated as one mitzvah. The earlier *nafka minas* are framed as the practical implications of that final ruling.
- A story describes Ravina following Mar bar Rav Ashi on a Shabbos of ריגלא when a corner-string tore, leaving the garment with only three, and Ravina either delays telling him until they reach home or tells him immediately in an alternate version. Mar bar Rav Ashi invokes גדול כבוד הבריות שדוחה לא תעשה שבתורה, and the Gemara limits this via Rav Papa’s explanation to the *lav* of לא תסור, meaning a Torah *lav* whose content enforces rabbinic authority and therefore functions in the realm of *derabbanan*. One version resolves the case by stating the place is a כרמלית דרבנן, so embarrassment can override the rabbinic-level carrying concern, while a full איסור דאורייתא of Shabbos carrying is not overridden.
- Rambam in הלכות ממרים פרק א is presented as holding that violating an איסור דרבנן also violates the Torah prohibition of לא תסור, and Ramban challenges this from the many sugyos that treat דאורייתא and דרבנן with different rules and leniencies. Minchas Chinuch is cited as expanding the difficulty, including the implication that an איסור דרבנן would be stricter than an עשה דאורייתא because it carries a Torah *lav* component, and the problem of why דרבנן violations do not generate דאורייתא פסלות לעדות if they are truly לא תסור violations. Ramban’s approach is presented as limiting לא תסור to Torah laws derived through י״ג מידות שהתורה נדרשת בהם rather than ordinary rabbinic enactments, and this is contrasted with other sources and considerations about what is more severe, what is explicit in Torah versus what is derived.
- Tosafos in *Sotah* דף ג ע״א is cited as asking how רבי עקיבא and רבי ישמעאל can dispute whether certain verses impose חובה/מצוה or merely רשות if there is a fixed count of תריג מצוות, because the arithmetic seems to produce 616 or 610. Tosafos answers that other verses must balance the count, where Rabbi Yishmael derives mitzvos and Rabbi Akiva treats them as *asmachta*, so the total remains 613. The Netziv offers a “hefel’dike” reconciliation by pointing to the dispute in *Menachos* about *tzitzis*, where Rabbi Yishmael counts four separate mitzvos in *tzitzis* while the Chachamim count one, yielding a net difference of three mitzvos that offsets the three places where Rabbi Yishmael reads רשות and Rabbi Akiva reads חובה.
- Ramban in שורש ראשון of *Sefer HaMitzvos* is presented as questioning whether the number 613 is a binding tradition or a דרשה, since the Gemara in *Makkos* derives 613 via תורה בגימטריא 611 plus *Anokhi* and *Lo yihyeh lecha* מפי הגבורה. Ramban notes a מדרש that suggests more than two commandments were heard directly, which would alter the arithmetic if the count were purely derived, and he concludes that if there is a מסורה then the number is fixed but if not then the “613” framework may not bind every תנא’s derivations. The text then pushes back that the conceptual structure of רמ״ח איברים and שס״ה גידים, and the Zohar’s portrayal of רב שמלאי as an *asia* who knew אסוותא דנפשא, reflects an inner linkage between the count of mitzvos and the human body and soul.
- The new Mishnah states התכלת אינה מעכבת את הלבן והלבן אינו מעכב את התכלת, and it also states תפילה של יד אינה מעכבת של ראש ושל ראש אינה מעכבת של יד. The text explains that historically each corner had both *lavan* and *techeiles*, with Rashi cited that two of the base four strings per corner were *techeiles* and after folding this yields four *techeiles* and four *lavan*, though other Rishonim dispute that distribution.
- A baraisa is cited where רבי derives from וראיתם אותו that *techeiles* and *lavan* are mutually indispensable, while Chachamim say they are not. רבי’s reasoning is built from הכנף appearing redundantly, yielding the rule הכנף מין כנף for *lavan*, together with the explicit פתיל תכלת, and then reading וראיתם אותו as requiring “אותו” with both components together. Chachamim accept the derivation of both components but interpret וראיתם אותו as allowing each component independently to fulfill the seeing-and-remembering function.
- Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav says the Mishnah can follow רבי by interpreting “not *meakev*” as referring to the order of insertion when making the *tzitzis*. A baraisa states מצוה להקדים לבן לתכלת and that if one reversed the order יצא אלא שחיסר מצוה, which is explained as שחיסר מצוה מן המובחר rather than lacking fulfillment of *lavan* itself, because רבי’s position of mutual indispensability would otherwise collapse the fulfillment. The Gemara then challenges that this only explains one direction, and it introduces the case of טלית שכולה תכלת to explain the reverse phrasing as a parallel order-case.
- A dialogue is cited where Levi asks Shmuel, called אריוך, to explain the Mishnah’s phrase, and Shmuel explains that the preferred order is *lavan* first and then *techeiles* because הכנף מין כנף precedes פתיל תכלת in the verse. Rami bar Chama answers the reverse phrase via טלית שכולה תכלת, where *techeiles* would be the “מין כנף” and the preferred order would invert, yet reversing it would still be acceptable.
- Rava objects that halacha should not hinge on garment color, phrased as מידי צבעא קגרים. Rava reinterprets the Mishnah as dealing with גרדומין, where the hanging parts of the strings are cut below the knot so that only remnants remain, and he states that if *techeiles* remnants remain with *lavan* intact or the reverse, it is acceptable. Rav Chiyya is cited that גרדומי תכלת כשירים, and the Gemara defines the minimum as Rav Hamnuna in the name of Shmuel: כדי לענבו, enough length to tie, while leaving unresolved whether the tying must be with all strings together or each string alone. Rav Ashi asks about thick strings that cannot be tied even though they are substantial, and Rav Acha brei d’Rava answers that such thickness is certainly valid because it makes the mitzvah recognizable.
- The Gemara identifies the view that allows fulfillment with only *lavan* when *techeiles* is absent through a tradition attributed to רבי יצחק בשם רבי נתן בשם רבי יוסי הגלילי בשם רבי יוחנן בן נורי: אין לו תכלת מטיל לבן.
- The text emphasizes the Torah’s framing of *tzitzis* as וראיתם אותו וזכרתם את כל מצוות ה׳ and aligns it with Rambam’s presentation of *mezuzah* in הלכות תפילין ומזוזה וספר תורה פרק ו׳ הלכה י״ג, where entering and leaving prompts remembrance of *Hashem* and awakens a person from הבלי הזמן toward ידיעת צור העולם and דרכי מישרים. Rambam’s description of *tefillin* in פרק ד׳ הלכה כ״ה is brought that קדושת תפילין קדושה גדולה היא and that as long as they are worn a person is עניו וירא and not drawn after שחוק ושיחה בטילה and not led by מחשבות רעות, but rather turns the heart to truth and justice, and Rambam records about Rav תלמיד רבינו הקדוש that he was never seen walking four amos without תורה or without *tzitzis* or without *tefillin*. Rambam is quoted that one who has תפילין בראשו ובזרועו וציצית בבגדו ומזוזה בפתחו is מוחזק לו שלא יחטא because he has many מזכירים that function as מלאכים שמצילין אותו מלחטא, with the verse חונה מלאך ה׳ סביב ליראיו ויחלצם.
- Kesef Mishneh is cited on הלכות דעות פרק ב׳ הלכה ד׳ as not knowing the source for Rambam’s statement that Rav never spoke שיחה בטילה, while a question to מהר״ץ חיות (שו״ת מהר״ץ חיות סימן עא) highlights that Rambam also uses a similar formula about Rav in the *tefillin* context. מהר״ץ חיות attributes Rambam’s source for Rav’s constant *tzitzis* and *tefillin* to a מדרש called עשרה מילי דחסידותא, as brought in סדר הדורות under Rav’s name אבא (אבא אריכא), including the line והיה רגיל בציצית ותפילין, and it notes that the tenth item lists that practice though the “no שיחה בטילה” claim does not appear as one of the ten. The text adds observations about items within those ten, including היה מכוון לבו בתפילה and והיה קולו ערב ועלה לתרגם, and it associates Rav with נוסח מוסף on Rosh Hashanah, מודים דרבנן, and the phrase בזכות תפילת רב in certain traditions.
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