Summary
  • Today's *daf* is Menachos 56, starting five lines from the bottom of 55b, and it continues a digression that tracks how *pesukim* generate the rule that all *menachos* come as *matzah* except *chametz* in *todah* and *shtei halechem*, how the word “אותו” in the *parshah* of *chatas nasi* functions as a limiting term in the laws of *tzafon*, and how the *Mishnah’s* liability for kneading, shaping, and baking *chametz* in a *minchah* leads into a comparison with the prohibition of inflicting a *mum* on *kodashim*, including whether one may inflict a further *mum* on an animal that already has a *mum*.
  • Today's learning is framed by the first *halachah* of the *perek*: כל המנחות באות מצה חוץ מחמץ שבתודה ושתי הלחם, and the rule is derived from two *pesukim*, one stating לא תעשה חמץ and another stating לא תאפה חמץ. The *Gemara* asks why the two verses are not treated as *klal u’prat* to restrict liability to baking alone, given the *Mishnah’s* ruling וחייב על לישתה ועל עריכתה ועל אפייתה. The *Gemara* answers in the name of רב אבטוריקי that *klal u’prat* applies only when *klal* and *prat* are *kerovim zeh lazeh*, but when they are *meruchakim zeh mizeh* a different *middah* applies.
  • The *Gemara* challenges רב אבטוריקי from a *baraisa* about the requirement of *tzafon* for a *chatas*, which is learned from the wording במקום אשר תשחט העלה תשחט החטאת together with the fact that an *olah* is slaughtered in *tzafon*. The *baraisa* explores why the Torah singles out *chatas nasi* in *Parshas Vayikra* after stating a general law of חטאת in *Parshas Tzav*, and the *Gemara* rejects reading this as *klal u’prat*, explaining that the structure is not *klal u’prat* but rather *prat u’klal*. The initial *hava amina* that *tzafon* might apply only to *chatas nasi* is tied to the “magical word” אותו, which suggests the *parshah’s* law might be limited to that specific offering, but the *Gemara* concludes that all *chataos* have *tzafon*.
  • After the conclusion that all *chataos* require *tzafon*, the *Gemara* asks what “אותו” excludes: השתא דנפקא ליה משחוטה זו חטאת, אותו למעוטי מאי. The *Gemara* proposes that it excludes the שעיר נחשון from *tzafon*, identifying it as the special *chatas* brought by נחשון בן עמינדב on יום הקמת המשכן, ראש חודש ניסן, as part of *korbanos sha’ah* brought by the נשיאים. The *Gemara* explains a *hava amina* that since the שעיר נחשון is included for *semichah* it might also be included for *tzafon*, and it brings a *baraisa* where רבי יהודה derives *semichah* for שעיר נחשון from וסמך ידו על ראש השעיר, while רבי שמעון uses the same *ribuy* to include שעירי עבודת כוכבים for *semichah*. רבינא challenges the צורך of “אותו” according to רבי שמעון, and רב זוטרא בריה דרב מרי further challenges the inference even according to רבי יהודה, arguing that a *ribuy* for *semichah* does not automatically create a *hava amina* for *tzafon* and that the need for a *pasuk* for *semichah* itself indicates that קדשי שעה are not learned from קדשי דורות.
  • The *Gemara* then identifies “אותו” as teaching that the animal must be in *tzafon* while the *shochet* need not stand in *tzafon*, formulating it as אותה טעונה צפון ואין השוחט עומד בצפון. A separate teaching attributed to רבי חייא establishes that unlike *shechitah*, *kabbalah* requires the *kohen* to be positioned in *tzafon*, and the text distinguishes that requirement from the permissibility of the *shochet* standing in the south while slaughtering in the north. The *Gemara* clarifies that רבי חייא’s emphasis is אין השוחט בצפון אבל המקבל בצפון, and it notes an alternate derivation for the *mekabel’s* position from וולקח as לא יקח, while stating that וולקח לא משמע ליה לרבי חייא.
  • The *Gemara* considers whether “אותו” excludes *melikah* of a *ben of* from *tzafon* by proposing a *kal vachomer* from *behemah* and then rejecting it by arguing that the comparison fails because *shechitah* uses a כלי while *melikah* does not. The *Gemara* also considers whether “אותו” excludes קרבן פסח from *tzafon* and cites a *baraisa* of רבי אלעזר בן יעקב that builds a *hava amina* from *olah* and then from *chatas* and *asham*, before concluding that the shared factor of קדשי קדשים blocks learning *Pesach* (קדשים קלים) from them. The text records that תוספות ties this section to the question of אם דבר הלמד בהיקש חוזר ומלמד בבנין אב.
  • The *Gemara* returns to the initial conclusion that “אותו” teaches that the animal must be in *tzafon* but the *shochet* need not be, and it resolves the earlier challenge by reinterpreting רבי חייא as focusing on the *mekabel* rather than the *shochet*. The text then resumes the *Mishnah’s* statement וחייב על לישתה ועל עריכתה ועל אפייתה and brings רב פפא’s ruling that one who bakes a *minchah* as *chametz* receives two sets of lashes, אחת על עריכתה ואחת על אפייתה, because baking also finalizes form. The *Gemara* reconciles this with the description of אפייה as מעשה יחידי by distinguishing between a case where someone else did the shaping and the baker is liable for both, and a case where the same person shaped and baked and the baking remains a standalone act for liability purposes.
  • A *baraisa* introduces the case of בכור שאחזו דם, where bloodletting is needed as a form of healing, and it frames the tension with the prohibition of inflicting a *mum* on *kodashim* derived from כל מום לא יהיה בו. רבי מאיר permits bloodletting only in a place that does not create a *mum*, חכמים permit it even where it creates a *mum* but forbid slaughtering on that *mum*, רבי שמעון permits even slaughtering on that *mum*, and רבי יהודה forbids bloodletting even if the animal will die. רבי יוחנן states that all agree in מחמץ אחר מחמץ שהוא חייב and in מסרס אחר מסרס שהוא חייב, but that the dispute is limited to מטיל מום בבעל מום.
  • The *Gemara* grounds רבי מאיר’s position in reading כל מום לא יהיה בו as inclusive, using the word כל to extend the prohibition to adding a *mum* even to an animal that already has a *mum*. The רבנן base their leniency on תמים יהיה לרצון, limiting the prohibition to an animal that is *tamim*, and the *Gemara* presses רבי מאיר with that verse and redirects it away from a congenital בעל מום to פסולי המוקדשין אחר פדיונם, excluding them from the prohibition despite continued restrictions like גיזה ועבודה. The רבנן, in turn, use כל מום to derive an additional prohibition against causing a *mum* through others, such as placing bait so a dog will bite the ear, and the text preserves this as a *derashah* of גרמא in the laws of *mum*.
  • The narrative closes by tying the second half of the *daf* back to the first by explaining that multiple actors can incur liability in the process of *chimutz* of a *minchah* even after a prior act of *chimutz*, and רבי יוחנן parallels that clarity to sequential liability in castration while isolating the uncertainty to sequential *mum* on an already blemished offering. The text reiterates that the earlier extended analysis of “אותו” centers on determining what is excluded from the laws of *tzafon*, culminating in the conclusion that the animal must be in *tzafon* while the *shochet* need not be, and it presents the later *mum* discussion as the continuation of the sugya’s broader theme of layered acts and layered prohibitions.
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