Menachos 58
Summary
- The sugya derives a *lav* for placing onto the *mizbe’ach* parts of offerings that are meant to be eaten, even when only a related component of the broader offering is burned, and it extends key cases to *Shtei HaLechem* and *Lechem HaPanim* through their attachment to other *eishim*-elements. It then frames a dispute about liability for placing such items on the *kevesh*, limits and expands the scope of “*osam*” and “*korban reishit*,” and develops the *derashot* of “*kol*” and “*ki*” to include partial measures and mixtures. The text continues with a *machloket* about how many sets of *malkot* apply to a mixture of *se’or* and *devash*, and it adds later interpretive layers from Rabbi Yosef Engel, the *Shelah*, and the *Zohar* about the status of *Shtei HaLechem* and the spiritual meaning of *kohanim* eating *kodashim* as “*miShulchan Gavoha kazchu*.”
- The *beraita* lists *basar chatat*, *basar asham*, other *Kodshei Kodashim* such as *zivchei shalmei tzibbur* including *kivsei Atzeret*, as well as *Kodashim Kalim*, *motar haOmer*, *motar Shtei HaLechem*, *Lechem HaPanim*, and *shirei menachot* as cases where placing the eaten portion onto the *mizbe’ach* violates a prohibition. Rashi identifies the “other *Kodshei Kodashim*” as *zivchei shalmei tzibbur* and emphasizes the unusual status of *kivsei Atzeret* as *Kodshei Kodashim*. The prohibition is derived from “כי כל שאור וכל דבש לא תקטירו ממנו אשה לה’,” with the rule “כל שהוא ממנו לאשים הרי הוא בבל תקטירו,” so that any offering with some component destined for the altar generates a *lav* for burning its other parts.
- The *gemara* challenges the inclusion of *Shtei HaLechem* and *Lechem HaPanim* because a *beraita* describes them as “שאין מהם לאשים.” Rav Sheshet answers “אין מגופו לאשים,” distinguishing between having no altar-component from the bread itself and still being linked to an altar-service through an attached element. The text treats *Shtei HaLechem* as bound by *zika* to the *kivsei Atzeret* and related communal offerings, and it treats *Lechem HaPanim* as coming with the *bazichei levonah* that are burned. The resolution holds that they lack “*migufo*” to the altar while still fitting “*minhu*” in the broader unit of sacrifice.
- The *amora’im* dispute whether one who brings these items up onto the *kevesh* violates the *lav* even without placing them on the fire. Rabbi Yochanan obligates based on “ואל המזבח לא יעלו לריח ניחוח,” reading “*hamizbe’ach*” to include the *kevesh*. Rabbi Elazar exempts for the expanded list and confines the inclusion of the *kevesh* to explicit *se’or* and *devash*, using “קרבן ראשית תקריבו אותם” and reading “אותם” as a limitation that blocks extending the *kevesh* rule to all items learned only through “כל שממנו לאישים.”
- The *gemara* asks how Rabbi Yochanan uses “אותם” if not as a limitation, and it answers that he applies it to a *beraita* excluding voluntary versions of these offerings. The text states “ציבור אמרתי לך ולא יחיד,” allowing the communal *Shtei HaLechem* but denying a private individual the ability to donate an analogous offering under “מוצא שפתיך תשמור.” It then rejects even a communal voluntary analogue by using “אותם” to restrict it to that singular mandated form. The text adds “ושתי הלחם והביכורים מן הדבש” as permitted in their ordained frameworks while excluding recreations as *nedavah*.
- A *beraita* argues that if the Torah had amplified only one of *se’or* or *devash*, the other could not be derived because each has a distinctive *kula*. The text states “שאור הותר מכללו במקדש” while “דבש לא הותר מכללו במקדש,” and it also states “דבש הותר בשירי מנחות” while “שאור לא הותר בשירי מנחות.” The *gemara* asks what “*hutar miklalo*” for *se’or* refers to and initially tests whether it points to *Shtei HaLechem* in a way that would imply optional analogues. Rav Amram answers that it refers to the actual mandated *Shtei HaLechem* that accompanies other sacrificial components rather than a fabricated *nedavah*.
- The text challenges Rav Amram’s framing by asserting that *devash* should also be “*hutar miklalo*” through *bikkurim* and the offerings brought with them, citing a *mishnah* about “הגוזלות שעל גבי הסלים” being offered while the baskets go to the *kohanim*. The response distinguishes the linkage of *Shtei HaLechem* to *kivsei Atzeret* as a true bond of *zika* and a *matir* relationship, while the birds that accompany *bikkurim* are described as “תנו לאתויי ביכורים הוא דאתו” without that sacrificial attachment. The conclusion maintains that *Shtei HaLechem* uniquely qualifies as *se’or* “*hutar miklalo*” in the *Mikdash*.
- Rami bar Chama asks Rav Chisda about one who places *basar chatat ha’of* on the *mizbe’ach*, since *chatat ha’of* has no intrinsic portion burned. The question turns on whether the rule depends on “כל שממנו לאישים” or on “כל ששמו קרבן,” supported by the adjacent phrasing “קרבן ראשית.” Rav Chisda answers that “כל ששמו קרבן” suffices, and the *gemara* aligns this with a *machloket tanna’im* between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva. Rav Chisda identifies *basar chatat ha’of* as the *nafka mina*, while Rava bar Rav points to *log shemen shel metzora*, supported by “תני לוי כל קרבנך לרבות לוג שמן של מצורע.”
- The text explains that extending the *lav* to the *kevesh* fits because placing an item onto the *kevesh* is treated as the beginning of *haktarah* rather than a mere preparatory act. It ties this to the language “הולכת איברים לכבש” and to the principle “אין לינה מועלת בראש המזבח,” presenting Rav Chaim Brisker’s analysis that *haktarah* begins upon reaching the altar domain. It cites *Targum Onkelos* on “ולא ילין חלב חגי עד בוקר” as “ולא יבית בר מן מדבחא,” reading the plain translation as defining *lina* through being left off the altar. The conclusion treats the *kevesh* as part of the altar’s sphere, so the *lav* can attach already at that initial stage.
- A further *beraita* derives liability for partial quantities from “כל” and for mixtures from “כי כל.” Abaye interprets the baseline measure as a *kezayit* and the partial as *chatzi zayit*, while Rava interprets the baseline as a *kometz* and the partial as *chatzi kometz*. The dispute turns on whether “יש קומץ פחות משני זיתים” or “אין קומץ פחות משני זיתים,” and it also implicates whether *haktarah* can be less than a *kezayit*. The text flags this as a major point for continuation and notes that Rava’s position implies a *kometz* of at least two *zeitim*.
- An *amoraic* dispute addresses one who offers a mixture of *se’or* and *devash* on the altar. Rava assigns four sets of *malkot*: for *se’or*, for *devash*, and for “עירובי שאור” and “עירובי דבש.” Abaye rejects that structure with “אין לוקין על לאו שבכללות,” treating the inclusion derived from “כי” as a composite prohibition that does not generate separate lashes. The text reports two versions of Abaye’s outcome, with one allowing an additional single set and another denying lashes for the inclusive component because it is not “מיוחד” like “לא תחסום שור בדישו.”
- Rabbi Yosef Engel in *Yosef Ometz* סימן מג quotes the *Shelah haKadosh* that on *Shavuot* “חמץ ומצה” are brought and that “והחמץ והמצה קרבין יחד על גבי המזבח,” and he notes the difficulty because *Shtei HaLechem* is eaten by *kohanim* and not burned. He then cites the *Zohar* describing “מקרבין חמץ לאוקדא על מדבחא” and uses the day’s *gemara* about *Shtei HaLechem* being “כל שהוא ממנו לאשים” through its *zika* to *kivsei Atzeret* as a basis to frame the *Zohar*’s language. He offers a deeper formulation that the *hakravah* of *kivsei Atzeret* renders the *Shtei HaLechem* as if it has an altar-standing in the halakhic definition, matching the idea that it is “אין מגופו לאשים” yet still classified within “ממנו לאשים.”
- Rabbi Yosef Engel in *Gevurot Shemonim* develops a separate line about *Minchat Kena’ot* and the threat that a guilty *sotah* could exploit “בעלים מפגלים” to invalidate the offering and evade the water’s test. He connects this to the rule that *pigul* cannot be generated by thoughts that switch between human consumption and altar consumption, “מאכילת אדם למאכל מזבח וממאכל מזבח למאכל אדם.” He cites the *Zohar* again about *Shavuot* and then grounds a conceptual move in “כהנים משולחן גבוה קזכו,” portraying *akhilat kohanim* of *kodashim* as a form of sharing in the altar’s domain rather than ordinary eating. He argues that when eating is not “משולחן גבוה,” such as a forbidden human act, it lacks that quasi-altar character, which blocks framing the thought as proper *pigul* because it becomes a cross-category intention.
- The text closes with *Mesillat Yesharim* פרק כו describing *kedushah* as transforming physical acts into sacred acts. It cites “אכילת קדשים” as a central example and quotes “כהנים אוכלים ובעלים מתכפרים” to show how eating can function within *avodah* and *kaparah*. It states that the *kadosh* becomes “כמשכן, כמקדש, וכמזבח,” and it frames this as a lens for understanding how *akhilah* in the world of *kodashim* can carry an altar-like significance. The narrative aligns this theme with the earlier *Zohar* language about “bringing chametz” by treating the *kohanim*’s sacred eating as bound to the altar’s reality.
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